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The impact of credit default swaps on corporate capital structure  
and investment policies 
 
Chunrong Wang, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2020 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are credit derivatives whose primary purposes include 
hedging and the trading of credit risks. Unlike other derivatives, such as options or futures, CDSs 
materially alter lender-borrower relations and thus have real economic effects on the companies 
referenced by the CDSs. In this thesis, I explore the impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital, 
corporate capital structure, and corporate social responsibility.  
First, I use the universe of U.S. public firms to examine the impact of CDS trading on a 
firm’s cost of capital during the period 2001 – 2018. My results robustly show that the inception 
of CDSs causes a significant reduction in a firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
Further analyses reveal that highly levered firms tend to reduce their debt weight, while firms with 
low leverage increase their usage of debt. Moreover, CDS referenced firms adjust their debt types 
by using more arm-length debts, while they simultaneously decrease the usage of revolving credits 
and term loans from banks. The alteration in capital financing choices may be ascribed to the 
improved information environment and reflects the fact that CDS trading increases debt 
renegotiation costs but simultaneously also reduces capital supply-side frictions. 
IV 
 
After confirming that CDS can impact firms’ financing decisions, I further investigate 
whether CDS trading can affect a company’s investment in corporate social and environmental 
activities. A longitudinal sample spanning from 2002 to 2017 across 11 countries and regions was 
constructed to evaluate the impact. I find that the inception of CDS trading causes a significant 
reduction in the metric of environmental emission reduction. In addition, the initiation of CDS 
trading weakly but negatively influences other aspects of CDS firms’ social and environmental 
performance. Further analysis reveals that investments in emission reduction activities have no 
relationship to shareholder value creation, whereas engaging in CSR activities related to, e.g., 
employee, community, or eco-product innovation, etc., increases shareholder wealth. Collectively, 
my findings reveal one of the downsides of CDSs arising from CDS-protected lenders who become 






















I would like to gratefully and sincerely thank my supervisors, Dr. Thomas Walker and Dr. 
Harjeet Bhabra for their excellent guidance and encouragement. I have learned so much from them 
and am honoured to have had the opportunity to work with them throughout my Ph.D. education 
at Concordia University.  
I also would like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Pascal François from HEC 
Montreal and Dr. Saif Ullah from Concordia University, the external examiner, Dr. Alexander 
Bassen  from University of Hamburg, the external examiner to program, Dr. Alan Eric Nash from 
Concordia University, and the examination chair, Dr. Mehdi Farashahi from Concordia University. 
I appreciate their valuable comments on my thesis and contributions. 
I am particularly beholden to my wife and son for their unconditional love and support in 
my Ph.D. journey. I also dedicate this dissertation to my parents and sisters who always encourage 
and support me. I would like to thank all my family members and friends for their inspiration and 




Table of Contents 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………...IX 
CHAPTER ONE ……………………………………………………………..……………..1 
Introduction………………………………………………..……………………………..…..1 
CHAPTER TWO……………………………………………………..…….………….……5 
Credit Default Swaps and the Cost of Capital……………………………………….……….5 
1. Introduction……………………………………...…………………………………………5 
2. Sample data, variables, and summary statistics……………………………………………18 
    2.1 Data sources and sample construction…………………………………………………18 
    2.2 Variables……………………………………………………………………………….21 
        2.2.1 Dependent variables………………………………………….……………………21 
        2.2.2 Independent variables……………………………………………………………..22 
        2.2.3 Control variables……………………………………………………….………….23 
2.3 Sample characteristics………………………………………………………………….26 
3. Methodology and empirical results………………………………………………………...29 
3.1 Baseline specification………………………….……………………………………….29 
3.2 Empirical results………………………………………………………………………..30 
3.3 Cost of equity: high- and low-rated firms………………………………………………33 
4. Robustness tests…………………………………………………………………………….36 
4.1 The reversal of CDS contracts………………………………………………………….37 
4.2 Alternative of Bloomberg WACC…………………………………………...…………38 
4.3 Propensity score matching (PSM) sample…………………………………………...…39 
4.4 Multivariate estimation of PSM samples……………………………………………….42 
4.5 CDS sample test………………………………………………………………………...42 
4.6 CDS trading liquidity test……………………………………………………………….45 
4.7 Monte Carlo simulation test…………………………………………………………….46 
4.8 The first difference sample test…………………………………………………………47 
5. Debt structure and WACC………………………………………………………………….49 
VII 
 
5.1 CDS firms’ information environment…………………………………………………..51 
5.2 Substitute debt for equity security………………………………………………………52 
5.3 Debt placement structure post-CDS trading…………………………………………….55 
6. Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………….59 
CHAPTER THREE…………………………………………………………………………..62 
Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Social Responsibility……………………………………62 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….62 
2. Sample Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics……………………………………………68 
2.1 Sample selection and data………………………………………………………………..68 
2.2 Variables…………………………………………………………………………………70 
    2.2.1 Dependent variables…………………………………………………………………70 
    2.2.2 Independent variables……………………………………………………………….72 
    2.3.3 Control variables…………………………………………………………………….73 
2.3 Summary statistics……………………………………………………………………….77 
3. Methodology and Empirical Results………………………………………………………...78 
3.1 Baseline specification……………………………………………………………………78 
3.2 Empirical results…………………………………………………………………………79 
4. Robustness Tests………………………………………………….………………………….82 
4.1 Propensity score matched (PSM) sample………………………………………….……..82 
4.2 Multivariate test based on the control-treated samples…………………………………..85 
4.3 Event study……………………………………………………………………………….86 
4.4 CDS initiation during the financial crisis period………………………………………...87 
4.5 Monte Carlo simulation of CDS initiation events……………………………………….88 
4.6 Subsample tests………………………………………………………………………….89 












List of Tables 
Tables for Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 Sample distribution and firm-level statistics……………………………………….117 
Table 2.2 The relationships between CDS trading and the cost of capital……………………120 
Table 2.3 The quantile regressions of WACC on CDS trading……………………………….121 
Table 2.4 The relationships between CDS trading and the cost of capital based on high- and low-
rated firms……………………………………………………………………………………...122 
Table 2.5 The relationships between CDS trading and the cost of capital based on high and low 
default probability……………………………………………………………………………..123 
Table 2.6 Probit regression results on the probability of CDS trading initiation……………..124 
Table 2.7 Comparison of control-treated firms’ characteristics………………………………125 
Table 2.8 The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using PSM samples…………….126 
Table 2.9 The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using CDS firms………………..127 
Table 2.10 The impact of CDS trading on cost of capital using trading liquidity…………….128 
Table 2.11 The distribution of coefficient estimates of CDSINIT with randomized CDS-trade-
initiation events (1,000 replications)………………….…………………………………….…129 
Table 2.12 The cost of capital and CDS trading initiation based on the first difference         
sample………………………………………………………………………………………....130 
Table 2.13 Stock analysts and CDS trading…………………………………………………..131 
Table 2.14 The relationships between CDS trading and weight of capital……………………132 
Table 2.15 The relationships between CDS trading and security issuance……………………133 
Table 2.16 CDS trading and debt placement……………………………………………...…..134 
Table 2.17 Cost of capital and debt compositions…………………………………………….136 
Online Table A1. The effects of the termination of CDS trading on WACC…………………137 
Online Table A2. The sensitivity tests of Bloomberg WACCs…………………………...…..138 
Online Table A3. The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using PSM            
samples……………………………………………………………………………………..…139 
Online Table A4. The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using CDS                
firms…………………………………………………………………………………………..140 
Online Table A5. The cost of debt and CDS trading based on the first difference………..…141 
X 
 
Online Table A6. Probit regression with the cost of capital as inputs……………….….……143 
Online Table A7.  The relationships between CDS trading and market and book leverage 
ratio……………………………………………………………………..……………..………144 
Online Table A8. CDS trading and debt heterogeneity as per high and low default probability 
subsamples………………………………………………………………………….…….…...145 
Online Table A9.  The relationships between CDS trading and bank loans………….……….146 
Online Table A10. The relationships between CDS trading and weight of capital controlling 
leverage……………………………………………………………………………….……….147 
Table for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics………………………………………………………….………148 
Table 3.2 The effects of CDS trading on environmental and social performance……….……151 
Table 3.3 Emission reductions and SG&A expenses………………………………….………153 
Table 3.4 Probit regression results on probability of CDS trading initiation…………….……154 
Table 3.5 . Comparison of control-treated firms’ characteristics prior to the inception of CDS 
trading………………………………………………………………………………….………155 
Table 3.6 The impact of CDS trading on E&S performance using PSM samples……….……156 
Table 3.7 Average cumulative differentials of ENER surrounding CDS initiation with different 
event windows…………..………………………………………………………………….….158 
Table 3.8 The effects of CDS trade initiation over the crisis period………………….….…….159 
Tablr 3.9 The distribution of estimated coefficients of CDSINIT with randomized CDS trade 
initiation events (2,000 replications)………………………………………………………..….160 
Table 3.10 Regression results of various subsamples………………………………….………161 
Table 3.11 Regressions of SG&A expenses on various E&S scores and controls………….….162 












CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
Credit default swap (CDS) is an insurance-like credit derivative contract in which  CDS sellers 
compensate CDS buyers when the underlying entity referenced by CDS triggers prespecified credit 
events (e.g., bankruptcy, payment default, restructuring, etc.) over a fixed contract period. Since 
its initiation in the late 1990s, the CDS market has grown exponentially over its first decade. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the gross notation amount of CDS reached 
$17 trillion at the end of 2005, a 95-fold increase compared to its level at the end of 1997, and 
peaked at $62.2 trillion in 2007. While the CDS market has gradually shrunk over the post-
financial crisis period, the notional amount of CDS has remained flat at around $10 trillion since 
2016 (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2019). Given the importance of CDS in 
financial markets, it is crucial to quantify the real effects of CDS trading on the economy. 
Unlike other derivative contracts (e.g., future, forward, etc.), CDS can materially alter the 
relationships between the borrowers (e.g., companies) and lenders (e.g., banks, insurance 
companies) (Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) because CDSs grant insured lenders 
an alternative option in case of debt renegotiation or restructuring, i.e., when borrowers default, 
CDS sellers reimburse lenders. Hence, the protected lenders become less accommodating over 
debt renegotiation. Furthermore, insured lenders have shifted the credit risk of borrowers to CDS 
sellers. Therefore, lenders may shirk their monitoring efforts on the borrowers because they cannot 
extract the same level of benefits from monitoring as before.  
The alteration in the lender-borrower relationship consequently changes the incentives of the firms’ 
decision-makers and thus has real economic effects on corporate policies and activities. 




conservative accounting standard (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015), further voluntarily 
disclosing corporate public information (Kim et al., 2018), enhanced corporate innovation (Chang 
et al., 2019), and more. However, no research has been developed on the influence of CDS trading 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given the fact that modern businesses and communities 
have embraced CSR with open arms, evidenced by the tremendous fund managed with CSR 
metrics (see the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, 2018 Facts), it is meaningful 
to fill in this gap.  
Furthermore, empirical researches on how CDS affects a firm’s investment activities, and thus its 
value, have reached mixed results. For example, Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018b) find a decline 
in firm value after CDS trading, while Danis and Gamb (2018) conclude that a firm’s value 
increases once CDSs refer its debt. To address this controversy, I assess the overall benefits and 
costs induced by CDS trading by analyzing the impact of CDSs on firms’ weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC). I use WACC instead of Tobin’q to indirectly measure the influence of CDS 
trading on a firm’s value because scholars have challenged Tobin’q as a proxy of a firm’s value 
(Bartlett and Partnoy, 2018) and WACC is determined by the capital markets. As a result, WACC 
reflects the market participants’ opinions on the risk of the focal firm. If CDS trading brings more 
costs than benefits to a CDS firm, thus increasing the firm’s risk, we would observe an increase in 
WACC. The reverse is true as well.  
I explore the effects of CDS trading on WACC in Chapter 2. I construct a panel sample using the 
universe of US companies from Compustat over 2001 - 2018 to conduct my tests. To assess the 
impact of CDSs on corporate capital structure, I also obtain debt compositions from Capital IQ. 




5,575 firms, of which 8,597 firm-year observations belong to 677 CDS firms, and 40,253 firm-
year observations come from 4,898 non-CDS firms.  
With the large sample, I find strong statistical evidence that CDS trading brings more benefits than 
costs to the focal firm and causes a significant reduction in WACC. The estimated coefficient is -
23.9 basis points (BPs) and is significant at the 1% level. In an economic sense, the decline of -
23.9 BPs in WACC is equivalent to a decrease of $21.85 million in firm financing costs. 
Furthermore, I also find that CDSs exert diverse effects on firms with different leverage ratios. 
Post-CDS trading, highly levered firms prefer decreasing their debt level, while firms with low 
leverage desire to increase their usage of debt by reducing equity issuances. Such diverse functions 
of CDSs reflect the threatening and credit supply effects of the empty creditors hypothesis.  
I investigate the impact of CDS trading on CSR performance in Chapter 3. I construct a longitude 
sample of globally public companies from eleven countries and regions over the period from 2002 
to 2017. The corresponding financial fundamental data was extracted from Worldscope. I measure 
the companies’ CSR performance with Thomson Reuters ASSET4 environmental and social (E&S) 
scores. After removing all lost data, my final sample has 23,901 firm-year observations from 3,383 
firms.  
By employing a multivariate panel regression and controlling firm-year fixed effects, I find robust 
evidence that CDS trading significantly and negatively impact a firm’s environmental emission 
reduction activities. The estimated coefficient of CDS trading is -4.9%, with a p-value of 0.065. 
To obtain an economic sense of the decline in emission reduction, I regress selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses on emission reduction score, and then convert the decline into 
an absolute dollar amount. I find that, on average, CDS firms cut their investment on environmental 




expenses of CDS firms. I also find that CDS trading negatively but weakly affects other CSR 
performance. I use several robustness tests to verify my findings, including propensity score 
matching, event study, Monte Carlo simulation, and various subsamples tests. All analyses 






Credit Default Swaps and the Cost of Capital 
 
1. Introduction 
Credit default swaps (CDSs)1 are credit derivatives whose primary purposes include hedging and 
the trading of credit risks. Unlike other derivatives, such as options or futures, CDSs materially 
alter lender-borrower relations (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) and thus have real economic effects 
on the companies referenced by the CDSs. Empirical studies have revealed both dark and bright 
sides of CDSs, e.g., reducing frictions on the capital supply side (Saretto and Tookes, 2013) and 
increasing the bankruptcy risk of referenced firms (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017). In this study, 
I aim to evaluate the overall costs and benefits of CDSs on the economy by investigating whether 
the introduction of CDSs can induce a change in a company’s weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC). In addition, I explore the channels through which CDSs drive the changes in a firm’s 
WACC.   
A firm’s WACC plays a critical role in business decisions (such as mergers and acquisitions). To 
maximize shareholder wealth, the executives of the focal firm strive to stretch the spread between 
the WACC and the expected returns of investment opportunities, by either reducing the WACC or 
increasing expected returns. An investment is typically only undertaken if the expected return 
exceeds the minimum cost of capital a firm can obtain in the capital markets. As such, the WACC 
reflects the beliefs of market participants (i.e., capital suppliers) regarding the risk of the focal 
 
1 Credit default swaps are credit derivatives that compensate CDS buyers (e.g., corporate bond holders, speculators, 
etc.) via lump sum contractual payments in case of prespecified credit events (e.g., restructuring, payment default, or 
bankruptcy) occurring over a predetermined period. In exchange for the insurance reimbursement, the buyers need 
to make periodic payments to the seller. A CDS is labeled a single-name CDS if it references the debt of a single 




company. Arguably, if the benefits of CDSs outweigh their costs for the focal company, market 
participants will lower their required return which will result in a lower WACC for the company. 
Conversely, an increase in the WACC implies that the costs of CDSs outweigh their benefits and 
thus cause an increase in risk and investors’ required rate of return. In this regard, changes in a 
firm’s WACC following the introduction of a CDS provide us with a barometer of the effects of 
CDS trading for a given firm. 
A large body of literature examines the externalities induced by CDSs on referenced firms by 
studying how they affect the firms’ behaviours and/or policies (e.g., Fung et al., 2012; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015; Batta et al., 2016; Danis, 
2016; Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2018a, 2018c; Fuller at al., 2018; Kim et al., 2018; Batta and 
Yu, 2019; and Chang et al., 2019). For instance, Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) examine 
whether the introduction of CDSs causes firms to change their financial reporting practices. My 
study is different from prior studies in that it evaluates the overall effects of CDSs. As such, my 
study is close to the prior papers by Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018b) and Danis and Gamb 
(2018), both of which examine the influence of CDSs on firm value. Interestingly, the two studies 
reach contradictory conclusions. Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018b) use Tobin’s q to proxy firm 
values and observe a decline in firm value following the inception of CDS trading, while Danis 
and Gamb (2018) use simulated US corporation data and document an increase in firm value. My 
study will address this controversy by analyzing how CDSs affect firms’ WACC. An increase in 
WACC will suggest a decrease in the firm’s value and vice versa. 
My research is related to studies that examine the impact of CDS trading on loan and/or bond 
spreads (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Hirtle, 2009; Shim and Zhu, 2014; Kim, 2016; Amiram 




mechanisms through which CDSs affect bond and loan costs. However, it is evident that bond and 
loan instruments are only a few methods that firms use to raise capital. Public companies generally 
employ various types of debt (e.g., syndicated facilities, term loans, revolving credits, and bonds) 
to attract investors (Rauh and Sufi, 2010; Colla et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important to examine 
the impact of CDSs on the overall cost of capital of a firm. 
My empirical analyses of the effects of CDSs stem from the theoretical contribution of Hu and 
Black (2008) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011). These theorists point out that CDS trading can lead 
to empty creditor issues2 which have both positive and negative effects for CDS referenced firms 
(hereafter, CDS firms). In terms of negative effects, they hypothesize that CDSs grant insured 
lenders3 improved bargaining power over ex-post debt renegotiations. Thus, those lenders become 
less accommodating in out-of-court debt workouts. Furthermore, overly insured lenders may have 
less or even no interest in the continuation of distressed companies, because if the CDS firm goes 
bankrupt, they can get compensation from CDS sellers, provided that the overall payoff (i.e., the 
payoffs generated by the CDSs plus the recovery value of debt) from the bankruptcy is greater 
than that from a compromise in debt renegotiations. Consequently, CDS trading increases the 
likelihood of bankruptcy and causes inefficient liquidation for distressed corporations.  
CDS trading lays a variety of costs on CDS firms by introducing additional frictions into debt 
renegotiations. For example, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) find a substantial increase in the 
likelihood of both bankruptcy and rating downgrading after the emergence of CDS markets. Facing 
 
2 Empty creditors are buyers who have largely or fully decoupled their debt-related cash flows and control rights by 
buying a disproportionate number of CDSs. 
3 We use CDS protected lenders, insured lenders, lenders, creditors, or CDS buyers interactively. All of them are 
corporate debt holders who purchase CDS contracts to protect their risk exposure rather than speculators whose 
main interest is to profit from fluctuations in the credit risk of referenced firms. The existence of speculators can 
enhance the liquidity of the CDS markets and facilitate transactions in the markets but may not alter the lender-




a heightened risk after CDS trading, capital suppliers will usually demand higher returns on their 
investment. Consistent with this finding regarding the increased risk, Narayanan and Uzmanoglu 
(2018b) provide evidence that CDS initiation accompanies an increase in the cost of equity. 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) find that CDS firms significantly increase cash holdings and conclude 
that such a conservative liquidity policy adopted by CDS firms results from the threatening effects 
of tougher lenders. Such an increase in cash holdings could promote extra agency costs (Jensen, 
1986) and suboptimal investment and eventually destroy shareholders’ wealth (Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006). Furthermore, Danis (2016) finds a significant lower participation rate of distressed 
exchange offer among CDS firms in contrast to the rate among non-CDS firms. Narayanan and 
Uzmanoglu (2018a) find that CDS firms face a holdout problem caused by CDS protected 
bondholders engaging in distressed exchanges. The lower participation rate or holdout problem 
would eventually halt the debt workout. Ultimately, shareholders would bear these costs caused 
by CDS protected bondholders.  
The risk hedging role of CDSs could also bring in costs to referenced firms because CDS protected 
lenders have relatively less motivation to actively monitor borrowers (Morrison, 2005; Ashcraft 
and Santos, 2009; Parlour and Winton, 2013; Shan et al., 2016; Amiram et al., 2017; Kim et al., 
2018). By using CDSs, the lenders transfer credit risks of referenced entities to CDS sellers, hence 
not achieving the same level of gains with the same level of monitoring efforts as before. 
Empirical studies find a series of evidence that lenders’ weakened monitoring efforts would 
increase the business costs of CDS firms. For example, the bond spreads of riskier firms increase 
after CDS trading (Ashcraft and Santo, 2009). The reason lies with the lost benefits from banking 
monitoring, such as mitigating adverse selection and moral hazards, which exceed the potential 




monitoring intensifies the conflict interests between managers and shareholders and incurs agency 
costs in the form of additional managerial perquisites. Amiram et al. (2017) provide direct 
evidence of an increase in the syndicated loan spreads after CDS trading. They argue that because 
CDSs reduce the effectiveness of lead arrangers’ shares in syndicated loans, which originally serve 
as the device to mitigate the information asymmetry between the lead arranger and syndicate 
members, lead arrangers must retain larger share of loans than before to validate their continuous 
efforts in monitoring borrowers, which in turn increase the loan spread. Furthermore, Martin and 
Roychowdhury (2015) show that CDS trade initiation results in a decline in borrowing firms’ 
reporting conservatism. Kim et al. (2018) demonstrate that the executives of CDS firms voluntarily 
disclose more public information (such as earning forecasts) after CDS trading because 
shareholders intend to make up for the reduced monitoring efforts of creditors and hence demand 
more information to monitor the firm. The decrease in reporting conservatism can increase 
business risks and the disclosure of firms’ information can incur additional business costs as well. 
I have discussed heretofore negative effects arising from CDS trading, but researchers have also 
found evidence of the positive effects of CDS trading. In their theoretical model, Bolton and 
Oehmke (2011) argue that CDSs could serve as a commitment device for borrowers to avoid 
strategically debt defaults. Therefore, CDS trading can help solve the limited-commitment 
problems of debt contracts when borrowers’ commitment is not verifiable and thus unenforceable. 
Furthermore, the availability of CDS offers a new channel through which banks can efficiently 
move their credit risk to CDS sellers and free up more capital originally tied to borrowers with 
high credit risk4 (Shan et al., 2016).  
 
4 A bank can purchase CDSs to protect its credit risk exposures to risky borrowers, and then the bank can replace the 
credit risk of borrowers (usually high) by the CDS seller’s credit risk (usually pretty low). By doing so, the bank can 




Such commitment and risk hedging functions of CDSs can reduce the frictions on credit supply 
sides and make insured lenders more willing to extend their credits, reduce the charged interest 
rate, and use fewer covenants and collaterals (Shan et al., 2019). Empirical studies find solid 
evidence to support these risk hedging and commitment effects. For instance, Ashcraft and Santos 
(2009) provide evidence that the spreads of bonds and bank loans decrease for high credit and 
informationally transparent firms. Using Asian bond data, Shim and Zhu (2014) reach a similar 
conclusion as Ashcraft and Santos (2009). Kim (2016) finds that bond spreads are significantly 
reduced, particularly for firms having a higher likelihood of strategic default. Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) provide evidence that CDS firms increase their leverage ratios and debt maturity comparing 
to non-CDS firms after the initiation of CDSs. Likewise, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) also find a 
significant increase in CDS firms’ leverage over post-CDS periods.  
While the above studies focus on the impact of CDS trading from the borrowers’ perspective, other 
studies have examined the issue from the lenders’ perspective. For example, Hirtle (2009) finds 
evidence that banks actively hedging risk with credit derivatives increase the maturity and volume 
of their term loans to larger and creditworthy referenced companies, implying an increased credit 
supply after CDS trading. Like Hirtle (2009), Shan et al. (2016) show that banks using CDS as a 
risk hedging mechanism supply more capital and provide larger loans than banks that do not hedge 
with CDSs. Moreover, Norden et al. (2014) find consistent evidence that banks actively hedging 
business risk with CDSs not only supply more credits, but also pass benefits from risk management 
to the entire portfolio of borrowers by lowering interest rate spreads. The increased supply of credit 
 
deemed to have zero risk) and still comply with regulatory capital requirement. Therefore, the bank can have more 




can enhance the firms’ financial flexibility and reduce their financial constraints, ultimately 
promoting economic growth.  
CDSs also benefit firms by improving their information environment (Stulz, 2010; Berndt and 
Ostrovnaya, 2014). The major participants in CDS markets are banks and financial institutions that 
usually generate loans to borrowers, and thus gather the borrowers’ private information (Acharya 
and Johnson, 2007; Flannery et al., 2010; Norden et al., 2014; Ivanon et al., 2016; Norden, 2017). 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that significant information incrementally revealed in CDS 
markets flows into equity markets, implying the existence of private information in CDS markets. 
Batta et al. (2016) find that the quality of analysts’ forecasts has been significantly improved after 
CDS trading. They conclude that CDS trading reveals the informed traders’ privileged information 
to equity markets. Liu et al. (2019) argue that CDS trading reduces the probability of stock price 
crashes for referenced firms, in that CDS traders incorporate into spreads the bad news that 
reference firms’ executives suppress. With an enhanced information environment, the role of 
banks to produce information becomes less critical to CDS companies. Therefore, CDS firms may 
change their financing choices and debt priorities. I test this hypothesis in this study. 
While I illuminate both positive and negative effects of CDS trading on firms, I specify that the 
functions of CDSs are complex and need to be analyzed case by case. For instance, though I discuss 
how loosened monitoring efforts can incur costs, the decreased monitoring may have positive 
effects on referenced firms as well. Chang et al. (2019) find that CDSs promote technological 
innovations because of CDS firms’ risk-taking activities resulting from lenders’ loosened 
monitoring. Shan et al. (2019) find that lenders adopt less stringent covenants and collateral 
requirements on new loans if there has been CDS trading in the borrowers’ debts. They suggest 




is costly to the lender. Using CDSs for strict covenants and collaterals may improve loan contract 
efficiency for both lenders and borrowers, and thus may have positive effects on CDS firms.  
As a result, CDS trading gives rise to both costs and benefits to the referenced companies. The 
costs from increasing frictions of renegotiation as a result of exacting effects of CDSs and from 
insufficient monitoring due to risk hedging can cause capital suppliers to demand higher required 
returns, thus escalating business costs. On the contrary, the benefits arising from decreasing 
frictions in credit supply (as a consequence of risk shifting and commitment effects of CDSs), as 
well as the improved information environment resulting from price discovery role of CDSs, can 
drive down the required returns of capital suppliers and enhance shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, 
the overall effects of CDS trading on the WACC rely on the tension between the two contrary 
forces on the referenced firms and must be investigated empirically.  
To explore the effects of CDS trading on WACC, I construct a panel sample using the universe of 
US companies from Compustat from 2001 to 2018. I collect CDS data from Markit and then 
manually match CDS firms with Compustat firms according to Markit Reference Entity Database 
(RED) and LexisNexis. I obtain debt compositions from Capital IQ and the cost of capital data 
from Bloomberg. My final sample contains 48,850 firm-year observations from 5,575 firms. Using 
this large dataset, I find strong evidence that CDS trading causes a significant reduction in the 
WACC for CDS firms across samples and estimation measures. The estimated coefficient of -23.9 
basis points (BPS) on CDS initiation based on the firm-year fixed framework is significant at the 
1% level. This decrease in the WACC is not only statistically significant, but also economically 
meaningful. With the average capital provided by equity and debt holders ($9.143 billion), this 
decrease in WACC is equivalent to a decline of $21.85 million in firm costs. To substantiate my 




My finding on the cost of equity is not straightforward, as the estimation suggests that CDSs either 
increase or have no effects on the cost of equity. Prior studies suggest that larger and transparent 
firms may further benefit from CDS trading, while CDSs may be detrimental to riskier firms or 
firms subject to asymmetric information (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Hirtle, 2009). I conjecture 
that CDS trading has contrary effects on the shareholders of riskier and safer firms. To examine 
my hypothesis, I categorize firms with a rate of above BBB+ into the high-rated group and the rest 
into the low-rated group. The estimates from the high-rated sample indicate that high-rated firms 
enjoy more benefits from the reduced cost of equity. In contrast, low-rated firms realize benefits 
from the reduction of the cost of debt, but in the meantime their investors demand higher returns 
on the cost of equity after CDS trading. To substantiate my findings, I segment firms into three 
groups based on Bloomberg five-year predicted default probability. I re-estimate my baseline 
model with subsamples that have a low and high default probability, respectively. The results from 
subsamples with high and low default probability are consistent with those from subsamples with 
high and low credit quality. 
To substantiate my conclusions, I re-estimate my baseline model with a dummy variable that 
indicates the termination of CDS trading. If the initiation of CDS trading can bring more positive 
effects on firms than negative effects so that I see a decrease in the WACC, then I should observe 
an increase in the WACC due to the cessation of CDSs. I find a significant and positive estimate 
on CDS reversal variable, validating my conjecture and conclusions from main sample. I further 
use an alternate of Bloomberg WACC, the empirical WACC (EWACC) which use rolling 
windows regression of net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) on total capital, in my baseline 
model. The consistent estimates using EWACCs as dependent variable indicate that my results are 




I also use several standard econometric mechanisms to validate my results. To address sample 
selection bias and endogeneity concerns, I construct propensity score marching (PSM) samples. 
The results from various PSM samples are in line with my prior results. To fully eliminate the 
sample selection concerns, I estimate the baseline model with CDS firms only. I observe negative 
and significant estimates on the CDS initiation when using the cost of debt as the dependent 
variable, consistent with my main sample results. I further introduce variables to control the level 
of strategic default incentives and find results consistent with Kim (2016). The cost of capital 
significantly declines for firms vulnerable to strategic default. 
My tests are subject to reverse causality concerns. It may be the case that investors anticipate the 
reduction in the cost of capital and consequently initiate CDSs to profit from the anticipated 
reduction of CDS spreads in the future. To address the reverse causality and further validate my 
results, I construct the first difference samples and test the baseline model on them. The results 
validate my main sample tests. I use the CDS initiation as the dependent variable and regress it on 
the changes in the various measures of the cost of capital. I find insignificant coefficients on the 
changes of various capital costs, indicating that there is no reverse causality in my tests. 
The initiations of CDS in my sample have clustered before 2007, and such a cluster creates 
concerns that it is some grouped events that drive the results instead of CDS initiations. To address 
this concern, I follow Bekaert et al. (2005) and Chang et al. (2019) to use a Monte Carlo simulation. 
The results from the simulation indicate that CDS firms and their initiation dates must match. 
Therefore, my results are not subject to event clustering issues. I also use CDS trading liquidity 
variables to substitute for the CDS availability indicator variable. Estimates using CDS daily 




After validating my results with a battery of tests, I study the channels through which CDSs affect 
the WACC. Because the cost of debt is significantly less than that of equity, firms may reduce the 
WACC by using more debt to retire equity financing. I test this conjecture with both firm-fixed 
effects model and quantile regressions. The estimate of regressions of debt weight on CDS 
initiation from firm-fixed effects models is positive and marginally significant at the 10% level, 
suggesting that debt weight of WACC increases after CDS trading. Based on this estimate, it seems 
that managers of CDS firms use more debt in capital mix. However, my empirical findings on debt 
issuance are contrary to this conclusion. The negative and significant estimates from the 
regressions of net debt issuance on CDS initiation indicates that CDS firms do not raise more debt 
post-CDs trading. On the contrary, they reduce the issuance of debt securities. This finding is 
consistent with Batta and Yu (2019) who find a decrease in net debt issuance after CDS trading. 
Therefore, I conclude that it was the emergence of CDS markets that causes an increase in values 
of debt, indicated by a decreased cost of debt.  
In addition, the estimates from quantile regressions indicate that CDSs have contrary effects on 
firms with high and low leverage ratios. Low levered firms significantly increase the usage of debt 
financing after CDS trading. This finding is consistent with Bolton and Oehmke’s (2011) 
hypothesis that CDSs serve as a commitment device and thus increase credit supply to borrowers. 
On the contrary, highly levered firms significantly reduce their debt weight by using more equity 
security. This finding is also in line with Bolton and Oehmke’s (2011) hypothesis that protected 
CDS lenders with improved bargaining power become less accommodating in ex-post debt 
workouts. This threatening effect of CDSs forces firms to reduce the usage of debt financing after 
CDS trading. In equilibrium, the contrary effects of CDSs on debt usage cause a marginal decrease 




By excluding the channel in changing the debt weight to reduce the WACC, managers can also 
reduce the cost of debt to lower the overall cost of capital. Public companies generally use multiple 
types of debt (Colla et al, 2013; Lin et al, 2013). For instance, syndicated facilities, loans, revolving 
credits, and senior or junior bonds and notes are common types of debt instruments employed in 
capital markets. Since distinct types of debt have different required returns, the cost of capital 
depends on the overall borrowing costs from each of the financing sources. Post-CDS trading, the 
cost of capital may increase (or decrease) even though the bond spreads reversely decrease 
(increase). It could be the case that CDS firms substitute bonds for term loans because of the 
emergence of CDS markets, which brings information advantages to firms. Such a substitution can 
alter the firms’ capital structure and the overall cost of debt, hence resulting in a change in WACC.   
To examine the above channel, I first provide evidence that CDS trading improves CDS firms’ 
information environment by showing an increased number of analysts recommending the purchase 
of the CDS firms’ stocks. With less asymmetric information problems, bank debt become less 
attractive to firms than before. Furthermore, the monitoring benefits of bank debt are weakened as 
well. Therefore, I conjecture that firms may substitute public debt for bank debt. I borrow the 
definitions from Lin et al. (2013) for public debt, described as the sum of various bonds, notes, 
and commercial papers, and for bank debts, described as the sum of bank loans, term loans, and 
revolving credits. I test my conjecture by regressing the ratios of each debt category to the total 
debt on CDS initiation. I find negative and significant estimated coefficients for revolving credits. 
Meanwhile, CDS firms significantly increase the weight of arm-length debt, demonstrated by the 
positive and significant  estimates. Finally, I test the relations between the measures of capital 
costs and various debt ratios and find evidence that the cost of debt is significantly and positively 




suggest that it is the substitution of bonds or notes for bank sources of financing that causes a 
decrease in the cost of debt and hence the overall cost of capital.  
Post-CDS trading, CDS firms alter their debt priority to capture the benefits induced by CDS 
trading and avert the costs associated with it. I conjecture that firms use more arm-length debt to 
replace revolving credits to avoid rollover risks. To substantiate my rollover risk explanation on 
the reduction of revolving credits, I re-examine the relation between ratios of revolving credits to 
total debt and CDS initiation with two groups of firms whose default probability lies above the 66% 
quantile and below the 33% quantile, respectively. Looking into the estimated coefficients under 
firm-fixed effects models, I find that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level and has a larger 
magnitude in the sample with higher default probability, compared to the corresponding estimate 
from the whole sample. More importantly, the corresponding estimate from the sample with low 
default probability is not significant at all. Such a sharp contrast in the estimates suggests that firms 
with high risk may run into more rollover risk after CDs trading because of the revolving credits. 
Therefore, firms adjust the usage of them when considering financing choices. 
My study contributes to the growing literature on the effects of CDS trading. Different from prior 
studies that examine one source of financing cost (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Hirtle, 2009; 
Shim and Zhu, 2014; Kim, 2016; Amiram et al., 2017; Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2018c), I 
consider the overall costs and benefits of CDS trading on the economy. My results robustly show 
that the costs of capital are significantly reduced after CDS trading. Furthermore, I show that CDS 
trading exerts contrary effects on firms with high and low credit quality. Equity holders demand 
lower required return in firms with higher credit quality, while shareholders in firms with low 
credit quality require higher returns to compensate their increased risk associated with CDS trading. 




firms with improved information environment prefer arm-length debt to bank debt. Thus, financial 
market innovation, particularly CDS, can affect companies’ debt compositions. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I describe my data sample and summary 
statistics. I present the test methodology and baseline results in section 3, and robustness tests are 
conducted in section 4. I make extra analyses in section 5, and section 6 concludes.  
2. Sample data, variables, and summary statistics 
2.1 Data sources and sample construction 
To construct my research sample, I merge data from several sources, including Compustat, the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Markit Group, Bloomberg, Capital IQ, the 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(13f), I/B/E/S, and Execucomp.  
I start with the universe of US public firms covered by Compustat from 2001 to 2018. Following 
prior studies (e.g., Saretto and Tookes, 2013), I exclude financial firms (such as banks and 
insurance companies, etc.) whose standard industrial classification (SIC) codes are within 6000-
6999. I first merge Compustat and CRSP datasets and require firm-year observations to have 
nonmissing total assets and debt on Compustat. I also drop observations with missing book and 
market values of equity, resulting in a sample of 87,124 firm-year observations from 8,984 firms. 
I draw WACC, cost of debt, and cost of equity from Bloomberg and merge these data with 
Compustat accounting data through International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). 
I start my sample period from 2001 to coincide with the availability of the Markit’s CDS trading 
quotes. Following Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and Amiram et al. (2017), I assign the first trading 




company to the CDS initiation date. I manually match each CDS firm from Markit to Compustat 
firm by using Bloomberg RED tracking events database5  and further validate CDS firms by 
exploring company events from LexisNexis6. Following Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018b), I 
trace a subsidiary that has been inferred by CDSs back to its parent company7. I follow studies 
(Kim et al., 2018; Amiram et al., 2017) to eliminate all CDS firms whose initiation trading dates 
are in January 2001, as there are ambiguities regarding these initiation dates because Markit started 
gathering quotes that month onwards. Finally, I obtain 873 non-financial US public firms who 
have been referenced by CDSs sometimes over the period 2001 to 20178. For all CDS firms whose 
trading dates fall in 2001, I further verify those dates using Bloomberg and do not find invalid ones 
(i.e., the trading dates start before 2001). 
Next, I obtain debt structure variables from Capital IQ database. Capital IQ details corporate debt 
structures in seven categories: commercial paper, revolving credit, bank and term loans, bonds and 
notes, capital lease, trust preferred, and other borrowings. The sources of debt information come 
from SEC fillings (e.g., 10-K, or 10-Q form), corporate financial reports, and press releases. 
Capital IQ collects these debt data several times a year (i.e., quarterly or semi-annually), 
consequently generating multiple inputs for identical issues. To clean up data, I first select data 
 
5 The Bloomberg RED tracking events track CDS firms’ major events (such as merger, spin off, or rename) that may 
interfere with CDS trading. For example, Science Applications International Corporation (SACI) was split into 
Leidos Inc. and a new independent company that retained the SACI name in September 2013. Bloomberg RED 
indicates that Leidos Inc. is the primary successor of the original SACI whose debts are first referenced by CDS 
contracts on March 5th, 2007. Thus, we consider March 5th, 2007 as the trading date for Leidos Inc. and trace Leidos 
to Compustat data rather than SACI. 
6 For instance, 21st Century Fox Inc. was spun off from the News Corporation on June 23rd, 2013. The News 
American Inc., a subsidiary of the original News Corporation, was inferenced by CDSs on February 28 th, 2001. We 
assign the initial CDS trading date of February 28th, 2001 to 21st Century Fox Inc and eliminate the original and new 
News Corporation from CDS sample although the new firm was inferenced by CDSs as well after the split. By 
doing so, we focus only on the impact of the initial CDS trading on firms. 
7 For example, Express Script Inc. was referenced on November 25th, 2005, according to Markit. We trace to its 
parent company, Express Scripts Holding Company, for accounting fundamentals in the Compustat database. 
8 Our CDS data spans from 2001 to 2017, while dependent variables, like WACC or cost of debt, span from 2002 to 




items with last filling or the only filling reports (i.e., FILLINGFLAG_COMPANY = 2 or 3). I also 
restrict reports to those that are the latest instance for the filling date and financial period (i.e., 
LATESTFILINGFORINSTANCEFLAG =1 and LATESTFORFINANCIALPERIODFLAG =1). I further 
remove duplicates by following Choi et al. (2018). For company-year observations, I require 
observations not to have the following identical data items: debt issuing identifier 
(COMPONENTID), debt description (DESCRIPTIONTEXT), principal amount (DATAITEMVALUE), 
maturity (MATURITYHIGH and MATURITYLOW), and interest payment 
(INTERESTRATEHIGHVALUE). Next, I use two approaches to further mitigate the concerns of 
duplicated reports9. For the same company-year observations with the same data item identifiers 
(COMPONENTID), I select the maximum and mean of reported items, respectively. Also, Capital 
IQ records both the maximum amount of revolving credits (debt type 2 in Capital IQ) committed 
by banks and the actual drawn amount by firms. I follow the method of Lou and Otto (2019) to 
remove all observations containing the string ‘Facility’ in the DESCRIPTIONTEXT field, because it 
indicates the maximum available credit to a firm, not the actual used one. Last, I aggregate all 
fined-grained debt components based on their type at an annual frequency. I then merge Capital 
IQ and Compustat/CRSP based on ISIN. 
I extract stock analyst data from Bloomberg and I/B/E/S. Because Bloomberg has more extensive 
coverage than I/B/E/S over my sample period, I use data from the former for my analyses and data 
from the latter for robustness tests. I acquire top executives’ (e.g., CEO, CFO, etc.) stock 
ownership from Execucomp, institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
 
9 Although we remove duplicated reports using the abovementioned approaches, duplicated reports in terms of 
unique debt issues still exist because we amass quarterly items into annual data for debt structure analyses. For 
example, during the 2013 fiscal year, Capital IQ collects debt data for Andeavor Inc. in March, June, September, 
and December, respectively. In each of these reports, the term loan identified by the unique debt issue identifier, 
COMPONENTID = 914786139, has a value of $0m, $499m, $498m, and $398m, respectively in each quarter. It is 




(13f), CDS average daily trading notional and total number of clearing dealers from DTCC, and 
long-term issuer rating data from Standard & Poor’s (S&P), respectively. I integrate those data 
into Compustat sample based on ISIN and retain only the observations that have no missing control 
variables discussed in section 2.2. Besides, following prior studies (e.g., Fuller et al., 2018; 
Colonnello et al., 2019), I exclude firms with zero long-term debt and total assets of less than $10 
million. My final sample contains 48,850 firm-year observations from 5,575 US public firms, of 
which 8,597 firm-year observations belong to 677 CDS firms and 40,253 firm-year observations 
come from 4,898 non-CDS firms10 . Furthermore, 41,077 observations have Capital IQ debt 
structure data from 5,250 firms. In line with prior studies in capital structure, I winsorize all 
accounting variables at the bottom and top one percentile to reduce the influence of potential 
outliers. 
2.2 Variables 
2.2.1 Dependent variables  
I draw WACC data from Bloomberg directly for two reasons: Bloomberg specialists evaluate the 
cost of debt for companies using fair market value (Bloomberg function FMV), and a multitude of 
institutional investors use the Bloomberg platform to refer to the fair values of corporate debt. The 
prevalence of using Bloomberg’s trading platform across the world gives us the confidence that 
Bloomberg WACC reflects the real cost of capital for companies. In detail, I extract the following 
data as my dependent variables: WACC, cost of debt, cost of equity, weight of debt, and weight 
 
10 The actual number of observations may vary in different regressions, depending on the joint availability of control 
variables. For example, when we control marginal tax rate in the baseline regressions, the sample size reduces to 




of equity11. The detailed definitions and computation of these variables can be found in Appendix 
2.2. 
In addition, to measure the influence of CDS trading on corporate debt structure, which may be a 
channel through which CDSs affect a company’s WACC, I construct other explained variables 
from Capital IQ. Particularly, following Lin et al. (2013), I use the ratios of bank debt and public 
debt to total debt as two measures of the preference for debt financing. The bank debt is the sum 
of revolving credits and loans from banks, the public debt is the sum of commercial papers and 
bonds and notes, and the total debt is the sum of all seven types of financing mechanisms 
mentioned above. In addition, I follow Colla et al. (2013) to compute the ratios of each type of 
debt to the total debt and evaluate whether firms prefer a special category of debt funding after 
CDS trading. 
2.2.2 Independent variables 
Following prior studies in the stream of CDS (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Martin and 
Roychowdhury, 2015; Chang et al., 2019), I construct an indicator variable CDSINIT to capture 
the influence of CDS trading on companies. CDSINIT has a value of one in and after the year of 
CDS trade initiation, and zero before that. Therefore, a significant negative (positive) estimated 
coefficient on CDSINIT would reveal that CDS trading causes a material reduction (increase) on 
the dependent variables, i.e., WACC, cost of equity, and cost of debt. I also build another dummy 
variable CDSFIRM to differentiate CDS and non-CDS firms. CDSFIRM has a value of one for 
CDS firms whose debt has been referenced over the sample period, and zero for non-CDS firms 
 
11 We evaluate the changes of both weight of debt and weight of equity because 12.6 percent of observations in our 
sample have non-zero preferred shares. This implies that an increase in the weight of debt is not necessarily 




(i.e., never have traded CDSs on their debts over the sample period). Thus, this dummy variable 
would capture the time-invariant divergence from unobservable firms’ characteristics between 
CDS and non-CDS companies. 
Besides the dummy variable CDSINIT, which indicates the availability of CDSs, I employ two 
alternatives that measure the liquidity of CDS trading, the average daily trading notional scaled on 
total debt, and the total number of clearing dealers in a year. Shan et al. (2019) argue that most 
benefits of CDS trading can be ascribed to the hedging capability of CDSs. A more liquid CDS 
market would allow lenders to locate sellers easily and reduce the cost of hedging. Furthermore, a 
liquid market can incorporate relevant information into quotes and disseminate information to 
other markets (e.g., bonds and equities), resulting in an improvement in the firm’s information 
environment. Consequently, if CDS trading could reduce the cost of capital, I conjecture that the 
more liquidy the CDS markets have, the more significant the effects of CDSs will be on referenced 
firms. I follow Narayanan and Uzmanoglu’s method (2018c) to assign zeros to these two 
alternative measures of CDS trading activity, if DTCC did not report the trading data12.  
2.2.3 Control variables 
A multiple of the firm’s internal and external factors can affect the focal firm’s capital financing 
decisions and hence influence the capital structure and the cost of capital. For instance, firms in 
the automobile industry use, on average, higher debt financing and leverage than firms in the 
information technology (IT) industry. Likewise, in the same industry, large firms exhibit many 
distinct characteristics in contrast to medium and small firms, such as having easy access to arm-
 
12 DTCC reports single-name CDS trading data for the most actively traded 1000 CDSs, and these data cover over 
95% of CDS trading activity in the world (Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2018c). Therefore, assigning zeros to missed 




length debt, less information asymmetry, or higher credit rating. Furthermore, the firms are not 
randomly selected to trade CDSs. The factors that contribute to the cost of capital may also the 
determinants of CDS trading. Therefore, I also control factors related to CDS firms’ selection.  
To isolate the effects of CDS trading on WACC, I employ a set of firm level controls that are 
determinants of WACC, including firm size, leverage, profitability, growth opportunity, capital 
intensity, firm maturity, business riskiness, institutional ownership, liquidity cost, uniqueness, 
dividends, marginal tax rate, credit risk, and stock liquidity. The controls listed above are 
suggested by prior studies on the cost of debt and equity and capital structure selection (e.g., 
Titman and Wessels,1988; Davydenko and Strebulaev, 2007; Colla et al., 2013; Saretto and 
Tookes, 2013; Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2018b). Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that larger 
firms tend to be more diversified and thus may have greater debt capacity. I use the logarithm of 
total assets13 to control firm size effects. Saretto and Tookes (2013) argue that larger firms undergo 
less adverse selection when issuing equities than small or medium counterparts because these firms 
are more transparent and have a higher credit rating. Following Chang et al. (2019), I use an 
indicator variable, S&P rated, which has a value of one if a firm was rated by S&P, and zero 
otherwise, to recognize a firm credit quality 14 . Furthermore, Berger and Udell (1995) and 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999) find that the firms’ maturity relates to the firms’ borrowing costs 
because a mature firm has less information asymmetry than younger ones. Following Loderer and 
Waelchli (2010), I proxy firm maturity by a firm’s age. I first select the earliest date of a firm’s 
 
13 We substitute log of sales for log of assets in our baseline regression. However, there is no material influence on 
our estimated coefficients. 
14 We also use Bloomberg five-year default probability to proxy firm’s credit risk. The estimated coefficients are not 




initial public offering (IPO) and the first date of inclusion in Compustat, and then use the number 
of years elapsed since the earliest date to approximate the firm’s age.  
Myers (1997) theorizes that firms with high growth opportunities may use less debt to avoid 
suboptimal investment issues. I control the firm’s growth prospects by using the market-to-book 
asset ratio. I also follow Titman and Wessels (1988) to use capital expenditures scaled by sales to 
capture the firms’ future growths. According to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), profitability would be an important factor in determining capital structure. More profitable 
companies may use less external financing sources and thus may have less cost of capital. I define 
profitability by the ratio of earning before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by assets. Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), and Chang et al. (2009) suggest that the level 
of R&D (research and development) expenditure represents the uniqueness of firms’ products and 
thus affects liquidation costs. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) also indicate that high liquidation 
costs grant equity holders stronger bargaining power during debt renegotiations and hence increase 
the cost of debt. Furthermore, the trade-off theory of capital structure posits that companies balance 
the advantages of debt tax shields and distress costs. Therefore, I control for the tax rate, product 
uniqueness, and liquidation cost. I proxy the firm’s product uniqueness by the ratio of research and 
development expenses to sales. Following Almeida and Campello (2007) and Kim (2016), I 
compute liquidation cost as one minus asset tangibility, which is defined as (0.715 × Receivables+ 
0.547 × Inventory +0.535 × Capital + Cash and short-term equivalent), divided by assets. 
Regarding the tax rate, I use the marginal tax rate computed by Blouin et al. (2010). I obtain the 
tax rate data from Compustat from 2001 to 2016. 
Aslan and Kumar (2012) find that ownership concentration negatively affects the cost of debt 




investment horizons help reduce the cost of equity as a result of their monitoring efforts. Therefore, 
I compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of institutional ownership and use it to proxy 
share ownership concentration. Charitou et al. (2011) find evidence that dividend initiation and 
payment can reduce business default risk. However, the dividend is also a mechanism that 
shareholders expropriate creditors’ wealth, evidenced by common debt covenants that limit 
dividend payments. Consequently, dividend policy can affect a firm’s agency cost and therefore 
the cost of capital. I include dividend per share (DPS) to control the dividend influence on the 
WACC.  
In addition, high business risk may induce a high default probability and thus claimholders could 
demand a higher return to compensate for the risk they bear. Arguably, business risk is the 
fundamental determinant of the cost of equity and debt, and hence the WACC. I use stock return 
volatility computed from the past five years weekly stock prices to proxy business risk. 
Additionally, I use leverage ratio to approximate the companies’ financial risk. Obviously, a higher 
leverage ratio not only increases the agency cost of debt, but also increases the firms’ default 
probability. I define the leverage ratio as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Finally, Butler et al. 
(2005) find that illiquidity stock increases the cost of issuing equity, and Amihud et al. (2015) 
show evidence that investors across countries require higher returns for holding illiquid stocks. 
Thus, I control for stock liquidity effects on the cost of capital. I define stock liquidity as stock 
trading turnover by volume scaled on the outstanding common shares. I present the sample 
statistics of controls in Table 2.1. 
2.3 Sample characteristics 
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the distribution of CDS firms by the initiation year. I observe the 




period from 2001 to 2007. After that, the initiation significantly decreases in part due to my 
research design, i.e., I only identify new CDS firms for my research. Martin and Roychowdhury 
(2015) argue that the financial crisis may contribute to the decrease in CDS initiations as well. My 
sample shows a similar pattern to that of Kim et al. (2018). For example, Kim et al. (2018) record 
that the percentages of CDS trade initiation are 23.2, 16.2, 17.8, 15.8, and 7.9 from 2001 to 2005. 
Over the same period, my sample has 21.7, 15.4, 17.8, 15.1, and 6.2 percent of CDS initiations, 
respectively. The absolute numbers of CDS initiations are also close in these two studies. I show 
the distribution of CDS firms by one-digit SIC code in Panel B. As shown, firms in manufacturing 
industry (such as food, petroleum, paper, printing, rubber, stone, and computer) are more prone to 
trade CDSs, demonstrated by the high percentage of firms, 45.6% of the sample.  
<Insert Table 2.1 about here> 
Turning to Panel C of Table 2.1, which presents the means, medians, and mean differences 
between CDS and non-CDS firms across firm-level characteristics, the upper part of Panel C shows 
the summaries of explained variables, and I observe that the cost of debt and equity of CDS firms 
are significantly greater than the ones of non-CDS firms. Notably, though CDS firms exhibit a 
higher cost of equity and debt than non-CDS firms, the overall cost of capital is lower for CDS 
firms because they use more debt capital than non-CDS firms, which use more equity capital.  
Debt priority is another apparent discrepancy between CDS and non-CDS firms. The former 
prefers public debts to bank debts, while the latter reverses the order. For example, the percentages 
of bonds and notes to total debt are 68.6 and 35.8 percent for CDS and non-CDS firms, respectively. 
Furthermore, 50.2 percent of total debt are from banks for non-CDS firms, while this percentage 
decreases to 18.2 for CDS firms. This divergence could be explained by the difference in firms’ 




explanation. In my sample, a larger number of stock analysts follow CDS firms rather than non-
CDS firms. On average, there are 13.93 analysts recommending CDS firms’ stocks, while only 
5.59 analysts for non-CDS firms. 
I describe firm-level controls on the lower part of Panel C. CDS firms show substantial differences 
from non-CDS firms across firm characteristics, indicated by the significant mean differences. 
CDS firms are larger, more profitable, usually rated by S&P, and employ higher financial leverage 
than non-CDS firms. Those finding are consistent with prior literature regarding the properties of 
CDS firms (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015; Chang et al., 2019). 
Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) argue that to alleviate information disadvantages comparing to 
the CDS buyers who generally originate loans, CDS sellers are more inclined to write CDSs for 
larger and mature firms. I also observe that CDS firms pay higher dividends and have higher stock 
trading liquidity than non-CDS firms. Regarding institutional ownership (IO), institutional 
investors tend to hold more shares of CDS firms than non-CDS firms. On average, institutional 
investors hold about 70.4 percent of common shares of CDS firms. In contrast, institutional 
shareholders hold only about 43.0 percent of non-CDS firms’ common shares. However, the HHI 
of IO indicates that CDS firms have more dispersed ownership (0.064 of HHI) than non-CDS firms 
(0.154 of HHI). In addition, CDS firms are more mature than non-CDS ones. The average firm’s 
age is 32.77 and 18.08 years for CDS and non-CDS firms, respectively.  
I present CDS trading activity in Panel D of Table 2.1. The mean of CDSINIT is 0.154, indicating 
that 15.4 percent of firm-year observations have CDS traded over the sample period. Last, I present 




correlation between CDSFIRM and CDSINIT is 0.9215 and significant at the 1% level. The high 
correlation is the result of the variable construction methodology, since both variables have a value 
of one after CDS trading initiation. Except for this correlation, others are reasonably lower (e.g., 
the maximum correlation is 0.56, between S&P rating and log of assets), implying that my tests 
will not suffer from multi-collinearity problems. Furthermore, the lower correlations among 
controls also indicate that these controls capture the different aspects of firms’ characteristics. The 
correlations in Panel E closely coincide with the statistics of Panel C. For example, the univariate 
correlation between firm age and public debt is 0.20, significant at the 1% level. In Panel C, CDS 
firms have a higher firm age and use significantly high public debts. Likewise, firm age and bank 
debt have a significant and negative correlation of -0.17, suggesting that mature firms (e.g., CDS 
firms) will use fewer bank debts than younger ones (e.g., non-CDS firms). 
3. Methodology and empirical results 
3.1. Baseline specification 
I aim to explore the relationships between the availability of CDSs and the changes in the cost of 
capital. Following prior studies, such as Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Chang et al. (2019), I use 
the difference in difference (DID) mechanism to investigate such relationships in a multivariate 
panel regression model. Specifically, I estimate the following baseline model with industry- or 
firm-year fixed effects16: 
 
15 To counter this high correlation, we mainly employ firm-fixed effects models for our tests. 
16 Model (1) is the simplified version of the following standard DID model: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖 + 𝜆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝜙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 





        𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙i,t = α + β𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀i + ω𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇i,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + ρFixedi + ϕYeart +
εi,t  (1) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is one of the explained variables (WACC, cost of debt, and cost of equity) 
for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The main variable of interest is CDSINIT, which is an indicator variable having 
a value of one in and after CDS initiation year, and zero before that. Its coefficient ω would capture 
the DID effects between treated and control firms (i.e., CDS and non-CDS firms). 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
vector of firm level control variables observed at the end of fiscal year 𝑡 − 1 defined in section 2.2. 
I lagged all controls one year because the initiation of CDS trading may not have affected the cost 
of capital immediately. Furthermore, using lagged controls attenuates potential endogeneity issues 
between the cost of capital and controls. 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖 denotes either firm or industry fixed effects. I use 
it to control the effects on the cost of capital of time invariant unobservable factors that are either 
at the firm or industry level. In addition, I incorporate year effects in my specification to capture 
aggregate time trends in the firms’ cost of capital. Following the suggestion of Petersen (2009), I 
cluster the standard errors at the firm level, given that observations of the same firm are 
autocorrelated. 
3.2. Empirical results 
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of the baseline model (1). In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2, I 
present regressions of dependent variables (e.g., WACC, etc.) on CDS initiation and on a set of 
firm-level controls without tax rate under industry-year and firm-year fixed effects models, 




time, as reported in column 317. As shown in the first three columns of Table 2.2, the overall cost 
of capital significantly declines after the inception of CDS trading. The declines in WACCs range 
from 22.7 to 28.1 basis points and are significant minimally at the 1% level. This reduction is not 
only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful. Using the average capital ($9.42 
billion) of CDS firms contributed by equity and debt holders, the declines in required return, when 
converted into monetary amount, are of $20.7 to $25.7 million. To examine whether my tests are 
vulnerable to potential outliers, I apply quantile regressions over quantiles of 0.15, 0.35, 0.5, and 
0.85. All estimated coefficients on CDS initiation are negative and significant at the 1% level, 
substantiating my results in Table 2.2. The estimated results from quantile regressions are reported 
in Table 2.3.  
Turning to the estimates of the cost of debt, I find consistent evidence of declines, significant at 
the 1% level across testing approaches and samples, in the cost of debt. Regarding results from the 
cost of equity tests, I observe positive estimates across samples, suggesting that investors required 
higher returns after CDS trading. This finding is consistent with Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018c) 
who ascribe the increase in equity returns to the increased bankruptcy risk after CDs trading. 
However, I find an insignificant estimate from the industry-fixed effects model. I observe contrary 
estimates between firm-fixed (0.242 with a t-statistic of 2.32) and industry-fixed (-0.245 with a t-
statistic of -2.34) effects models, and both are significant at the 5% level. As per these controversial 
estimates, I hold my conclusions on the cost of equity and address this issue in section 3.3. 
 
17 We report estimates with and without marginal tax rates because the marginal tax rates are available up to 2016 
fiscal year in Compustat. The joint availability of tax data and controls significantly reduces our sample from 48,850 





Furthermore, the decline in the cost of debt dominates the effects in the cost of equity, 
demonstrated by an overall decline in the cost of capital.  
<Insert Table 2.2 about here> 
<Insert Table 2.3 about here> 
The coefficients on controls are in line with prior literature. For example, all coefficients on 
profitability are negative and significantly at the 1% level, suggesting that more profitable firms 
rely more on internal financing than on debt or equity sources of capital. This result is compliant 
with the pecking order theory of financing. Similarly, all estimates on business riskiness proxied 
by stock volatility are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that both lenders and 
equity holders require higher returns when facing high risk. Turning to the estimates on 
institutional shareholders, I notice that IO concentration negatively affects debt holders but have 
positive effects on shareholders. A higher IO concentration implies a higher bargaining power for 
shareholders; therefore, debt holders may require greater returns on their lending. Additionally, 
the larger and significant coefficients on liquidity variables demonstrate that stock trading liquidity 
proxied by stock volume turnover, which is scaled by outstanding common shares, has more 
negative effects on equity holders than on debt holders. This situation reverses when examining 
leverage effects. Debt holders require higher compensation for highly levered firms, while high 
leverage ratios seem not to affect equity holders. In addition, shareholders value more dividend 
payments, demonstrated by significant negative coefficients on dividend payments, while debt 
holders frown on dividend payments and require higher returns. Lastly, firm size is positively 




Turning to estimates of quantile regressions in Table 2.3, I have several interesting findings. For 
instance, the estimated coefficients on profitability support both the trade-off and pecking order 
theories. In column (1) of Table 2.3, the positive coefficient on profitability (0.308) is significant 
at the 1% level, indicating a positive relation between profitability and cost of capital. This estimate 
implies that when a firm has a high earning capability but employs a conservative debt policy, i.e., 
using a very low financial leverage ratio, the firm loses value because of the wasting tax shield 
benefits of interest expenses. Likewise, looking at the estimate on riskiness in column (1) of Table 
2.3, I note that the coefficient on volatility is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that low levered firms could benefit more from increasing business risk. Similarly, I also observe 
contrary signs for the coefficients of firm’s age for firms with lower and higher costs of capital. 
3.3. Cost of equity: high- and low-rated firms 
The baseline test provides solid evidence of a decline in the cost of debt after CDS trading. Such 
a decline in the cost of debt results in a decrease in the overall capital cost. Nonetheless, the 
evidence on the cost of equity is not straightforward. I conjecture that CDS trading has diverse 
effects on the cost of equity, and the effects hinge on the firms’ credit quality. The increase or 
decrease in the shareholders’ required returns relies on whether shareholders are beneficial or 
detrimental to CDS trading. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that CDS trading reduces a bond’s 
spread for larger and more transparent firms, while CDSs cause an increase in the bond spread for 
riskier firms. Accordingly, I hypothesize that CDSs may positively affect shareholders in high-
rated firms while negatively influence equity holders in low- or non-rated firms. The insignificant 
estimates of regressions of the cost of equity may be due to the mixed sample firms, i.e., the sample 
includes both high- and low-rated firms. To test this conjecture, I define a variable, 




by S&P rating agency, and zero otherwise. I re-estimate my baseline model (1) using the high- and 
low-rated sample firms and report the results in Table 2.4. 
<Insert Table 2.4 about here> 
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the estimates using high-rated firms. Starting with the cost of equity, 
I find consistent evidence that CDSs reduce the cost of equity for high-rated firms. The coefficients 
are negative and significant at either the 5% or 10% level. Turning to Panel B, which shows 
estimates from low- and non-rated rated firms and sharply contrasts with the results of high-rated 
firms, I find positive coefficients of regressions, significant minimally at the 5% level, on the cost 
of equity. This evidence suggests that the mixed results before may be partially due to the mix 
samples. The positive effects on the cost of equity from high-graded firms are counteracted by the 
negative effects from low- and non-rated firms. Furthermore, I note that the estimated coefficients 
from regressions of the cost of debt in high-rated samples are not significant at the 10% level, 
suggesting that high-rated firms did not capture the benefits from debt financing after CDS trading. 
In contrast to high-rated firms, low-rated firms significantly reduced their cost of debt post-CDS 
trading.  
To substantiate my results above, I proxy a company’s credit quality, provided by Bloomberg, for 
a five-year predicted default probability and re-sample firms into high and low default groups. 
Particularly, I classify firms whose default probability lies above the high 66% percentile into the 
high-risk group, while firms with a default probability in the lower 33% percentile are sampled 
into the low-risk group. I estimate the baseline model using the high and low default risk samples 
and present the results in Table 2.5. 




The results in Table 2.5 support the findings based on credit quality samples. Starting from Panel 
A of Table 2.5, I observe negative coefficients of regressions on the cost of equity. Both estimates 
are significant at the 5% or 10% level, suggesting that CDS trading brings down the cost of equity. 
In contrast, the estimates from high default sample are positive and significant at the 1% or 5% 
level. These findings indicate that shareholders in high-risk firms demand higher returns after CDS 
trading. Interestingly, in Panel B, the estimates from the cost of debt are negative and significant 
at least at the 5% level. The positive effects on the cost of debt and negative effects on the cost of 
equity in high-risk firms cancel each other, resulting in less positive effects on the overall cost of 
capital. Turning back to Panel A, like with the high credit sample, I find estimates from the cost 
of debt that are insignificant, implying that firms with a low default probability did not capture 
benefits from channels related to debt financing. Different from high credit sample, I note that 
firms with a low default risk seize significant benefits by lowering the overall cost of capital, 
demonstrated by the negative and significant estimates from the cost of capital. These findings 
corroborate Ashcraft and Santos’s (2009) arguments as well as my conjectures. The results from 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 disclose that CDSs bring benefits to high-credit firms mainly through the 
channel of reducing equity cost18, while it offers benefits to low-rated firms or firms with higher 
default probability through lowering the cost of debt.   
In summary, the results presented in Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 suggest that equity investors hold 
diverse views regarding CDS trading. Shareholders in firms with a high default risk or low credit 
quality view negatively CDS trading and therefore require a higher return to compensate for the 
risk. Such an increase in the cost of equity complies with Bolton and Oehmke’s (2011) threatening 
 
18 The overall cost of capital for investment graded firms is decreased but not significant at the 10% level. One 
reason is that the sample firms increases equity issuances, evidenced by the significant and positive estimated 
coefficient when regressing Equityweight on CDSINIT variable, i.e., firms in investment graded sample increase 




effects of CDS. In contrast, shareholders in firms with a low default risk or a high credit quality 
reduce their required returns after CDS trading. This phenomenon is also consistent with Bolton 
and Oehmke’s (2011) commitment effects of CDS. Furthermore, the cost of debt decreases for low 
credit or high default risk firms. This finding implies that high and low credit firms capture the 
benefits of CDS trading through different channels.  
The decreased cost of debt may be due to external lenders. For example, Ivanov et al. (2015) argue 
that debt holders may pass some of the benefits of CDS trading to borrowers by requiring a lower 
interest rate. These benefits include decreased costs in monitoring, less contracting expenses, or 
easier hedging (Shan et al. 2019). However, I point out that the reduced cost of debt in lower rated 
firms or firms with higher default probability may not be due to external lenders. By adjusting 
capital structure and debt types, firms can also decrease the cost of debt and capital as well. I 
discuss the channels through which firms reduce WACC in Section 5. Furthermore, although the 
tax rate affects the cost of capital, it does not materially alter the results. To reduce sample attrition, 
I ignore the tax rate in the following tests. In the next section, I validate my results with some 
robustness tests. 
4. Robustness tests 
Prior studies (e.g., Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015; Chang et 
al. 2019) find that CDS referenced companies are usually larger, have investment grade ratings, 
less information opacity, and relatively high credit. This finding is in compliance with the theory 
of adverse selection, i.e., CDS sellers desire to sell protection to trustworthy companies that are 
more visible (i.e., have less information asymmetry) and highly rated to lower their information 
disadvantage comparing to CDS buyers who usually draft loans and thus have private information 




it could also be that some unobservable factors drive CDS selection and simultaneously influence 
the firms’ cost of capital. To address those sample selection and endogeneity concerns, I follow 
the literature (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury, 
2015; Kim et al., 2018; Chang et al. 2019) to use various robustness tests, including the reversal 
of CDS test, empirical WACC test, propensity score matching sample, CDS samples only, Monte 
Carlo simulation, the first difference sample, and CDS liquidity variables to proxy CDS 
availability. 
4.1 The reversal of CDS contracts 
Following Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018b), I introduce a dummy variable, CDS-reversal, 
which has a value of one for CDS firms in the years immediately following the termination of 
CDSs, and zeroes otherwise. The rationality is that if the initiation of CDS trading can lower the 
WACC because of more benefits induced by CDS trading, the termination of CDSs may cause an 
increase in the WACC, since the accompanied benefits may be removed by the termination of 
CDS. For instance, the lenders may be unwilling to increase their credit supply to those past CDS 
firms or charge a higher interest rate than before. Consequently, the cessation of CDSs may deliver 
a negative signal to the capital markets. To test this hypothesis, I include CDS-reversal as another 
independent variable in the baseline equation (1).  
I report the regression results in Online Table A1. Columns (1) of Online Table A1 reports 
estimates with industry-year fixed effects model. The coefficients of CDSINIT and CDS-reversal 
are -0.460 (t-value of -5.14) and 0.276 (t-value of2.57), respectively. Both estimates are significant 
at the 1% level. This evidence indicates that investors may charge a higher interest rate after the 
termination of CDSs, which causes an increase in the WACC. Another explanation is that CDS 




column (2) which shows the estimates based on firm and year fixed effects model, I observe a 
negative coefficient of CDSINIT and significant at the 1% level as before. Still, I observe a positive 
estimate on CDS-reversal (0.049 with a t-value of 1.10), although it is not significant at the 10% 
level. Overall, those estimates support that the initiation of CDS trading would bring more benefits 
than costs to CDS firms, which cause a decrease in the WACC. 
4.2 Alternate of Bloomberg WACC 
I proxy the market required returns by Bloomberg WACCs (BWACCs), which are the weighted 
averages of equity return based on capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and debt returns computed 
from Bloomberg’s proprietary methodology. It may be the case that BWACCs drive my results 
because several approaches (e.g., the implied cost of capital, Fama-French three factors model, 
etc.) are used in practice to estimate the equity and debt returns (Frank and Shan, 2016; Olson and 
Pagano, 2017). To test whether my results are sensitive to BWACC, I use Olson and Pagano’s 
(2017) approach to estimate an empirical WACC (EWACC) by using equation (2). 
                                    𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                           (2) 
 where 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the net operating profit after taxes for frim i in the period t, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the average of the firm i’s book value and market value in the period t-1. The coefficient estimate 
represents an average WACC of a company over a period. Following Olson and Pagano (2017), I 
first compute the moving sums of four-quarter NOPATs for each firm, starting from the 1st quarter 
of 1993. I then use rolling windows analysis ranging from 16 to 22 quarters to regress NOPATs on 
total capitals. The coefficients of regression (i.e., EWACCs) proxy the average cost of capital of a 
company over the rolling window period. I re-estimate my baseline equation (1) with EWACCs 




the columns (1) and (2) of Online Table A2, respectively. Both coefficients of CDSINIT are 
negative and significant at the 5% level. This evidence corroborates my conclusions as per 
Bloomberg WACCs. 
4.3 Propensity score matching (PSM) sample 
I use the following probit model to assess the probability of CDS trading initiation. 
Prob(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = ∅(𝛼 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑Industryk + 𝜔Yeart)    (3) 
in which ∅ is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution. CDSINIT is an 
indicator variable that has a value of one in and after CDS trading initiation, and zero before that. 
𝑋 is an array of firm level characteristics that are used to predict the inception of CDS trading. 
Following Chang et al. (2019), I include all controls into vector 𝑋 to mitigate the concerns that the 
factors affecting the cost of capital may also drive CDS trading initiation. In addition, following 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), I include the ratio of working capital to assets, excess stock return 
defined as the difference of stock returns relative to the ones from the prior year, turnover 
computed as the sales divided by assets, cash holding defined as the ratio of cash and equivalent 
to assets, and PPE ratio defined as the net of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) divided by 
assets19. Furthermore, I include Fama-French 48 (FF48) industry classification to isolate industry-
fixed effects and year-fixed effects to tackle aggregate time trends effects on the cost of capital.  
Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), I construct a probit sample 
by using all firm-year observations of non-CDS firms whose debts are never inferenced in CDS 
markets and firm-year observations of CDS firms up until the beginning of CDS trading, i.e., 
 
19 We also include return on assets (ROA) as done in Subrahmanyam et al. (2014). However, there is a high 
correlation between ROA and Profitability, thus causing a multicollinearity problem. We keep Probability in the 




eliminating firm-year observations of CDS firms for the post-CDS trading periods. I estimate 
equation (2) with lagged one-year firm level characteristics over the period 2001 to 2017 and 
present the results in Table 2.6. The model (2) forecasts the onset of CDS trading reasonably well, 
as indicated by the high concordant percentage (96.4%) and pseudo-R2 (44.6%). These statistics 
are comparable to previous studies. For example, the pseudo-R2 is 39% in Subrahmanyam et al. 
(2017) and the proportion of concordant pairs is 91.5% in Martin and Roychowdhury (2015). The 
coefficients of predictors are in line with prior studies (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017; Chang et al., 2019). For instance, larger firms, firms with high 
leverage and less riskiness, and more profitable and rated firms induce more interests of CDS 
market participants, demonstrated by the significant estimated coefficients. In addition, the 
coefficient on firm age is positive and significant at the 1% level, further implying that mature 
firms are likely to have CDS trading initiated in the sample period. Lastly, the significant 
coefficient on liquidation cost indicates that lenders pay significant attention to the recovery values 
of CDS firms, consistent with the CDS structural model. 
<Insert Table 2.6 about here> 
I generate control firms (non-CDS firms) for treated ones (CDS firms) by year. Specifically, I 
compare the predicted likelihood of CDS initiation of non-CDS to that of CDS firms in the year 
prior to CDS trading initiation. Following Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), I produce three control 
samples using different matching criteria to further verify my results and attenuate the constraints 
of the propensity score matching20. Specifically, I construct three control samples as follows: (1) 
the one non-CDS firm with the closest propensity score to the CDS firm; (2) the one non-CDS 
 
20 For example, one limitation of propensity score matching is that unobservable confounders cannot be balanced in 





firm with the closest propensity score to the CDS firm and within the same CDS firm’s FF48 
industry classification; and (3) the same rule as for sample 2 but using Fama-French 17 (FF17) 
instead of FF48 as exacting matching conditions. Furthermore, I allow a non-CDS firm to be 
matched to multiple CDS firms in control samples of 2 and 3 but not in sample 1 to produce diverse 
PSM samples. However, in samples 2 and 3, I require that the same non-CDS firm go into the 
control sample only once each year. In this way, I have unique firm-year observations throughout 
my samples, even though a non-CDS firm may serve as a control for several CDS firms. Finally, 
for all three control samples, I require the distances of mean logit of propensity scores between 
CDS and non-CDS samples to not be statistically significant at the 10% level21.  
I present firm characteristics of the control-treated samples prior to the year of CDS trading 
initiation in Table 2.7. For brevity, I only present the statistics based on the matching criterion (1), 
which require no multiple matching when selecting the nearest matching non-CDS firm. By doing 
so, I have the exact number of treated and control firms in the sample. Under criterion (1), I 
successfully match 408 CDS firms from a total of 677 CDS firms. In Table 2.7, I observe that CDS 
firms and non-CDS firms are not significantly different in terms of leverage, probability, growth, 
IO concentration, liquidation cost, R&D, and S&P rated. These statistical results suggest that these 
firm-level characteristics are unlikely to be the sources of difference in the cost of capital between 
CDS and non-CDS firms after the inception of CDS trading. Like prior studies (e.g., Martin and 
Roychowdhury, 2015; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017; Chang et al., 2019), in spite of carefully 
matching, I find that CDS firms remain different from non-CDS firms in size, firm age, riskiness, 
 
21 We use SAS procedure PSMATCH to match non-CDS observations to CDS peers. We adjust the parameter of 
PSMATCH, ‘CALIPER’, to produce the maximum sample and simultaneously the mean difference of propensity 
scores between CDS- and non-CDS samples, not significant at the 10% level. Following Austin (2011b), the 




dividends, and stock liquidity, evidenced by significant differences between mean differential tests. 
However, the non-significant difference between propensity scores of two groups indicates that 
those firms have a similar propensity to trade CDSs. Finally, I note that all explained variables, 
WACC, cost of debt, and cost of equity, are similar in statistics for both groups prior to the CDS 
trading. Therefore, there are no trends in the firm characteristics that may cause variances between 
CDS and non-CDS samples post-CDS trading. 
<Insert Table 2.7 about here> 
4.4. Multivariate estimation of PSM samples 
I re-estimate the baseline model (1) with my three PSM samples. I present the estimates in Panel 
A, B, and C of Table 2.8. For brevity, I only report the estimated coefficient on CDSINIT and 
CDSFIRM across samples. Consistent with the results from the whole sample, I find that all 
coefficients of regressions of WACC and cost of debt on CDS initiation are significant and 
negative at the 5% or 1% level across three PSM samples. The magnitude of estimates is similar 
to that of the whole sample as well. Furthermore, I still observe the non-significant estimated 
coefficients when regressing the cost of equity on CDS initiation. To further substantiate my results, 
I reconstruct my PSM samples from the probit sample that contains firms with zero long-term debt 
and total assets of less than $10 million. I present estimates in Online Table A3. The results based 
on the expanded probit sample are the same as those in Table 2.8, confirming the validity of my 
PSM tests. Overall, this evidence supports my main findings from the whole sample test: the 
availability of CDSs reduces the cost of debt and the cost of capital.  
<Insert Table 2.8 about here> 




The whole sample results are based on comparing outcomes of CDS firms and non-CDS peers by 
controlling a set of covariates. However, there may have some latent factors that drive CDS firms 
to behave differently from non-CDS firms, and those factors are absent in my model. While I have 
employed PSM procedure to mitigate sample selection concerns, i.e., making CDS and non-CDS 
more alike, another way to reduce such uncertainty is to use the CDS firms only. In contrast to 
non-CDS firms, which are the benchmarks when assessing the CDS effects, a CDS firm may be a 
more appropriate benchmark to another CDS firm. I follow Ashcraft and Santos (2009) to estimate 
the baseline model using the treated sample (CDS firms). Additionally, I introduce the CDSLAG 
to the equation, which is an indicator variable but lagged one year for CDSINIT to capture the 
potential dynamic effects of CDS trading over time. I present the estimates in Panel A of Table 
2.9.  
<Insert Table 2.9 about here> 
The estimates from the cost of debt are in line with my estimates from the whole sample and 
various PSM samples. Both coefficients on CDSINIT and its lag, CDSLAG, are significant and 
negative at either the 5% or 10% level, indicating that CDS trading reduces the cost of debt 
financing. The coefficients on CDSLAG are greater than those on CDSINIT, suggesting that CDS 
trading increases effects over time. Furthermore, all estimates of regressions of cost of equity are 
non-significant, consistent with my main samples’ estimation. Turning to the regressions of 
WACC, all estimates are negative, and one of the estimates on the CDSLAG is close to the 10% 
significance level, suggesting a reduction on the cost of capital after CDS trading. 
Overall, the estimation from the cost of debt, which is highly congruent with all estimates from 
various samples so far, and the estimates on WACC in Panel A of Table 2.9 are weak in contrast 




CDS and non-CDS drive the results. To examine such possibilities, I follow Kim (2016) to use the 
interaction between strategic variables and CDS trading to explicitly capture the advantages 
generated by CDS trading. The logic is that firms that are vulnerable to strategic default concerns 
will benefit more from CDS trading than firms without such concerns. For example, shareholders 
of companies with high liquidation costs or stronger CEO’s ownership will have more bargaining 
power than creditors, hence those firms possess greater incentives to strategically default. 
I introduce a dummy variable, High_liquidation, which equals one if the CDS firm’s liquidation 
cost at the time of CDS initiation is above the median of CDS sample firms, and zero otherwise. I 
present the estimated results in Panel B of Table 2.9. I observe that the estimated coefficients on 
interactions are significant and negative at either the 5% or 1% level for WACC and the cost of 
debt, while the estimate on the cost of equity is negative but non-significant as before. Additionally, 
Colonnello et al. (2019) find evidence that institutional ownership is positively related to the net 
outstanding amount of CDSs and the existence of empty creditors. I use institutional ownership 
concentration as an alternative strategic variable and assign a value of one for firms whose HHI of 
institutional ownership are above the median value, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, Martin and 
Roychowdhury (2015) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014, 2017) also indicate that firms with higher 
leverage ratios attract more attention from lenders since high leverage ratios indicate high financial 
risk and default probability. I use the level of leverage ratios as another strategic variable to control 
for the level of CDS trading. Similarly, I assign a value of one for firms whose leverage ratios are 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise. The estimates are presented in Online Table A4. 
The results based on these two alternative strategic measures are consistent with the findings when 
using liquidation cost as a strategic variable, thus verifying the conclusions from CDS samples. 




opportunity tests indicate that  the reduction in the cost of debt led to a decline in the overall cost 
of capital. The effects of CDS trading on the cost of equity rely on the credit quality of the focal 
company. 
4.6. CDS trading liquidity test  
Prior studies have shown that the degree of CDS trading liquidity produces different effects on 
referenced firms. For example, Saretto and Tookes (2013) examine proxy liquidity with the 
number of CDS quotes and CDS bid-ask spreads and find evidence that companies can maintain a 
higher leverage ratio and longer debt maturity if CDSs are traded more actively on their debt. 
Likewise, Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018a, b) show that the activity of CDS trading relates to a 
firm’s value and cost of capital, respectively. I follow these studies to use CDS trading activity 
variables as replacements to the indicator variable, CDSINIT, to verify my results. I obtain CDS 
trading activity data from DTCC over the period 2009 to 2018. Specifically, I use the log of 
average daily trading notional volume and the total number of clearing dealers in a fiscal year to 
proxy the liquidity of CDs trading. I scale the notional volume by the natural log as the original 
notional amounts are significantly skewed right22.  
<Insert Table 2.10 about here> 
I present the estimated coefficients in Table 2.10. Starting from regressions of the cost of debt, all 
estimates are negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that high liquidity of CDS trading 
substantially reduces the cost of debt financing. Turning to regressions of WACC, I observe that 
three out of four estimates are negative and significant at either 5% or 1% level. Last, the estimates 
of regressions of the cost of equity with the industry-fixed effects model are significant and 
 
22 Over the period 2009 to 2018, we have 4,734 firm-year observations from 570 CDS firms, of which 1,723 




negative, implying the positive effects of CDS trading on equity holders. On the contrary, the 
estimates from the firm-fixed effects model are non-significant, consistent with the whole sample 
results demonstrating that CDS trading has no effects on equity holders.  
4.7 Monte Carlo simulation test 
In this section, I analyze the CDS initiation events by Monte Carlo simulation. Chang et al. (2019) 
state that the clustered characteristics of CDS trading initiations may cause spurious regression 
results, i.e., the significant effects may be attributed to events clustering instead of CDS firms 
themselves. I follow Bekaert et al. (2005) and Chang et al. (2019) to construct samples with pseudo 
CDS trading years among CDS firms. Specifically, I first gather the real CDS trading initiation 
years from 677 CDS firms. Next, I randomly assign these true CDS initiation years to CDS firms. 
I then construct the sample by combing all non-CDS firms and the CDS firms with pseudo trade 
initiation years. I estimate the baseline model (1) using the constructed sample with firm-year fixed 
effects and record the coefficients of CDSINIT. I reiterate this procedure 1,000 times and report 
the distribution of coefficients of CDSINIT in Table 2.11 for the cost of debt as an example.  
<Insert Table 2.11 about here> 
The mean (-0.172) and median (-0.171) of coefficients on CDSINIT from the regressions of the 
cost of debt in Table 2.11 are significantly different from the estimated coefficient based on true 
sample (coefficient of -0.256 with t statistic of 3.86)23. The 95th percentile of the distribution shows 
a coefficient of negative -0.255 and a t statistic of -3.78, which is close to my estimate from the 
real sample. Thus, my estimate is located the left tail far out from the mean and median values. 
This evidence indicates that my results are not attributed to statistical artifacts or CDS initiation 
 
23 The difference between the mean coefficient and the true one is 0.084 with a t statistic of 1.91, which is 




events clustering because many replications with pseudo samples, which have the true distribution 
of CDS initiation dates, would produce coefficients close to the true one estimated from the 
original sample. Therefore, the impact of CDS trading on the cost of debt owes to the firm and its 
true time of CDS trading initiation, and not to time trends of CDS trading.  
4.8 The first difference sample test 
One issue I have not yet addressed is the reverse causality between the changes in the cost of 
capital and the inception of CDSs. It may be the case that investors forecast a company’s successful 
prospect and are willing to provide CDSs on the company’s debt to profit from the further lowered 
spreads. Such transactions can cause a decrease in the focal firm’s CDS spreads as well as the 
credit risk. The positive information can disperse into both bond and stock markets. Consequently, 
the required returns from various investors will decline. To further address the reverse causality of 
CDS initiation and endogenous concerns of CDS trading, I regress the first differences of the cost 
of capital on the CDS initiation. Specifically, I estimate the following model with the first 
difference samples.   
        ∆𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = ω𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇i,t−1 + γ∆Xi,t−1 + ρFixedi + ϕYeart + εi,t  (3) 
where ∆𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙i,t is the first difference between the cost of capital (e.g., WACC, cost of 
debt, or cost of equity) in a fiscal year and its value in the prior year. Likewise, ∆Xi,t−1 represents 
the first difference of control variables discussed in section 2.2.3. CDSINIT is an indicator variable 
that has a value of one in and after the year of CDS trading, and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖 denotes 
firm-fixed effects. I control for year effects to attenuate the changes in the cost of capital. To 
investigate the reverse causality from the cost of capital to CDS initiation, I follow Kim et al. (2018) 




of capital and lagged changes of controls. I estimate the model (3) with or without firm-fixed 
effects and present the results in Panel A and B of Table 2.12, respectively. For brevity, I only 
present the coefficients of interested variables, CDS initiation, and various costs of capital. The 
full results are reported in Panel A and B of Online Table A5. 
<Insert Table 2.12 about here> 
Starting from Panel A of Table 2.12, I consistently observe negative and significant coefficients 
of regressions of the cost of debt on CDS initiation. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% 
level regardless of firm-fixed effects. The estimates from the cost of equity are negative and 
significant at the 5% or 10% level. Last, I find one out of two estimates from the regressions of 
WACC on CDS initiation to be significant at the 10% level. Turning to Panel B of Table 2.12, I 
observe that all coefficients of regressions of CDS initiation on lagged changes in the various costs 
of capital are not significant at the 10% level. This evidence indicates that the CDS initiation causes 
the reduction of the cost of debt. There is no reverse causality from the cost of debt to the CDS 
initiation. Besides the test above, I also run a probit model and include the changes in the cost of 
capital as an input factor. I find no significant coefficients on the changes in the cost of capital. 
This evidence indicates that there is no causal relation between the changes in the cost of capital 
and the CDS initiation24. The results are presented in the Online Table A6. 
Taken together, my evidence indicates that the overall cost of capital was reduced after CDS 
trading. For firms with medium or lower credit quality, their cost of debt financing declines, while 
 
24 Though the changes in the cost of equity have no anticipating power for CDs initiation, the cost of equity itself 
can predict the inception of CDSs. This is because the cost of equity can be a proxy of a firm’s business risk, and 




firms in investment grade benefit from a reduction in the cost of equity. In the rest of the paper, I 
investigate the channels through which firms lower their cost of capital. 
5. Debt structure and WACC 
A firm’s capital structure optimization and financing choices are the outcomes of interplaying 
between various factors, such as business risk, growth options, firm’s information environment, 
cost of financing, and major stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, creditors, top executives) (Myers, 
1977, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Diamond, 199; Hovakimian et al., 200; Frank and Goyal, 
2003; Rauh and Sufi, 2010; Lemmon and Zender, 2010; Denis and McKeon, 2012). Post-CDS 
trading, many factors above have changed because CDSs alter the relationship between the lenders 
and borrowers (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) and improve a firm’s information environment as well. 
For example, Kim (2016) argues that CDSs bring down the cost of bond financing because of the 
commitment function of CDSs. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Batta et al. (2016) show that CDS 
markets enhance a firm’s information environment and thus reduce information asymmetry 
between internal managers and external investors. Confronted with these everchanging milieus, 
firms may consequently amend their capital financing policies and adjust capital leverage to seize 
the benefits and avoid the costs associated with CDS trading. 
A CDS company’s cost of capital could change due to either external or internal channels. With 
respect to external channels, CDS protected lenders may encounter some benefits arising from 
CDS trading, hence lowering the required interest rate. For instance, Ivanon et al. (2016) state that 
the cost of bank financing was reduced because CDSs offered reduced monitoring costs. However, 
regarding the cost of bonds, empirical studies come to mixed conclusions. For example, Kim (2016) 
studies bond spreads of CDS firms using 1,506 US firm-quarter observations from 136 corporate 




experience significant declines in their bond spreads post-CDS trading. In contrast, Narayanan and 
Uzmanoglu (2018c) find that CDSs intensify debt renegotiation discordance and actually increase 
bond spreads. Their study uses 2,940 corporate bonds issued by 303 US public firms over the 
period 2008 to 2016.  
In this section, I focus on the internal channels and their consequences on the overall cost of capital. 
In this regard, managers have two channels to adjust a firm’s cost of capital. They can substitute 
debt for equity or inversely do so. As the cost of debt is much lower than that of equity, a firm can, 
to some extent, reduce the overall cost of capital. Another channel is to adjust debt priority among 
various debt types when financing externally. For example, retiring bank loans by issuing a new 
bond or using more subordinated debts instead of secured ones. As different types of debt have a 
distinct cost of interest and flexibility, managers may alter their debt financing orders and thus 
change the overall cost of capital.  
Nonetheless, both channels significantly rely on the assumption of an improved firm’s information 
environment after CDS trading. A firm’s information environment plays an important role in the 
firm’s selection of external financing sources. The pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) 
assumes that information asymmetry between internal managers and external investors causes 
adverse selection when obtaining funds from external sources. Consequently, firms prefer to use 
less information sensitive types of funding, like debt, instead of equity. It is reasonable to conclude 
that a company with an improved information environment, and consequently subject to less 
information asymmetry problems, may be more willing to issue equity rather than debt, especially 
when it already has high financial leverage ratios because a high leverage ratio not only increases 




first address whether the information environment of a CDS firm has changed after CDS trading, 
and then investigate the channels for reducing the cost of capital.  
5.1 CDS firms’ information environment 
CDS markets play a critical role in producing and disseminating information (Ashcraft and Santos, 
2009; Stulz, 2010) because the participants in CDS markets are all institutions, such as banks or 
insurance companies that usually possess private information regarding the borrowers’ business 
and financial status (Acharya and Johnson, 2007). This kind of insider information would generally 
be reflected in the quotes of CDSs and, therefore, CDS spreads reveal the true credit risk of 
referenced firms and play price discovery roles in other markets (Batta et al., 2016), such as stock 
and bond markets. Prior studies find that information flows into stock markets from CDS markets, 
implying an overall improvement in a firm’s information transparency (Acharya and Johnson, 
2007). I follow Batta et al. (2016) for the number of stock analysts who recommend stock buying 
of a firm as the proxy of the firm information environment. Specifically, I use the number of 
analysts as the dependent variable and regress it on CDS initiation to measure the changes of CDS 
firms’ information quality. Table 2.13 reports the regression of the number of analysts on CDS 
initiation. 
<Insert Table 2.13 about here> 
In Table 2.13, I observe that the coefficients on CDS initiation are positive and significant at the 
1% level for both industry and firm-fixed effects model. The adjusted R-squared is 89.4% in the 
firm-fixed effects model, and 11 of the 14 estimated coefficients are significant minimally at the 
5% level, indicating that my model effectively captures the factors that affect analysts to follow 




their information environment because more analysts follow CDS firms and hence produce and 
release more information for the firms. The information discovery and dissemination reduce the 
asymmetric information between the firm and external investors and may finally induce an 
alteration on the firms’ financing choices and their capital structure. With  more symmetric 
information between managers and investors, I explore whether managers adjust their capital mix 
and debt priority to seize the benefits of CDS trading. 
5.2 Substitute debt for equity security 
Through my tests, I find consistent evidence that CDS firms experience a decline in the cost of 
debt after CDS trading. Such decreases may cause a reduction of the overall cost of capital. 
However, I cannot rule out the possibility that managers alter financial leverage to capture the 
benefits from CDS trading, thus resulting in a decline in the WACC. The mean of after-tax cost of 
debt of CDS firms is 3.00%, which is substantially lower than the mean of the cost of equity, which 
is 10.93%. By adjusting the weight of debt to equity, CDS firms can reduce the WACC as well. 
To investigate this channel of changing WACC, I estimate the relations between the market weight 
of debt and equity and CDS initiation. I obtain the market weight of debt and equity from 
Bloomberg. The details regarding the computation of weights are provided in Table 1.   
Table 2.14 presents the results of regressions of the weight of debt and equity on CDS initiation 
and a set of control variables. I present the results estimated with firm-fixed effects model in 
column (1) for weight of debt and equity. I also report estimates based on quantile regression in 
columns (2), (3), and (4) over quantiles of 0.15, 0.50, and 0.85, respectively. I employ quantile 
regressions because I observe that CDS trading exerts greater effects on firms with high book 
leverage ratios than firms on the other end. I conjecture that CDSs have contrary effects on firms 




<Insert Table 2.14 about here> 
Examining the left side of Table 2.14, I find two noteworthy results. First, CDS trading has 
contradictory effects on companies with low and high market leverage ratios. The estimate on CDS 
initiation over the quantile of 0.15 in column (2) is positive (1.18) and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that firms originally employing lower debt financing would substantially increase the 
use of debt. In contrast, the one in column (4) over the quantile of 0.85 is negative (-2.58) and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms with a high leverage ratio would decrease debt 
usage after CDS trading. Such contrary effects are because CDSs have both commitment and 
exacting functions on the focal firms. Firms with higher leverage are more likely to confront 
stronger threatening effects from empty creditors, while firms with lower leverage ratios may 
capture more commitment benefits of CDS, i.e., the latter can increase access and flexibility to 
capital markets, thus leading to using more debt financing than before. The arguments above are 
supported by the results on the right side of Table 2.14 as well, which show the quantile estimates 
for the weight of equity. 
Second, the estimate of regression of the weight of debt on CDS initiation with firm-fixed effects 
model is positive (1.43) and marginally significant at the 10%. Correspondingly, I observe a 
negative coefficient on the weight of equity (-1.53) and significant at the 10% level as well. To 
verify my estimates, I regress market and book leverage ratios on CDS initiation and report 
estimates in the Online Table A7. Both estimates on CDS initiation are positive and significant at 




finding is consistent with prior studies, such as Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Batta and Yu 
(2019)25.  
At first glance, it seems that, post-CDS trading, the capital supply effects of CDS on firms with 
lower leverage ratios outweigh the threatening effects on firms with higher leverage ratios. As a 
result,  firms use more debt financing than equity financing, on average. Nonetheless, I point out 
that the increase in the weight of debt may be attributed to a firm’s debt issuance as well as to the 
decreased required returns on debt from investors, or a mix of them. To further ascertain the 
channels that reduce the WACC, I estimate the relations between CDS trading and security 
issuance. I regress net debt and net equity issuance on CDS initiation and on an array of firm’s 
controls used before. I present the results in Table 2.15. Starting from net debt issuance, I find 
negative estimates significant at the 5% or 10% level on CDS initiation with firm- and industry-
year fixed effects, respectively. This evidence demonstrates that, on average, firms do not issue 
more debt after CDS trading. On the contrary, they reduce the issuance of debt. This finding is 
consistent with Batta and Yu (2019) who find a decrease in debt issuance as well. Turning to net 
equity issuance, I observe that one of the two estimates is negative and marginally significant at 
the 10% level, indicating less equity issuance after CDS trading. However, the negative effect on 
equity issuance is weaker than the effect on debt issuance, evidenced by the negative but 
insignificant estimate from firm-fixed effects model. 
In summary, I find evidence that the firm’s weight of debt increases on average. The firm’s 
increasing issuance of debt financing is not a cause here, but rather the decreased required return 
on debt is. This finding reveals that debt value increases because of the hedging functions of CDSs. 
 
25 The weight of debt and equity we use in this study is the proportion of long-term debt to the firm’s market value, 
in contrast to Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Batta and Yu (2019) who use the total debt scaled by the total book or 




Interestingly, I also find the weight of equity to be marginally decreased and associated with less 
equity issuance. Therefore, the decrease in WACC could partially be ascribed to the improved 
proportion of debt in capital mix. However, such benefits are not due to managers actively 
adjusting debt usage, but to the hedging function of CDS markets, which generally increase the 
values of debt. 
<Insert Table 2.15 about here> 
5.3 Debt placement structure post-CDS trading 
To advance my understanding of how CDSs reduce the cost of debt, I follow Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) to analyze the relation between CDS initiation and various debt compositions. Because 
different types of debt have distinct interest costs and covenants, a firm can withdraw a high cost 
of debt with others that have lower required returns. For instance, the increased information 
transparency between firms and capital markets may give CDS firms more access to public debt 
markets, and they may use more bonds or notes instead of bank loans as a result. Such a conversion 
would reduce the overall cost of debt financing. I follow Colla et al. (2013) to classify debts into 
seven categories: bank loans, revolving credits, bonds and notes, commercial papers, leases, others, 
and trusted preferred. Furthermore, I follow Lin et al. (2013) to construct public and bank debt 
categories. The public debt is the sum of commercial papers and senior and subordinated bonds 
and notes, while bank debt is the sum of bank loans, term loans, and drawn revolving credits. I 
scale those debt compositions by total debt and use the ratios in my analysis.  
<Insert Table 2.16 about here> 
I present the estimates of regressions of debt composition ratios on CDS initiation and a set of 




significant coefficients on CDS initiation across estimators. The estimates are close to the ones in 
Chen et al. (2018). For example, the estimated coefficient for public debt with firm-fixed effects 
is 0.048 and significant at the 1% level in their paper. My estimate is 0.036 and significant at the 
1% level as well. Turning to its components, the estimates from bond are positive and significant 
at the 1% level, while the estimates from commercial papers are insignificant. This evidence 
indicates that CDS trading has no effects on the usage of commercial papers but stimulate firms to 
use substantially more arm-length debt, like bonds. The coefficient from column (2) of bond 
regression using firm-fixed effects model is 0.047, implying that CDS firms increase bond sources 
of financing by 4.7% on average after CDS trading. This percentage is equivalent to a $207 million 
increase in a firm’s bond financing, on average. As a result of using more bond financing, the 
public debt ratio increases.  
In sharp contrast to the increase in public debt, bank debt significantly decreases, demonstrated by 
the negative coefficient of -0.046 (significant at the 1%) on CDS initiation from the firm-fixed 
effects model. Once again, this estimate is close to Chen et al. (2018) in which the corresponding 
estimate is negative (-0.05) and significant at the 5% level. When further examining estimates from 
bank loans and revolving credit regressions, I find that bank loans are negatively but not 
significantly affected by CDS trading, indicated by the negative t statistic of -1.30 from the firm-
fixed effects model. This finding is consistent with Saretto and Tookes (2013). They posit that the 
insignificant impact of CDSs on bank loans may be ascribed to the fact that most CDSs are written 
on bonds, and not on bank loans.  
Different from Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Chen et al. (2018) in which the authors do not 
separately examine the effects of CDSs on revolving credits and loans, I treat bank loans and draw 




debt, evidenced by the weight in bank debt. For example, the mean percentages of revolving credits 
to bank debt are 34% and 45% for CDS and non-CDS firms, respectively. On the other hand, the 
financing costs are different for these two financing vehicles. I find a substantial reduction in the 
usage of revolving credits post-CDS trading. When combining the estimates from bank loans, I 
see that the significant reduction in revolving credits causes the overall decrease in bank debt.  
The reduction in revolving credits may stem from the threatening effects of CDS trading. 
Borrowers may use long-term bonds to facilitate their short-term sources of liquidity to avoid 
rollover risk of revolving credits. To substantiate my arguments, I re-examine the relation between 
debt compositions and CDS initiation, with one third of the firms showing a higher default 
probability. The firms in this group would generally have a higher rollover risk than firms with a 
low default probability. If CDS trading aggravates the banks’ concerns of repayment for these 
firms, I would observe a more significantly negative effect on those firms in terms of the usage of 
revolving credits. I present estimates in Online Table A8. The coefficients of regressions of 
revolving credits on CDS initiation are negative and significant at the 1% level across models. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of coefficients (0.058) from firm-fixed effects model is almost double 
comparing to the corresponding one (0.031) from the whole sample. In contrast, the corresponding 
estimate from firms with a low default probability is not significant at the 10% level and has a 
smaller magnitude (-0.017). These findings support the rollover risk explanations for the reduction 
in revolving credits. However, I point out that the reduction in revolving credits may be also due 
to the increased costs associated with revolving credits. Because of an increased default probability 
after CDS trading, banks may demand higher commitment fees or set stricter covenants on short-
term lending. Last, I also observe that CDS trading has positive and significant effects on other 




To further shed light on the relations between bank loans and CDSs, I re-estimate the relation with 
quantile regressions over quantiles of 0.5 and 0.85 and report the results in Online Table A9. The 
estimates on CDS initiation are negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms 
originally with high bank loans reduce the borrowing from banks after CDS trading. The evidence 
of panel and quantile tests indicates that firms substitute bonds or notes for bank sources of debt. 
If such substitution causes a reduction in the cost of capital or cost of debt, I should observe a 
relation between the capital costs and the corresponding debt compositions. Based on the 
decreased cost of debt, I conjecture that the cost of debt has a positive relation with bond/note 
financing. Consequently, the increased usage of bond/note results in a lowered cost of debt, since 
generally the cost of bond is less than the cost of bank financing. I test my conjecture and report 
the estimates in Table 2.17.  
<Insert Table 2.17 about here> 
In Table 2.17, I find strong evidence to support my conjecture. The estimates on bond are positive 
and significant at the 1% level across models. Particularly, all estimates of regressions of WACC 
on public debt or bond are negative and significant minimally at the 10% level, indicating that the 
increased usage of bond financing can significantly reduce the overall cost of capital of a firm. 
This finding is consistent with my general knowledge that bank loans are costlier than bonds/notes. 
I also observe positive and significant coefficients on bank loans; however, the magnitude of 
estimates is about one third of the ones on bonds, indicating that bonds/notes have stronger effects 
on the cost of debt than bank loans. In this regard, bank loans may serve special functions to a firm, 
such as producing information or building reputation. Cost may not be the main consideration 
when evaluating external debt financing. Turning to revolving credits, I observe negative estimates 




than the one on bank loans, indicating that revolving credits hold a stronger influence on the cost 
of debt. Interestingly, though revolving credits can significantly reduce the cost of debt, firms 
significantly cut down their usage after CDS trading. One explanation for such a reduction is that 
post-CDS trading firms attempt to avoid rollover risk associated with revolving credits. 
In summary, the weight of debt marginally increases, while the weight of equity marginally 
decreases after CDS trading. The increase in debt weight is not due to the issuance of more debt 
securities but to the increased values of debt instruments caused by CDS markets. I also find that 
CDS firms adjust their debt priority by substituting arm-length debts for bank debts over post-CDS 
trading. The substitution may be due to CDS threatening effects or simply because the firms would 
like to capture the advantages of CDSs, such as longer maturity or easier access to public debt. 
Because the cost of bond is generally lower than bank loans, such a substitution causes a reduction 
in the cost of capital.  
6. Conclusions 
The CDS market has attracted substantial controversies (Stulz, 2010). Some believe that CDSs are 
partially to blame for the subprime crisis in the US that led to the subsequent 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. As a result, opponents of CDS have called for a ban on CDS trading. At the same time, 
others have pointed out that CDS trading completes the financial markets by providing easy and 
cheap hedging vehicles. Researchers have examined various tangible effects of CDSs on firms and 
the economy by examining how CDSs affect corporate policies and activities. My study expands 
these analyses and evaluates the overall costs and benefits associated with CDSs by evaluating 
their impact on a firm’s cost of capital. I construct a panel dataset using the universe of US public 




My findings show that CDSs significantly reduce the cost of capital, suggesting that investors view 
CDS trading positively. The channels that affect the cost of capital are different for high and low-
rated firms. Equity holders require a lower return on highly rated firms after CDS trading, while 
most low-rated firms benefit from a reduced cost of debt financing. Compared to shareholders in 
highly rated firms, investors in low-rated firms raise their required returns because of the increased 
risk associated with CDSs. However, the reduction in the cost of debt dominates the increase in 
the cost of equity, resulting in an overall decrease in the cost of capital. 
I have explored the channels through which CDS firms reduce the cost of capital. Quantile 
regressions of different debt ratio levels show that CDS trading initiation has an opposing effect 
on high and low leverage firms. Firms with low leverage significantly increase their usage of debt 
and correspondingly reduce their equity weight, while firms with high and medium leverage 
significantly reduce the weight of debt in their capital structure and issue more equity. Both effects 
are consistent with the empty creditor hypothesis which posits that CDS exerts simultaneously two 
contrary functions on firms. On one hand, it increases the credit supply for borrowers; on the other 
hand, it introduces frictions into debt renegotiation. Furthermore, I find a decrease in the firms’ 
debt issuance but an increase in debt weight in WACC after CDS trading. One reason to explain 
this finding is that the risk hedging function of CDSs may increase the value of debt. Therefore, 
the increase in weight of debt is a channel that decreases the overall cost of capital. 
Finally, I find strong evidence that CDS firms alter their debt placement structure. Post CDs trading, 
CDS firms use more arm-length debt than bank debt. In particular, they reduce their usage of 
revolving credits and use fewer term loans than before. This fact reflects the exacting effects of 
CDS trading. To avoid rollover risk, firms prefer arm-length debt to short-term bank debt for 




These two channels interplay together and result in a reduction of the overall cost of capital. My 
findings suggest that financial market innovations, such as CDSs, affect a firm’s financing 







Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been deeply ingrained in modern business practices and 
society26. Although CSR prevails in global societies, the motives and factors that lead corporations 
to engage in CSR initiatives are not well-understood (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). For instance, 
agency theorists blame CSR as a means for managers to seize their interests at the costs of 
shareholders (Friedman, 1962; Jensen, 2001), while institutional theorists argue that the 
institutional environment (e.g., social norms, legal systems, etc.) plays a pivotal role in shaping 
the corporations’ CSR policies (Campbell, 2007; Lee, 2011; Brammer et al., 2012). Likewise, 
stakeholder theorists advocate the use of CSR for promoting stakeholders’ relationships of a 
corporation (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Freeman et al., 2010), and by this 
means achieving competitive advantages and sustainability for the focal company. Consistent with 
the theories above, academics identify various empirical factors that affect a firms’ CSR practices, 
e.g., research and development expenditure (Padgett and Galan, 2010), institutional shareholder 
(Dyck et al., 2019), governance (Jo and Harjoto, 2012), social milieus (Chih et al., 2010),  and 
more. In this article, I explore whether the innovation of financial markets, specifically the credit 
default swaps, can impact companies’ CSR practices. 
 
26 The importance of CSR to businesses and communities can be inferred from the tremendous fund that uses CSR as 
investing metrics. For example, the total US-domiciled assets under the management using sustainable, responsible, 
and impact investing (SRI) strategies grew to 12 trillion at the start of 2018, an 18-fold increase comparing with the 




Credit default swaps (CDSs) are credit derivatives wherein the buyers of CDSs make periodic 
payments to CDS sellers during the contract period in exchange for protection against risky credit 
events (e.g., payment default, debt restructuring, etc.) of the CDS referenced firms. The initial 
purpose of CDSs was to allow holders of corporate bonds/loans to protect themselves from the 
risk of default. Nonetheless, because CDS materially alters the relationships among major 
corporate stakeholders (Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke 2011), CDSs practically not only 
function as vehicles of risk hedging but also have shown real effects on CDS firms’ operation and 
investment strategies (Li and Tang, 2016; Danis and Gamba, 2018; Batta and Yu, 2019). For 
example, Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) show that CDS firms substantially adopt less 
conservative accounting standards over post-CDS periods. Kim et al. (2018) document that 
managers of CDS firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose the firm’s earning forecasts. Chang 
et al. (2019) show that CDS trading significantly and positively promotes firms’ technology 
innovations. Given the importance of CDS in the economy27, it is necessary to fully understand 
and examine the externalities CDS trading induces on the economy. 
My empirical analysis of CDS is grounded on the empty creditor hypothesis developed by Hu and 
Black (2008) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011). The empty creditor hypothesis posits that CDS 
insured lenders may become less accommodating in debt renegotiations because CDSs provide 
them with a valuable alternative option28 as opposed to a compromise during debt renegotiations 
(Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). Furthermore, overly insured lenders who have negative economic 
exposure may prefer forcing distressed CDS firms into default to collect payments from CDS 
 
27 For example, CDS transactions rank third among derivative products after interest rate and foreign exchange; its 
notional amount remained at $9.9 and $9.75 trillion at the end of 2016 and 2017, respectively (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2017 annual report). 
28 CDS protected lenders can claim reimbursement from CDS sellers if the referenced firm triggers credit events 




sellers (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017; Denis, 2016). In this regard, CDS trading could increase 
the restructuring frictions of the distressed firms, which decreases the likelihood of success 
renegotiation and causes more inefficient bankruptcy than before. 
Empirical studies have documented evidence validating this threatening effects of CDSs. For 
instance, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) provide evidence that following CDS-trade-initiation, the 
probability of bankruptcy significantly increases. Danis (2016) finds that bondholders of CDS 
firms are less inclined to participate in out-of-court debt workouts than bondholders of non-CDS 
firms. Bedendo et al. (2016) show that distressed CDS firms tend to have higher recovery rates in 
exchange offers to surmount the boycott of CDS-protected creditors. 
The threatening effects of CDS may negatively affect a firm’s corporate environmental and social 
practices because CSR activities may only bring benefits to the focal firm in the long run but 
require vast investment outlay (Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Lins et al., 2017). For example, Giuli 
and Kostovetsky (2014) document that S&P 500 companies that are more CSR inclined will 
averagely spend $80 million more than those that are not CSR inclined, and US corporations spend 
hundreds of millions of dollars in CSR activities. Due to these high financial costs and the 
intensified stress from exacting CDS protected lenders, I conjecture that executives may become 
more conservative towards CSR activities when CDSs were traded on their debts. In contrast to 
the long-term implicit benefits arising from engaging in CSR initiatives, CDS firms may prefer to 
invest in projects with sizeable economic benefits for fulfilling their obligations to debtors or cut 
down on investments to preserve more cash (Subrahmanyam et al., 2017), hence avoiding 
negotiating with CDS protected lenders. Therefore, I hypothesize that CDS inception would induce 




On the other hand, the empty creditor hypothesis also implies that CDS can deter the borrowers’ 
ex-ante strategic default incentives because CDSs enhance the lenders’ bargaining position over 
the ex-post debt renegotiation. Consequently, CDS could act as a commitment device in debt 
contacts for borrowers, i.e., not to strategically default. Besides, by shifting the borrowers’ credit 
risk to the CDS sellers, the CDS insured lenders can convert high risk-weighted loans into low 
risk-weighted ones in their balance sheets (Shan et al., 2015, 2016). These two functions of CDS, 
i.e., shifting risk and serving as a commitment device, reduce frictions on the credit supply sides 
and therefore increase the firms’ debt capacity. Empirical studies verify this credit supply effect. 
For instance, Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that CDS firms maintain a higher level of leverage 
ratios and longer debt maturity in contrast to non-CDS firms after the introduction of CDSs. 
Consistent with Saretto and Tookes (2013), Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) also find that CDS firm’s 
leverage increases significantly over post-CDS periods. Hirtle (2009) finds that CDS-hedged 
banks originate new term loans coupling with larger volumes and longer maturities.  
Furthermore, CDS markets reduce the information asymmetry (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009) and 
enhance public information disclosure of CDS firms (Kim et al., 2018) because managers of CDS 
firms face more stress for information requirements from shareholders due to weakened 
monitoring effects of debt lenders. With more information disclosed, CDS firms become less 
opaque in terms of information transparency (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009) and thus may attract 
more public attention concerning CSR activities. Meanwhile, the informational role of CDS 
markets may facilitate ESG evaluators to collect corporate CSR data and hence improve CSR 
scores, even if the focal firm maintains its original CSR policies. Therefore, my second hypothesis 
is that the inception of CDS trading may be positively related to CSR performance. Ultimately, 




CSR policies. The net impact of CDS trading on a firm’s CSR practices depends on the wrestling 
of the contrary tensions caused by CDSs and should be determined empirically.  
To test my two contrary hypotheses, I construct a longitude sample of globally public companies 
from eleven countries and regions over the period from 2002 to 2017. These include the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Canada. I use Thomson Reuters ASSET4 environmental and social (E&S) scores 
to proxy a company’s environmental and social performance, respectively. By employing both 
event study and multivariate panel regression while controlling for both firm and time trend effects, 
I explore the impact of CDS trading on the firms’ CSR initiatives. 
I find statistical evidence indicating that CDS trading significantly and negatively influences firms’ 
environmental emission reduction activities. The coefficient of CDS trading for emission reduction 
test is -4.9% with a p-value of 0.065 based on my whole sample, indicating a significant reduction 
in the metric of environmental emission reduction following CDS trading. In the economic sense, 
this reduction is equivalent to a $35.94 million cut back on a firm’s emission reduction expenses. 
Additionally, I observe weak but negative effects of CDS trading on firms’ other CSR activities. 
These findings are consistent with the exacting effects of the empty creditor hypothesis. Over post-
CDS periods, managers avert to negotiate with exacting CDS-protected lenders and thus employ 
more conservative policies on spending scarce corporate resources. 
I run several robustness tests to corroborate my findings, including event study, the propensity 
scores matched sample, Monte Carlo simulation, and various subsample tests. Results based on 
those tests robustly substantiate my conclusions. I also compare the impact of CDS initiation over 
the financial crisis period (August 31, 2008-August 30, 2009) with the impact over non-crisis 




exogenous shock to all firms in the economy, and most firms face credit crunch (Stulz, 2010; 
Augustin et al., 2014). The tight credit supply would exacerbate firms’ financial needs and induce 
managers to become further conservative over the crisis period than usual. My estimates indicate 
that the negative effects of CDS trading become more salient in the crisis period comparing to the 
effects over the non-crisis period. 
Finally, I explore the motives that CDS firms significantly cut back expenses on emission 
reduction activities while not on other aspects of CSR. I follow Hillman and Keim (2001) to 
investigate the relationship between shareholder value creation proxied by MVA and stakeholder 
relationship management proxied by ASSET4 E&S scores. My results indicate that emission 
reduction activities have no statistical relation to shareholder value creation, while other activities 
of CSR significantly and positively enhance shareholder value generation.  
My study contributes to the present literature in several ways. First, my paper contributes to the 
growing body of CDS literature. I reveal one of the downsides of CDSs. That is, CDS trading 
induces firms to shrink their efforts on environmental emission reduction activities. My paper 
helps policymakers to weigh the benefits and costs of CDSs. Second, my work contributes to CSR 
literature. A long-lasting dispute in CSR literature is whether there is a robust connection between 
CSR performance and firm value assessed by either financial or accounting terms (Margolis et al., 
2007; Becchetti et al., 2008; Kruger, 2015; Buchanan et al., 2018). My results shed light on this 
issue by showing that good stakeholder relationship management, measured by high CSR scores, 
brings value to shareholders.  
Third, my paper illuminates the relation between environmental activities and shareholder value 
creation. I show that shareholder value creation proxied by market value added (MVA) has no 




resource management and eco-product innovation activities, could bring wealth to shareholders. 
This finding is consistent with Siegel’s (2009) argument that green management matters unless it 
can realize the organization’s goal and ultimately bring wealth to shareholders. My findings help 
policymakers ascertain which policies corporations are more inclined to undertake under the 
circumstance of curtailed spending.  
Last, my study contributes to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) 
and CSR performance. As far as I know, this is the first study that uses longitudinal data to explore 
the supra relationship from the overall CG levels instead of from a single or several aspects of CG. 
My empirical tests suggest that the overall CG is a critical determinant of a firms’ CSR quality. 
Research articles that do not control the overall CG quality may produce biased estimates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe my data sample and summary 
statistics. I present the test methodology and baseline results in section 3, and robustness tests are 
conducted in section 4. I analyze primary and secondary stakeholders in section 5, and section 6 
concludes.   
2. Sample Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics 
2.1. Sample selection and data 
I construct my longitudinal sample by merging several data sources: Markit Group, Bloomberg, 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4, Worldscope, Datastream, Compustat, and the Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation (DTCC). I obtain the CDS initiation dates from Markit Group and 
Bloomberg. Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Amiram et al. (2017), I identify the first 
CDS trade date of the referenced firm covered by Markit as the CDS inception date. I identify 




my sample from January 2001 because it is the first month that Markit begins to collect derivative 
quotes from key CDS trading dealers. As CDS transactions traded over the counter, I are unsure 
whether those dealers started quoting CDS spreads in January 2001 while these CDSs were 
actually traded before 2001. To reduce such ambiguity, I remove 189 CDS firms whose trading 
dates fall in the first quarter of 200129. Following Kim et al. (2018), I verify the onset dates of CDS 
firms in 2001 by examining the early trading dates available in Bloomberg. I further require that 
there is at least one-year financial and corporate social and environmental data available 
immediately after the onset of CDS trading. As per this rule, 657 CDS firms are eliminated, 
resulting in 569 CDS firms and 7,567 firm-year observations in my CDS sample.  
I obtain corporate environmental and social data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 and use E&S 
metrics as the proxies of the corporations’ CSR performance. My E&S metrics span from the 2002 
fiscal year to the 2017 fiscal year. Following the previous literature in the realm of CDS (for 
instance, Saretto and Tookes, 2013; Guest et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2019), I exclude firms in the 
financial industry that are identified by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) (SIC 
codes 6000-6999). The resulting sample includes 4,347 non-financial firms and 73,899 firm-year 
observations, respectively. I merge the E&S sample with Worldscope’s fundamental financial data 
and Datastream’s stock prices by matching the corporations’ International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN). 
Additionally, I obtain the exchange rate, firm age, and SIC codes from COMPUSTAT. Precisely, 
I follow Shumway (2001) and Loderer and Waelchli (2010) to approximate a firm’s age by first 
 
29 Unlike Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Amiram et al. (2017), and Kim et al. (2018) who remove CDS firms whose 
trading dates fall in January 2001, we eliminate all CDS firms traded in the first quarter of 2001. This action will 
lessen concerns of ambiguous CDS initiation dates in non-US markets because, in contrast to US market, the non-




selecting the earlier of the firm’s initial public offering (IPO) date and the first date when the firm 
was included in the Compustat database. The number of years elapsed since the earlier date is then 
used to approximate the firm’s age. I then merge the CDS sample with E&S and accounting 
samples through ISIN. Finally, I exclude observations that missed any of E&S metrics and thirteen 
control variables (see Section 2.2.3 for controls). This exclusion results in a full sample of 23,901 
firm-year observations from 3,383 firms. Specifically, my final sample is comprised of 2,844 non-
CDS firms with 17,214 firm-year observations and 539 CDS firms with 6,687 firm-year 
observations. 
Lastly, for US CDS firms, I collect the average daily CDS notional amount and the number of 
clearing dealers from DTCC over the period 2009 to 2017. DTCC provides weekly aggregate 
single-name CDS transaction data for the most active 1000 reference entities from October 2008 
onwards. I use the average daily CDS notional amount and the total number of clearing dealers in 
the fiscal year as alternative predictors of the onset of CDS trading. After manually matching each 
US CDS firm with the DTCC data, I obtain 2,082 firm-year observations over the period 2009 to 
2017. By combining this US CDS subsample with the corresponding US non-CDS observations 
in this period, I finally have 6,722 US firm-year observations spanning from 2009 to 2017. 
2.2. Variables 
2.2.1. Dependent variables 
Academics have struggled to determine how to operationally measure CSR performance (Clarkson, 
1995; Wood and Jones, 1995; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Margolis et al., 2007; Galant and Cadez, 
2017). The task has been challenging because of the multidimensional characteristics of CSR, 




2016). At the same time, there is no universal definition of CSR, making the task of measuring it 
more complicated. Researchers A variety of measures of CSR performance has been employed by 
researchers. For example, reputation indexes, including Fortune magazine corporate reputations 
(McGuire et al., 1988), Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (Artiach et al., 2010; Chih et al., 
2010), and Newsweek Green Rankings (Cordeiro and Tewari, 2015); questionnaires and surveys 
(Alexander and Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle et al., 1985; Rettab et al., 2009); content analysis 
(Abbott et al., 1979; Karagiorgos, 2010); and single dimension measure of CSR such as carbon 
cost (Cadez and Guilding, 2017). The variety of measurements of CSR is one of the major causes 
that leads to the ambiguous relationship of CSR and corporate financial performance (Wood, 1991; 
Margolis et al., 2007; Galant and Cadez, 2017).  
I use Thomson Reuters ASSET4 E&S scores to measure corporate social and environmental 
performance for three reasons. Firstly, it has a relatively broader coverage of publicly listed firms 
across countries30. Secondly, it evaluates CSR from multidimensions. Thirdly, the ASSET4 dataset 
was widely adopted to quantify corporate E&S performance (e.g., Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; 
Cheng et al., 2014; Shaukat et al., 2016; Dyck et al., 2019). Over 150 trained content research 
analysts across the globe publicly collect available sources of information, including annual reports, 
company websites, nongovernment organization (NGO) websites, stock exchange filings, CSR 
reports, and news (Thomson Reuters ESG Score, 2019). Indicatively, the usage of only publicly 
available information ensures the objective and transparent evaluation of CSR performance. 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 data is available starting from the 2002 fiscal year, and it initially 
 
30 Betty Moy Huber and Michael Comstock posted a summary of ESG providers, “ESG Reports and Ratings: What 






covers approximately 1000 large and publicly traded firms (such as constituents of S&P 500, 
Nasdaq 100, CAC 40, FTSE 100, etc.). As of 2017, Thomson Reuters maintained and evaluated 
the CSR performance of over 7000 publicly traded corporations across the world.  
Thomson Reuters collects over 900 data points per firm dealing with CSR performances (Cheng 
et al., 2014; Shaukat et al., 2016). For example, ‘Does the company make donations in cash or in-
kind?’ and ‘Total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission in tonnes’ are two data points regarding the 
firms’ social philanthropic and environmental performance, respectively. These data points are 
transformed into quantitative data by analysts and are employed to calculate 250 key performance 
indicators (KPIs) to be further aggregated into 18 categories within four pillars: (1) environmental 
(three categories: emissions reduction, resource reduction, and product innovation), (2) social 
(seven categories: employment quality, health and safety, training and development, diversity, 
human rights, community, and product responsibility), (3) governance (five categories: board 
structure, compensation policy, shareholder rights, and vision and strategy), and (4) economic 
(three categories: client loyalty, performance, shareholders, and loyalty). Categories and pillars are 
calculated with equal weight and then Z-scored by benchmarking ASSET4 universe. Therefore, 
ASSET4 E&S scores are a relative measure of the firms’ CSR performance comparing to all 
companies within the ASSET4 dataset. 
In my study, I focus on ten themes of CSR performance, including three environmental categories 
and seven social categories. Furthermore, I include environmental and social pillar scores as my 
dependent variable as well to evaluate the overall effects of CDS trading on environmental and 
social performance. 




I construct a dummy variable denominated as CDSINIT, which has a value of one for the CDS 
firms in and after CDS initiation year and zero before that. CDSINIT is my main variable of interest, 
which captures the changes in CSR performance following CDS inception. A significant and 
positive (negative) coefficient on CDSINIT would indicate that the initiation of CDS strengthens 
(weakens) the firms’ CSR activities. I also construct another dummy variable, CDSFIRM, which 
has a value of one for CDS firms and zero for non-CDS firms, to control the time-invariant 
unobservable difference between CDS firms and non-CDS firms. Therefore, CDSINIT captures 
the incremental effects of CDS trading on the firms’ CSR behaviors.  
Prior studies have extensively use the CDS trading notional or liquidity variables to proxy CDS 
activity (e.g., Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2016; Fuller et al., 2018; Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 
2018a, 2018b; Chang et al., 2019; Colonnello et al., 2019). Therefore, as an alternative to the 
CDSINIT dummy variable, I use CDS average daily trading notional amount and log of the total 
number of clearing dealers in the fiscal year to proxy CDS activity. I hypothesize that the more 
liquidity the CDS trading on a reference entity has, the stronger the influence of CDS effects on 
the focal firm’s CSR performance.  
2.2.3. Control variables 
A large body of literature has examined the incentives and factors that drive corporations to engage 
in CSR activities (e.g., McGuire et al., 1988; Roberts, 1992; Campbell, 2007; Siegel and Vitaliano, 
2007; Artiach et al., 2010; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Chih et al., 2010; Padgett and Galan, 2010; 
Shaukat et al., 2016; Dyck et al., 2019). I rely extensively on this stream of literature to construct 
an array of control variables to isolate the impact of CDS trading on CSR activities. Lins et al. 
(2017) and Dyck et al. (2019) suggest that institutional ownerships may impact a firm’s social 




ratio of the strategic holdings, which is the sum of all five percent and beyond share ownership to 
total outstanding common shares, as the institutional ownership.  
Large firms attract more public attention and, thus, more scrutiny and pressure from the public 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Artiach et al., 2010; Chih et al., 2010). Furthermore, they can realize 
economic scales in CSR activities (Artiach et al., 2010). Following Artiach et al. (2010), I use total 
assets on a natural log scale (log (assets)) to control the effect of firm size on CSR performance31. 
Further, compared to small firms, large firms may experience less financial constraints; therefore, 
they may have more financial flexibility to deploy resources on CSR activities (Hong and 
Kostovetsky, 2012). Following Lins et al. (2017) and Dyck et al. (2019), I use leverage32, defined 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets, tangibility, which is defined as the ratio of net property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets, and cash holdings, defined as cash and equivalent 
divided by total assets, to control the firm’s financial slacks.  
Furthermore, a firm’s financial performance may influence its CSR efforts (Ullmann, 1985; 
Roberts, 1992; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Clarkson et al., 2011;). Executives in firms with weak 
financial performance may face increasing pressure from shareholders; therefore, they may focus 
more on commercial activities rather than on CSR ones (Roberts, 1992; Artiach et al., 2010). 
Following Artiach et al. (2010) and Lins et al. (2017), I proxy the firms’ financial performance 
(profitability) by the ratio of operating income to total assets33. Furthermore, a high market-to-
 
31 We also use the log of total sales to proxy the firm’s size. There is no material influence on our results. 
32 Replacing leverage by market leverage has no statistic effects on our results. 
33 We also proxy the profitability by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled 
by total assets, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on capital. All proxies produce the same 
level of statistics. Further, following Artiach et al. (2010), we construct free cash flow using free cash flow divided 
by total sales to proxy profitability and financial slacks. However, the Pearson correlation between free cash flow 
and capital intensity variable is -0.798 and significant at the 1% level. The high correlation may cause 




book ratio implies a firm’s future growth opportunity and its investment opportunity. High growth 
firms may have more prospects of integrating CSR into their products (Artiach et al., 2010) and 
may have higher CSR performance. I use the market-to-book ratio (MTBV) to account for growth. 
Clarkson et al. (2011) argue that firms with higher capital expenditures are expected to have better 
CSR performance because newly designed machinery is more likely to lower the pollution and 
resource waste by employing cutting-edge technology. Following Clarkson et al. (2011), I use the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total sales (CAPEX) to control capital intensity effects.  
Padgett and Galan (2010) test the direct relationship between research and development (R&D) 
expenditure and CSR performance. They found evidence of a significant, positive correlation 
between them. Other studies corroborate such a relation (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). 
Technology innovation would lead to innovative products and processes, which in turn could use 
resources efficiently, enhance productivity, and thus may satisfy the firms’ various groups of 
stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Padgett and Galan, 2010). Following Padgett and 
Galan (2010), I proxy R&D spending (R&D) by the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales34.  
Jo and Harjoto (2012) find evidence that corporate governance (CG) enhances the corporations’ 
CSR engagement, because a high level of governance may restrict opportunistic managerial 
behaviors and thus increase the trustworthiness of stakeholders, ultimately improving corporate 
social performance and reputation. Further, Shaukat et al. (2016) report that corporate board 
attributes, such as board diversity, independence, board strategic vision, and so on, can affect 
corporate CSR performance. Because corporate governance is a holistic system; therefore, a single 
 
34 We also use the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets to control R&D effects, a measure used by King and 
Lenox (2001) and Chang et al. (2018). Both measures lead to the same level of statistical results. Following the 
conventions (see Koh and Reeb (2015) for statistics of coding missing R&D expenses), we assign a zero to all 




aspect of governance mechanism would not be a valid measure of weaknesses and strengths of the 
focal firm’s governance. Consequently, I employ the governance score from the ASSET4 database 
to control the influence of the overall corporate governance on CSR practices. 
Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) and Padgett and Galan (2010) argue that a firm’s business risk and 
CSR performance have a negative causality. Managers tend to reassess and alter their planning 
activities when financial risk is heightened. Furthermore, high financial volatility may also put 
firms on the edge of decline and bankruptcy (Baird and Thomas, 1985; Subrahmanyam et al., 
2014). I follow Chang et al. (2019) to use the stock volatility over the fiscal year to proxy a firm’s 
riskiness35. 
Cochran and Wood (1984) point out that asset turnover could influence a firm’s CSR performance 
because this ratio measures the capability of managers to efficiently use the firm’s assets to 
invest—including CSR outlay—and generate profits. I define asset turnover as sales divided by 
total assets. Finally, I control the age of a corporation because Roberts (1992) documents evidence 
of a correlation between a firm’s age and CSR performance. A mature corporation may have stable 
strategies regarding its CSR policies (Roberts, 1992) and more exposure in the media than a new 
corporation, and hence more public pressure for its involvement in CSR activities. Following 
Loderer and Waelchli (2010), I estimate a firm’s age by selecting the earlier of its initial public 
offering (IPO) date and the first date when the firm was included in Compustat. The number of 
years elapsed since the earlier date is used to approximate a firm’s age. 
The thirteen factors supra are firm-level characteristics that may influence a firm’s CSR 
performance. In contrast to these internal factors, institutions (such as laws and regulations, 
 
35 We also use beta and stock volatility over three fiscal years to proxy a firm’s risk. All measures show the same 




policies, social norms, ethics, and cultures, etc.) also shape the corporations’ CSR activities via 
framing incentive and punishment structures (Campbell, 2007; Lee, 2011). In addition, Siegel and 
Vitaliano (2007) argue that firms selling experience and credence goods (such as automobiles and 
appliances) may have higher CSR performances than firms selling search goods (such as clothing 
and furniture). I include firm-fixed effects in my specification to account for systematic differences 
caused by institutional factors and firm types on CSR activities across countries and industries. 
Furthermore, I follow Chang et al. (2019) to winsorize all control variables at the bottom and top 
one percentile to reduce the effects of potential extreme values. 
2.3 Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the statistics of environmental and social metrics for both CDS and 
non-CDS firms across eleven countries and regions. All E&S metrics of CDS firms are 
significantly higher than those of non-CDS firms. For instance, the means of the overall 
environmental score are 62.49 and 41.47 for CDS and non-CDS firms, respectively. The difference 
between them is significant at the 1% level.  
Turning to Panel B, which describes the summary statistics of firm-level characteristics used as 
control variables in my analyses, I observe significant differences between CDS firms and non-
CDS firms across all firm features. The CDS firms are more profitable and less risky in equity 
returns, have a large market capitalization, high asset tangibility and leverage, and low growth rate 
than their counterparts. These statistics are consistent with findings of the extant CDS literature, 
such as Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) and Chang et al. (2019). Further, CDS firms show 
higher governance quality and have a longer firm age. For example, the means of CDS firm age 
and governance are 28.67 years and 61.92, respectively, which are significantly greater than the 




<Insert Table 3.1 about here> 
In Panel C, the environmental and social scores have notable variations across eleven countries 
and regions. The E&S scores range from the lowest ones, 38.12 and 38.58 (Hong Kong), to the 
highest ones, 77.97 and 78.67 (Germany). Most European countries show significantly higher E&S 
scores than Asian countries. Remarkably, firms from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have 
significantly higher environmental scores than social scores, while this situation reverses for firms 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. My sample has relatively the same 
properties as Dyck et al. (2019). 
In Panel D, I present the distribution of CDS firms by one-digit SIC code. As shown, CDS firms 
are selected mainly from the manufacturing industry (such as food, petroleum, paper, printing, 
rubber, stone, and computer) in my sample (51.76% of the sample), following by transportation 
business (18.55% of the sample). I report the distribution of CDS firms in Panel E by the inception 
year of CDS trading. Most of the CDS are initiated from 2001 to 2007, capturing 73.47% of the 
CDS sample.  
I describe the Pearson correlation matrix of selected variables in Panel F. I observe that the highest 
correlation is 0.896, which is between CDSFIRM and CDSINIT. Such a high correlation is due to 
my variable construction methodology. I employ the firm-fixed model to counteract this possible 
multicollinearity concern. Except for this correlation, I do not observe high correlations between 
control variables, which indicates that multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem in my 
regression. 
3. Methodology and Empirical Results 




To estimate the effects of CDS trading on CSR performance, I apply the difference in difference 
(DID) mechanism to all empirical tests. I estimate the following baseline regression model with 
firm-year fixed effects36. 
   log (𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒i,t) = α + β𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇i,t−1 + γ𝑌i,t−1 + ω𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚i + ϕ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟t + εi,t      (1) 
where 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is one of the twelve E&S scores for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The main variable of interest 
is CDSINIT, which is an indicator variable and has a value of one for the CDS firm in and after 
CDS initiation, and zero before the initiation year. Its coefficient 𝛽 captures the percentage effect 
on E&S scores due to CDS trading. A significant and positive (negative) coefficient of CDSINIT 
would indicate that CDSs strengthen (weaken) a firm’s CSR activities. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is the vector of firm-
level control variables observed at the end of year 𝑡 − 1 defined in section 2.2.3. I follow Chang 
et al. (2019) to lag all control variables one year in contrast to dependent variables because the 
initiation of CDS trading is not expected to immediately affect a CDS firm’s CSR activities. I 
include firm-fixed effects in my specification to control the effects of time-invariant, unobservable 
firm characteristics, and institutional differentials on CSR activities across countries and industries. 
Further, I incorporate year effects in my specification to capture the aggregate time variation in 
CSR performance. Given that the observations of the same firm are autocorrelated, I cluster the 
standard errors of coefficients at the firm level37. 
3.2. Empirical results 
 
36 With firm-fixed effects model, the DID regression specification (2) reduces to equation (1):              
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
37 We also cluster the standard errors at both firm and year dimensions by following the suggestion by Petersen 





Table 3.2 reports the estimates of my baseline model (1). I regress each E&S score with and 
without controlling Governance and organize the results in pairs. I present estimates using all 
controls except Governance in the first column, while the second column uses all controls.  
<Insert Table 3.2 about here> 
 As shown in Table 3.2, all coefficients of CDSINIT are negative, although most are not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This finding suggests that the introduction of CDS trading negatively 
impact CSR performance. Across E&S measures, emission reduction metric (ENER) is the only 
one having a statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient of CDSINIT is -4.9%, statistically 
significant at the 6.82% level, indicating that compared with non-CDS firms, CDS firms 
experience, on average, a 4.9% reduction on emission reduction score after CDS trading initiation. 
This reduction is not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. To examine 
its economic significance, I follow Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) and Lins et al. (2017) to estimate 
the relation between Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) expenses and emission 
reduction score with my whole sample. Specifically, following Lins et al. (2017), I regress the log 
of SG&A expenses on the log of assets, equity book to market, cash and equivalent to total assets, 
total debt to total asset, cash dividend payment to total assets, and earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) to total assets. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3.3. 
<Insert Table 3.3 about here> 
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics of SG&A expenses based on CDS firms, non-
CDS firms, and full sample. As per the estimated coefficient of ENER and mean and median values 




($15.81) million decrease in emission reduction expenses based on the mean (median) of CDS 
sample following the CDS trading initiation one year later38. 
I also find that governance quality plays a vital role in determining firms’ CSR performance. All 
coefficients of Governance are statistically significant at the 1% level across regressions. Further, 
with the inclusion of governance control, the magnitude of all coefficients of CDSINIT is reduced 
significantly. Particularly, the coefficients of the social score (SOCSCORE), environmental score 
(ENVSCORE), resource reduction (ENRR), training and diversity (SOTD), and product 
responsibility (SOPR) are statistically significant at either the 5% or 10% level without controlling 
Governance. However, when including governance control, they all lose statistical significance. 
This evidence suggests that when analyzing CSR issues, the omission controlling governance 
would yield biased results. 
The coefficients of control variables are, in general, conform to the extant literature of CSR. For 
instance, the coefficients of total assets and firm age are mostly positive and statistically significant. 
This result reflects that larger and more mature companies face more public pressure than small 
ones and thus have a relatively higher CSR performance. Risk is generally negatively related to 
CSR scores, consistent with the present CSR literature. In addition, I observe that asset turnover 
significantly and positively promotes a corporation’s E&S performance, evidenced by most, 
though not all, positive and statistically significant estimates of coefficients on asset turnover. 
Furthermore, all coefficient estimates of R&D are positive, and most are close to or significant at 
 
38 Let 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜀,  
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
= 𝑦 ∗ 𝛽, so the 𝛽 ∗100% is approximately the percentage differential on dependent 
variable 𝑦 due to a unit change in variable 𝑥. In our case, when CDSINIT changed from zero to one, ENER 
decreased by 4.9% approximately. The change in ENER from its mean, 62.43, is then: 4.9% *62.43=3.059. 
Likewise, one-unit change in ENER will cause 0.39% difference in SG&A expenses. Therefore, the total change of 
SG&A expenses due to CDS trading would be 0.39%*3.059=1.19%. The change of SG&A from its mean value of 




the 10% level. This result is in line with prior studies, such as Padgett and Galan (2010), who find 
a significantly positive relation between R&D expenses and CSR performance. 
Taken together, the baseline results presented in Table 3.2 suggest that CDS trading adversely 
influences a firm’s CSR efforts. Particularly, CDS trading significantly and negatively affects the 
firm’s emission reduction activities. These findings indicate that the executives of CDS firms 
become more conservative towards the company’s investment outlay related to CSR activities 
when they realize that CDSs were traded on their firm’s debt. To reduce the potential of triggering 
credit events and consequently negotiating with tougher CDS protected lenders, the executive pays 
more attention to economic returns instead of social returns. Those results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the CSR performance of CDS firms declines after the CDS trading initiation. The 
results corroborate the threatening effects of the empty creditor hypothesis. In the next section, I 
verify those results with several robustness tests. 
4. Robustness Tests 
4.1. Propensity Score Matched (PSM) sample 
Prior literature in CDS stream (e.g., Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2019) documents 
that firms selected to be referred for CDS trading are generally larger and more mature, more 
informationally transparent, and possess better creditworthiness. This fact is consistent with lemon 
effects. Comparing with CDS buyers, CDS sellers face an information disadvantage regarding the 
referenced firms because CDS buyers are generally loan originators or bondholders, and thus hold 
private information of the borrowers. Therefore, CDS sellers prefer to trade trustworthy companies 
that are less opaque and larger in market value by way of reducing transaction risk. It is possible 




performance. To address those concerns, I follow the literature (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015; Chang et al. 2019) to form matched 
control firms that have never been selected to trade CDS throughout the whole sample period. 
I use the following probit model to capture the likelihood of CDS trading each year. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = ∅(𝛼 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝜔𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡)    (3) 
in which ∅ is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution. CDSINIT is an 
indicator variable that has a value of one in and after CDS trading initiation, and zero otherwise. 
𝑋 is a vector of firm-level characteristics that are used to predict the inception of CDS trading. 
Following Chang et al. (2019), I include all controls into vector 𝑋 to mitigate the concern that the 
determinants of CSR performance may also be factors driving CDS trading initiation. Besides, 
following Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), I include the ratio of working capital to total assets and 
return on assets as well. Furthermore, I include Fama-French 48 industry classification to isolate 
industry fixed effects on CSR performance. I also include country- and year-fixed effects into my 
model to address country differential and aggregate time trends effects on CSR performance.  
Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009), I use firm-year observations of CDS firms until the 
beginning of CDS trading, i.e., excluding CDS firm-year observations in post-CDS-initiation 
periods. I combine this traded CDS subsample with all firm-year observations in which firms are 
never traded in CDS markets (i.e., non-CDS firms) to construct my whole probit sample and use 
it to estimate equation (3). Table 3.4 reports the probit regression results. The model (3) predicts 
the onset of CDS trading reasonably well, as evidenced by the high concordant percentage (92.2%) 
and pseudo-R2 (35.7%). These statistics are comparable to previous studies. For example, the 




in Martin and Roychowdhury (2015). The coefficients of predictors are in line with the extant 
literature (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). For instance, larger 
firms, firms with high leverage, and more profitable firms attract more attention from  CDS market 
participants. The coefficient of Governance is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting 
that firms with good governance are likely to have CDS trading originated in the sample period.  
<Insert Table 3.4 about here> 
Next, I use the estimates of equation (3) to generate control firms for each CDS firm by comparing 
the computed propensity of CDS initiation. Specifically, I compare the estimated likelihood of 
CDS initiation of non-CDS firms to that of CDS firms in the year prior to the CDS trading initiation. 
I follow Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) to produce three matched samples using different matching 
criteria to further verify my results and counter the limitations of propensity score matching 
methodology39: (1) the single non-CDS firm has the same Fama-French 48 industry as the CDS 
firm and has the closest propensity score to the CDS firm, (2) besides conditions of (1), the non-
CDS firm and CDS firm come from the same country, (3) the two non-CDS firms have the same 
CDS firm’s Fama-French 48 industry and have the closest propensity score to the CDS firms. 
Moreover, I require the distance of mean propensity scores between CDS and non-CDS samples 
not to be statistically significant at the 10% level. I employ Martin and Roychowdhury’s (2015) 
approach to allow a non-CDS firm to match multiple CDS firms. However, the same non-CDS 
firm can go into the control sample only once for each year. This way, I have unique firm-year 
observations throughout my samples even though a non-CDS firm may serve as a control for 
several CDS firms. 
 
39 For example, the propensity score matching method is based on the premise that the control unit is independent of 




I tabulate the firms’ characteristics of the control-treated sample before the year of CDS trading 
initiation in Table 3.5. For brevity, I only present the statistical results based on the matching 
criteria (1), which require the closest matched non-CDS firm to have the same Fama-French 48 
industry classification as the one of CDS firm. Panel A compares the E&S performances of 
matched non-CDS and CDS firms, while Panel B assesses the thirteen firm characteristics and 
logit of propensity scores for both samples. In Panel A, I observe that all E&S scores are 
statistically the same for CDS and matched non-CDS samples. In Panel B, as shown, CAPEX is 
the only firm-level characteristic that is statistically significantly different between the control and 
treated samples. The high CAPEX suggests that CDS firms have higher capital intensity than non-
CDS firms. Except for this firm characteristic, CDS firms statistically exhibit the same 
characteristics with the non-CDS firms prior to the initiation of CDS trading. These results suggest 
that these firm-level CSR determinants documented in extant CSR literature are unlikely the 
sources of differences in CSR performance after the inception of CDS trading.   
<Insert Table 3.5 about here> 
4.2. Multivariate test based on the control-treated samples 
I now re-estimate the baseline model specified by equation (1) with my three PSM samples. Panels 
A, B, and C of Table 3.6 report the regression results. The coefficient of CDSINIT measures the 
treatment effect from the control-treated sample. For brevity, I only report the coefficients of 
CDSINIT across E&S scores and samples. Similar to the findings from the whole sample, all 
coefficients of CDSINIT are negative across three control-treated samples. In particular, the 
coefficient estimates of CDSINIT for emission reduction (ENER) are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level across samples, suggesting that in contrast to non-CDS firms, CDS 




trading. Further, I do not observe any of the coefficient estimates for social scores to be significant 
at the 10% level, although they are all negative. This evidence indicates that after the initiation of 
CDS trading, CDS firms reduce their CSR efforts in general and particularly in environmental 
emission reduction efforts.  
<Insert Table 3.6 about here> 
4.3. Event study 
Following Chang et al. (2019), I conduct an event study to examine the differences in CDS firms’ 
E&S performances surrounding the inception of CDS trading. I benchmark non-CDS firms against 
CDS firms and define the counterfactual event year (t=0) of a non-CDS firm as the trading 
initiation year of the corresponding CDS firm. I then compute the average cumulative differentials 
over various event windows between CDS and non-CDS firms. For brevity, I only present results 
of emission reduction based on propensity-matched sample created as per criterion (1) because I 
did not find statistically significant results for other E&S scores. I plot the mean cumulative 
differences for event windows (-1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 2) in Figure 3.1 and report event study results 
of emission reduction in Table 3.7. 
<Insert Figure 3.1 about here> 
<Insert Table 3.7 about here> 
As shown in Table 3.7, the largest average cumulative difference (∆ENER=-2.098, p-value of 
0.126) occurs within the immediate year after the year of CDS trading initiation between control-
treated samples. While this difference decreases within two years after the year of CDS initiation, 
it becomes significant at the 10% level, indicating that CDS trading significantly and negatively 




initiation. Further, the negative CDS effects fade out within three years after CDS trading, as 
evidenced by the non-significant mean cumulative differential difference (event window (0,3), p-
value of 0.224) between CDS and non-CDS firms. Overall, the finding based on the event study is 
consistent with the one based on the whole sample, i.e., the initiation of CDS trading negatively 
affects firms’ emission reduction activities. 
4.4. CDS initiation during the financial crisis period 
Results from both the whole sample and PSM samples support the hypothesis that CDS firms adopt 
more conservative investment policies, such as being more prudent with CSR investment after 
their debts have been referenced for CDSs. Consequently, CDS-trade-initiation negatively affects 
CDS firms’ CSR performance. During the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, firms were 
confronted with more tightened bank lending and credit crunch because of the overall shaky 
financial markets (Campello et al., 2010). Therefore, the limitation of capital availability and a 
dramatic plunge in profits could strengthen the negative effects of CDS trading on a firm’s CSR 
performance because survival is the managers’ primary mission during the crisis. Thus, I expect 
to observe an increased coefficient of CDSINIT during the financial crisis period. I follow Dyck et 
al. (2019) to define the period of August 31, 2008, to August 30, 2009, as the crisis period. I 
construct an indicator variable, CRISIS, which equals one if a firm’s fiscal year ends within this 
period and zero otherwise. I use the following equation with the PSM sample as per criterion (1) 
to investigate my supposition.  
   log (𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒i,t) = α + β1𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇i,t−1 + β2𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇i,t−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + β3𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + γ𝑌i,t−1 +




I report the regression results in Table 3.8. Across E&S metrics, emission reduction (ENER) 
regression has the largest coefficient of CDSINIT (-0.096) and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The coefficient of interaction between CDSINIT and CRISIS from ENER regression is -0.085, 
with a p-value of 0.107. Also, the coefficient of CRISIS is -0.063 and has a p-value of 0.106. These 
coefficient estimates suggest that over the crisis period, the CDS-trade-initiation causes a reduction 
of about 14.8% in CDS firm’s emission reduction score comparing to non-CDS firms. Moreover, 
I do not find any significant coefficient estimates for social scores. These results suggest that 
during the crisis period, the inception of CDS trade further intensifies the concern of managers of 
CDS firms to satisfy debt obligations.  
<Insert Table 3.8 about here> 
4.5 Monte Carlo simulation of CDS initiation events 
In this section, I analyze the CDS initiation events by Monte Carlo simulation. Chang et al. (2019) 
state that the clustering feature of CDS trading initiation may cause spurious regression results, 
i.e., the significant effects may be attributed to CDS events clustering instead of CDS firms 
themselves. I follow Bekaert et al. (2005) and Chang et al. (2019) to construct CDS samples with 
pseudo CDS trading years. Specifically, I first gather the real CDS trading initiation years from 
539 CDS firms. Next, I randomly assign these true CDS initiation years to CDS firms. I then 
construct the sample by combining all non-CDS firms with these CDS firms but with pseudo trade 
initiation years. I estimate baseline specification (1) using the constructed sample and record the 
coefficient of CDSINIT. I reiterate this procedure 2,000 times and report the distribution of 
coefficients of CDSINIT in Table 3.9. Because the coefficient estimate for the emission reduction 
(ENER) score is the sole statistically significant one at the 10% level, I, therefore, analyze the 




<Insert Table 3.9 about here> 
The mean and median of CDSINIT coefficients from emission reduction (ENER) regression 
reported in Table 3.9 are close to zero, and the estimated coefficient based on the true sample 
(coefficient of -0.049, with a p-value of 0.065) is far out in the left tail of the distribution. The 95th 
percentile of the distribution shows a coefficient of -0.042 with a t-statistic of 1.31, which is well 
above my estimated coefficient of -0.049 with a t-statistic of 1.82 reported in Table 3.2. This 
evidence indicates that my results are not attributed to statistical artifact or CDS initiation event 
clustering because many replications with pseudo samples, which have the true distribution of 
CDS initiation dates, would produce coefficients close to the true one estimated from the original 
sample. Therefore, the impact on CSR performance is indebted to the firm and its right time of 
CDS trading initiation, not to the time trends of CDS trading.  
4.6 Subsample tests 
In this section, I further alleviate the concerns of endogeneity and sample selection bias using 
various subsamples to estimate the baseline model (1). To mitigate sample selection concerns, I 
follow Ashcraft and Santos (2009) to estimate the baseline model using the treated sample (CDS 
firms) only. Besides, I partition my whole sample into a variety of subsamples and re-estimate the 
baseline model with these subsamples. First, I partition the whole sample into two subsamples 
based on the time of financial crisis, spanning from 2002 to 2007 and 2010 to 2017, respectively. 
Second, I estimate the baseline model with observations from developed countries by excluding 
firm-years from South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Last, I partition observations into US and 
non-US subsamples. I do so because capital market financing dominates in the US, while bank 




be different in the US and non-US markets. For the sake of brevity, in Table 3.10, I only report 
coefficients of CDSINIT from emission reduction regression across samples.  
<Insert Table 3.10 about here> 
Column (1) of Table 3.10 reports the estimated coefficient of CDSINIT (-0.059, p-value=0.039) 
from CDS samples. This estimate validates my full sample test in which the coefficient of 
CDSINIT from emission reduction regression is -0.49, with a p-value of 0.065. This evidence 
shows that sample selection bias is not likely an issue in my test. The coefficient of CDSINIT (-
0.047, p-value=0.090) from the developed country sample presented in column (2) has relatively 
the same magnitude as the one in the whole sample (-0.049, p-value=0.068), indicating that CDS 
trading may affect firms’ emission reduction performance similarly across countries and regions. 
I present the estimated coefficients for sample spanning from 2002 to 2007 in column (3) and 
sample from 2010 to 2017 in column (4), respectively. The coefficient estimate from the prior 
financial crisis sample (-0.064, p-value=0.033) has a relatively larger magnitude than the one from 
the post-crisis period (-0.058, p-value=0.031). This evidence indicates that CDS-trade-initiation 
results in greater influence on firms’ emission reduction activities in prior financial crisis period 
than in post-crisis periods. Finally, columns (5) and (6) report estimates for the non-US sample 
and the US sample, respectively. The estimated coefficient (-0.078, p-value=0.019) of non-US 
samples is significant at the 5% level and is greater than the one from the whole sample, while the 
estimate (-0.053, p-value=0.193) from US sample is not significant even at the 10% level. These 
results indicate that CDS trading has more significant effects in non-US countries and regions than 




For the US subsample spanning from 2009 to 2017, I substitute CDS trading activity variables for 
the indicator variable, CDSINIT, to verify the results above. I report the estimated coefficients of 
the average daily trading notional and the log of the total number of clearing dealers in columns 
(7) and (8), respectively. Both coefficients are negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting 
that CDS trading negatively affects CDS firms’ emission reduction engagement in the US. This 
finding is consistent with prior studies, e.g., Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018a, b), that show that 
actively traded CDSs exert more effects on referenced firms. Furthermore, this evidence suggests 
that CDS trading activity has more capability to capture the effects of CDS trading on the CDS 
firms’ CSR performance than the indicator variable, CDSINIT. 
To summarize, I use various approaches to validate my main conclusions that CDS trading 
significantly and negatively influences firms’ emission reduction performance and weakly but 
negatively affects other CSR efforts. Such negative effects of CDS trading on CSR performance 
are due to the threatening effects of empty creditors. The estimates of various PSM samples 
validate my conclusions by showing consistently estimated coefficients of CDSINIT. The event 
study also displays a significant and negative average cumulative difference of ENER between 
control and treated samples surrounding CDS initiation year.  Furthermore, the regression analyses 
on financial crisis periods confirm the empty creditor hypothesis. Over the crisis periods, CDS 
firms’ managers become more concerned about their debt obligations, evidenced by the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term between CDSINIT and CRISIS (-0.085, p-value=0.107). My 
conclusions are resilient to a variety of subsample composition, including samples of CDS firms, 
firms from developed countries, firms from prior and post 2008-2009 financial crisis, and US and 





5. Primary vs. secondary stakeholders  
The baseline and various robustness test results suggest that the inception of CDS trading causes 
negative effects on the CDS firms’ CSR performances. In particular, it significantly and negatively 
influences firms’ emission reduction activities. In this section, I aim to justify the inclination of 
CDS firms to shrink their efforts on emission reduction rather than on other environmental and 
social aspects. I hypothesize that emission reduction activities have a close and high correlation 
with the corporations’ expenses than other CSR activities. Consequently, when executives cope 
with increased concerns arising from fulfilling the debt obligations of exacting lenders, they prefer 
to cut back expenditures related to emission reduction activities. To test this hypothesis, I employ 
the same approach used in Table 3.3 to regress SG&A expenses on the rest of the E&S category 
scores. The results are reported in Table 3.11.  
<Insert Table 3.11 about here> 
The estimated coefficients of E&S scores range from the lowest one, 0.23% for health and safety 
(SOHS), to the highest one, 0.55% for production innovation (ENPI). All estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient of emission reduction (ENER) is in the middle, 
with a value of 0.38%. This evidence is contrary to my supposition that emission reduction 
activities have the highest relation with corporate SG&A spending, and hence modifying in ENER 
activities would cause the most considerable change in SG&A expenses. Accordingly, cost-saving 
may not have a connection with the decline in firms’ emission reduction activities.  
To justify my findings, I resort to stakeholder theory, since stakeholder management is a practical 
mechanism to carry out corporate environmental and social responsibilities (Clarkson, 1995; 




different importance to the sustainability of the focal firm. Further, because of limited resources 
such as capital availability, managers must strategically balance competing stakeholders’ claims 
on the corporation’s resources and identify stakeholders whose resources are vital to the 
corporation’s survival (primary stakeholders). According to Freeman et al. (2010), primary 
stakeholders usually include customers, employees, shareholders, creditors, local communities, 
and suppliers. In contrast, secondary stakeholders are not essential to the firm’s survival, such as 
media, competitors, special interest groups, the surrounding society, and so on (Freeman et al., 
2010). Therefore, post-CDS trading, I conjecture that the managers of CDS firms still uphold CSR 
initiatives intending to develop and manage primary stakeholder-firm relations (such as employees 
and local communities). At the same time, they may pay less attention to the secondary 
stakeholders’ claims (such as the natural environment). 
In Appendix 3.2, I replicate the descriptions of key performance indicators (KPI) of emission 
reduction from Thomson Reuters 2015 ESG data Glossary. Examining these definitions suggests 
that except for the emission reduction, most ESG assessments focus on primary stakeholders. For 
example, social/product responsibility (SOPR) and social/health and safety (SOHS) evaluate a 
firm’s performance on customers and employees, respectively, while most emission reduction 
(ENER) criteria study the negative externalities incurred by corporate operations on the natural 
environment, a secondary stakeholder. For example, greenhouse gas emissions and the total 
amount of waste produced are two KPIs of emission reduction measures. Therefore, when facing 
economic uncertainties, CDS firms may cut back costs related to the secondary stakeholders. In 
this case, expenses associated with the natural environment may be the first to be cut. I hypothesize 




creation in contrast to other stakeholder’s management, such as employee, customer, and 
community relationship management.  
To test the supra hypothesis, I employ the approach in Hillman and Keim (2001) to investigate the 
relation between a firm’s market value creation and stakeholder relationship management. 
Following Hillman and Keim (2001), I proxy shareholder value creation by MVA, which is the 
firm’s market value minus its total capital contributed by its equity and debt holders. I use the 
ASSET4 E&S scores as the proxies of the levels of stakeholder engagement. A high score indicates 
that the focal firm has built a healthy and positive relationship with the involved stakeholders. For 
example, a higher community score suggests that the managers sensitively attend to claims from 
the community in which the firm operates. 
Furthermore, I compute an overall employee relationship score by equally weighting the four 
category scores associated with employees, i.e., health and safety (SOHS), training and 
development (SOTD), employment quality (SOEQ), and diversity and opportunity (SODO). I call 
it the workforce score. I also include control variables applied in the extant firm-value and CSR 
literature (such as Hillman and Keim, 2001; Lins et al., 2017; Buchanan et al., 2018) to isolate 
factors that could affect MVA. Specifically, I include the following firm-level characteristics as 
controls: firm size, profitability, risk, leverage, growth opportunity, cash holdings, capital intensity, 
R&D, and cash dividend. I estimate my whole sample using equation (5): 
log (𝑀𝑉𝐴i,t) = α + β𝐸&𝑆 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒i,t−1 + γ𝑋i,t−1 + ω𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦i + ρ𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + ϕ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟t + εi,t (5) 
where 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the market value-added of firm 𝑖 at the end of fiscal year 𝑡, 𝐸&𝑆 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is one 
of the environmental or social scores of firm 𝑖 at the end of fiscal year 𝑡 − 1, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is an array of 




and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  represents the industry-, country-, and year-fixed effects, respectively. As usual, I 
cluster standard errors at the firm level. I present the regression results of equation (5) in Table 
3.12.  
<Insert Table 3.12 about here> 
Row (1) of Table 3.12 reports the estimated coefficient of ENER (0.041, with a p-value of 0.452). 
This non-significant coefficient suggests that the engagement in environmental emission reduction 
activities has no direct economic relation to shareholder value creation 40 . In contrast, the 
coefficients of resource reduction (0.092) in Row (2) and environmental product innovation (0.132) 
in Row (3) are significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. This evidence suggests that good 
management in resource control and eco-product innovation may generate value for shareholders. 
Turning to Row (4) in which I report the relationship between MVA and employee relationship 
management, I find the largest magnitude (0.194, with a p-value of 0.006) of estimated coefficients 
across relationship measurement in Table 3.12. The estimate is significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that effective employee management plays an essential and decisive role in shareholder 
value creation. This finding is consistent with Edmans (2011) and Guiso et al. (2015), who 
document a positive relationship between employee management and shareholder’s wealth. Rows 
(5) and (6) report estimates for human rights and community relationship management. Both 
estimated coefficients are significant at the 10% level, implying that maintaining a good 
relationship with the local community and respecting fundamental human rights are beneficial not 
only to the involved stakeholders but also to the shareholders. Finally, in Row (7), I find a non-
 
40 We also use Tobin’ Q as the proxy of firms’ value and regress it on emission reduction (ENER) score scaled on 
log. The estimated coefficient estimate of log (ENER) is -0.0371, with a p-value of 0.0234, which suggests that 




significant but positive relationship (0.0577, with a p-value of 0.24) between product responsibility 
and shareholder value creation. This result suggests that customer relationship management 
proxied by product responsibility score has a weak but positive influence on shareholder value 
creation. 
Overall, my findings are in line with Hillman and Keim (2001), who document that investing in 
secondary stakeholder relations may not create value for shareholders while maintaining good 
relationships with primary stakeholders will bring value to shareholders. The estimates by 
regressing MVA on various proxies of stakeholder relationship management strongly support my 
conjecture that CDS firms mostly cut down costs related to environmental emission reduction 
activities when facing cost-savings. Managers opt for such policies because, in part, investment in 
emission reduction activities may not yield economic benefits to shareholders, evidenced by the 
non-significant estimated coefficient of ENER.  
6. Conclusion  
In this study, I examine the impact of CDS trading on the firms’ CSR performance using firms 
from eleven countries and regions. I provide evidence that CDS trading leads to weak but negative 
effects on the firms’ CSR performance in general, but holds a significant and negative influence 
on the firms’ emission reduction activities. This conclusion is robust to various testing approaches, 
including event study, propensity score matching, Monte Carlo simulation, and various subsample 
examinations. By associating emission reduction scores to SG&A expenses, I find that CDS firms, 
on average, cut down their expenditure on environmental emission reduction activities to the 
amount of $35.94 ($15.41) million based on the mean (median) of SG&A expenses of CDS firms. 
A further examination of the connection of SG&A expenses and other E&S metrics indicates that 




because other E&S metrics have a higher correlation with the firms’ expenses than the emission 
reduction metric. 
I justify my finding by examining the relationship between the firms’ market value-added and the 
various stakeholder relationship management proxied by ASSET4 E&S scores. My results indicate 
that emission reduction activities have statistically no economic relation with shareholder value 
creation. In contrast, other activities, such as resource and employee management, have strong 
positive effects on shareholder value creation. Therefore, when the managers of CDS firms 
concern with debt obligations of CDS insured lenders, they may cut down investments on emission 
reduction activities. The results are consistent with instrumental stakeholder theory that managers 
pay more attention to primary stakeholders’ interests, such as employees and customers, and pay 
less attention to secondary stakeholders, such as the natural environment, when managers need to 
resolve conflict interests among stakeholders. My results highlight the downside of CDSs arising 
from the threatening effects of empty creditors. After the inception of CDS trading, the managers 






While a stream of literature has explored the motives and factors that propel a firm’s CSR activities, 
academics and practitioners still struggle to understand why and how a company engages in CSR 
activities. Given the increasing importance of CSR in businesses and societies, I add to the 
literature by addressing the question of whether financial market innovation, particularly CDSs, 
can impact a company’s corporate social responsibility.  
With more extensive sample data from eleven countries and regions across the globe, I find robust 
evidence that CDS trading significantly and negatively affects a company’s emission reduction 
activities. Post-CDS trading, a CDS firm’s ENER score decreases by 4.9% generally in contrast to 
non-CDS firms. To get an economic sense of this decrease, I associate the reduction in ENER 
scores with SG&A expenses and find the decline in ENER score to be equivalent to a cut of $35.94 
million in a firm’s emission reduction investment. However, although CDS negatively affects a 
firm’s other CSR performance, I find no statistical evidence that the influences are significant. 
Furthermore, emission reduction activities seem to have no relation to shareholders’ value creation, 
while other CSR activities, such as employee management and eco-product innovation, do 
positively correlate with shareholders’ wealth. 
I also explore the impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital and corporate capital structure. I 
assess the overall benefits and costs induced by CDS trading on a firm because previous studies 
have reached mixed conclusions on this topic. I construct a longitudinal sample with the universe 
of Compustat US public companies to conduct my tests. I find strong statistical evidence that CDS 
trading brings more benefits than costs to CDS firms, evidenced by a lowered WACC post-CDS 




Highly levered firms prefer to reduce their usage of debt, while firms with lower leverage desire 
to take the advantage of CDS trading by increasing their debt usage. Finally, I find that CDS firms 
adjust their debt placement. Post-CDS trading, they substitute arm-length debt for bank debt. 
Notably, they significantly reduce the usage of revolving credit and simultaneously increase bond 
issuance to avoid rollover risk. Overall, the changes in debt placement reflect that CDS trading 
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Figure 3.1. Average cumulative differentials of emission reduction score surrounding the 
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Appendix 2.1. Bloomberg methodology for computing WACC, cost of debt, and cost of 
equity 
1.WACC cost of debt (after tax) 
The after-tax weighted average cost of debt for the security is calculated using government bond 
rates, a debt adjustment factor, the proportions of short- and long-term debt to total debt, and the 
stock’s effective tax rate. The debt adjustment factor represents the average yield above 
government bonds for a given rating class. The lower the rating, the higher the adjustment factor. 
The debt adjustment factor (AF) is only used when a company does not have a fair market curve 
(FMC). When a company does not have a credit rating, an assumed rate of 1.38 (the equivalent 
rate of a BBB+ Standard & Poor’s long-term currency issuer rating) is used. The exact 
calculation of the debt adjustment factor is Bloomberg proprietary calculation. 
Cost of Debt = [[(SD/TD) * (CS*AF)] + [(LD/TD) * (CL*AF)]] * [1-TR] 
Where SD= Short Term Debt, TD = Total Debt, CS=Pre-Tax Cost of Short-Term Debt, AF= 
Debt Adjustment Factor, LD= Long-Term Debt, CL= Pre-Tax Cost of Long-Term Debt, TR 
=Effective Tax Rate. 
2. WACC Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity is derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
The cost of equity=Risk-free rate + [beta * Country risk Premium] 
The default value for the risk-free rate is the country’s long-term bond rate (10-year). 
3. WACC (Weighted Average cost of Capital) 
The cost of capital is computed as: 
WACC = [KD * (TD/V)] + [KP * (P/V)] + [ KE * (E/V)] 
Where: KD=Cost of Debt, TD = Total Debt, V =Total Capital, KP= Cost of Preferred, P= 
Preferred Equity, KE=Cost of Equity, E=Equity Capital 
Total Capital =Total Debt + Preferred Equity + Equity Capital. Figures are drawn from the 
company’s most recent report, annual or interim. 
3. WACC Weight of Equity  
The ratio of market capital to total capital, calculated as: 
 Historical Market Cap/ (Historical Cap + ST Borrowings + LT Borrowings + Preferred Equity). 
4. WACC Weight of Debt  
The ratio of total debt to total capital, calculated as: 
(ST Borrowings +LT Borrowings) / (Historical Market Cap + ST Borrowings + LT Borrowings 




Appendix 2.2 Variable definitions 
Variable Name Definition Source  
WACC The weighted average of cost of debt (after tax) and cost of capital, please see Appendix 2.1 for details. Bloombrg 
Cost of debt The overall cost of debt, including all sources of debt financing, please see Appendix 2.1 for details. Bloombrg 
Cost of equity The required rate of return of investors, computed from capital asset pricing model (CAPM), please see 
Appendix 2.1 for details. 
Bloombrg 
Weight of debt The weight of debt evaluated on market values, please see Appendix 2.1 for details. Bloombrg 
Weight of equity The weight of equity evaluated on market values, please see Appendix 2.1 for details. Bloombrg 
Default The five-year predicted default probability. Bloombrg 
Public debt The ratio of the sum of bank loans, term loans, and revolving credit to total debt. Capital IQ 
Bond The ratio of the sum of senior bonds and notes and subordinated bonds and notes to total debt. Capital IQ 
Commercial The ratio of commercial papers to total debt. Capital IQ 
Bank debt The ratio of the sum of senior bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, and commercial papers to 
total debt. 
Capital IQ 
Bank Loan The ratio of the sum of bank loans and term loans to total debt. Capital IQ 
Revolving credit The ratio of the revolving credit to total debt. Capital IQ 
Lease The ratio of the capital lease to total debt. Capital IQ 
Other The ratio of other borrowings to total debt. Capital IQ 
CDSFIRM A dummy variable that has a value of one for CDS firms and zero for non-CDS firms in which CDSs. 
have never been referenced on their debts in CDS markets over the sample period. 
Constructed  
CDSINIT A dummy variable that has a value of one for the CDS firms in and after the CDS initiation year and 
zero before that. 
Constructed  
CDSLAG The lagged variable of CDSINIT by one year. Conctructed 
Dealer The total number of clearing dealers in the fiscal year scaled on the log. DTCC 
Notional  The average daily trading notional volume scaled by the long-term debt in the fiscal year. DTCC 
Log (Assets): Total assets (AT) on the natural log scale. Compustat 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets (AT).  Compustat 
Liquidation 1-tangibility. Compustat 
Tangibility  The ratio of (0.715 × Receivables + 0.547 × Inventory + 0.535 × Capital + 1 × Cash Holdings) divided 
by the total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
CAPEX The ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to total sales (SALE). Compustat 
Cash Cash and equivalent (CHE) divided by total assets (AT).  Compustat 





Appendix 2.2 Continued 
Variable Name Definition Source  
MTBV The ratio of equity market value to its book value. Compustat 
Log (Age): A firm’s age is computed by selecting its earliest initial public offering (IPO) date and the first date 
when the firm was included in COMPUSTAT. The number of years elapsed since the earliest date is 
used to approximate a firm’s age. 
Compustat/CRSP 
Riskiness The stock volatility over the past five fiscal years.  CRSP 
Stock liquidity The yearly stock turnover by volume divided by outstanding common shares. Compustat 
R&D The ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Compustat 
S&P rated An indicator variable that has a value of one if a firm is rated by S&P, and zero otherwise. S&P 
INVTGRADE An indicator variable that has a value of one if a firm’s rating is above BBB, and zero otherwise. S&P 
Leverage The ratio of total debt (DT) to total assets (AT). Compustat 
IO concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of institutional ownership is defined as: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
2𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  , where 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is firm i’s total number of owners at time t and 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
2  is square of the 
percentage ownership in a company i at time t of owner j. 
Thomson 13f 
Dividends Cash dividend payments divided total assets. Compustat 
ROA Net income (NI) divided by total assets (AT). Compustat 
FF48 FF48 is the Fama-French 48 industry classification. Compustat 
FF17 FF17 is the Fama-French 17 industry classification.  
WCAP The ratio of working capital (WCAP) to total assets (AT). Compustat 
Net equity issuance Sale of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus the purchase of common and preferred stock 
(PRSTKC) scaled by start-of-period assets (AT). 
Compustat 
Net debt issuance Debt issuance (DLTIS) less debt repayments (DLTR) plus the change in short-term debt (DLCCH), 
scaled by assets (AT). 
Compustat 
High_liquidation An indicator variable that has a value of one if liquidation cost is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. 
Compustat 





An indicator variable that has a value of one if HHI of institutional ownership is above the sample 
















ENVSCORE Environmental performance 
score 
The environmental pillar measures a company's impact on living and non-living natural 
systems, including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOCSCORE Social performance score The social pillar measures a company's capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers, and society, through its use of best management practices.  
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
ENER Emission reduction score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards reducing 
environmental emissions in the production and operational processes. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
ENRR Resource reduction score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards achieving 
efficient use of natural resources in the production process. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
ENPI Product innovation score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness in supporting the 
research and development of eco-efficient products or services. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOEQ Employment quality score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness in providing high-
quality employment benefits and job conditions. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOTD Training and development 
score 
It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards providing 
training and development (education) for its workforce 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOCO Community score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards 




SODO Diversity and opportunity 
score 
It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards 
maintaining diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOHS Health and security score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness in providing a 
healthy and safe workplace. 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOHR Human rights score It measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards 
respecting the fundamental human rights conventions.  
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 
SOPR Product responsibility score measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards creating 








Appendix 3.1. Continued 
  Independent Variables  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
Variable Name Definitions Source 
CDSINIT CDS trade initiation A dummy variable having a value of one for the CDS firms in and after CDS initiation year, and 
zero before that. 
Constructed  
CDSFIRM CDS referenced firms A dummy variable having a value of one for CDS firms, and zero for non-CDS firms. Constructed  
WORKFORCE Employee workforce The Workforce Score measures a company’s effectiveness towards job satisfaction, the health and 
safety of the workplace, and the maintenance of diversity and equal opportunities and development 
opportunities for its workforce. This variable is computed from an equally weighted average of 
SOTD, SODO, SOEQ, and SOHS. All data is extracted from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
database. 
Constructed  
Log (Assets): The natural log of total 
assets 
Total assets on the natural log scale. Worldscope 
Profitability Financial profitability Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets.  Worldscope 
Tangibility Asset tangibility The ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets. Worldscope 
CAPEX Capital expenditure The ratio of capital expenditures to total sales. Worldscope 
Cash holdings Cash and equivalent Cash and equivalent divided by total assets.  Worldscope 
MTBV Market to book ratio The ratio of equity market value to its book value Worldscope 
Log (Age): The natural log of firm age A firm’s age is computed by selecting the earlier of its initial public offering (IPO) date and the 
first date when the firm was included in COMPUSTAT. The number of years elapsed since the 
earlier date is used to approximate a firm’s age. 
COMPUSTAT. 
Risk Business riskiness The stock volatility over the fiscal year.  Datastream. 
Turnover Asset turnover The ratio of total net sales to total assets. Worldscope 
R&D Research and development 
expenses 
The ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Worldscope 





The ratio of the strategic holdings, which is the sum of all five percent and beyond share ownership 
to total outstanding common shares.  
Worldscope 
Governance Corporate governance The corporate governance pillar measures a company's systems and processes, which ensures that 
its board members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term shareholders.  
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4  
Dividends Cash dividends Cash dividend payment divided total assets. Worldscope 
ROA Return on assets Net income divided by total assets. Worldscope 
WCAP Working capital The ratio of working capital to total assets. Worldscope 
CRISIS Financial crisis An indicator variable which equals one if a firms’ fiscal year ends between August 31, 2008, to 
August 30, 2009, and zero otherwise. 
Constructed  
FF48 Fama-French 48 FF48 is the Fama-French 48 industry classification. Fama-French 
Notional  The average daily trading 
notional amount 
The average of CDS daily trading notional amount. DTCC 
Dealer The number of clearing 
dealer 





Appendix 3.2. Key performance indicators of emission reduction 









Does the company have a policy for reducing environmental emissions or its impacts on biodiversity? And does the company have a 











Does the company report on initiatives to protect, restore, or reduce its impact on native ecosystems and species, biodiversity, and 

















and SOx Emissions 
Reduction 






Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, substitute, or phase out volatile organic compounds (VOC) or particulate matter 
less than ten microns in diameter (PM10)? 
ENERO10V Emission 
Reduction/Waste 






































Does the company report on the concentration of production locations to limit the environmental impact during the production 
process? OR Does the company report on its participation in any emissions trading initiative? OR Does the company report on new 






Does the company report on partnerships or initiatives with specialized NGOs, industry organizations, or governmental or supra 


























Change Risks and 
Opportunities 







Does the company report on its environmental expenditures or on proactive environmental investments to reduce future risks or 






Table 2.1. Sample distribution and firm-level statistics 
Panel A. Sample distribution of CDS firms based on the inception year 
Year Number of new CDS firms Percentage  Cumulative percentage 
2001 147 21.71 21.71 
2002 104 15.36 37.08 
2003 121 17.87 54.95 
2004 102 15.07 70.01 
2005 42 6.20 76.22 
2006 44 6.50 82.72 
2007 50 7.39 90.01 
2008 7 1.03 91.14 
2009 4 0.59 91.73 
2010 5 0.74 92.47 
2011 8 1.18 93.65 
2012 10 1.48 95.13 
2013 3 0.44 95.57 
2014 7 1.03 96.60 
2015 9 1.33 97.93 
2016 3 0.44 98.38 
2017 11 1.62 100 
Total  677 100  
 
Panel B. Sample distribution of CDS firms based on one-digit SIC industry 
SIC Industry Number of 
CDS firms 
Number of firm-year 
observations 
Percentage of all CDS 
firms 
Agriculture, Forest and 
fishing (0) 
2 29 0.34 
Construction and mining (1) 66 747 8.69 
Manufacturing (2,3) 309 4,122 47.94 
Transportation (4) 125 1,555 18.09 
Wholesale and retail (5) 71 915 10.64 
Services (7,8,9) 104 1,229 14.30 






Panel C. Summary statistics of firm-level variables 
This table presents sample statistics for both CDS and non-CDS firms. The explained and debt composition variables span 
from 2002 to 2018, while firm-level controls are over the period 2001 to 2017. Variables are summarized at the firm level. 
The actual number of observations varies for different variables, depending on the joint availability of controls when testing 
the baseline model. WACC, cost of debt, and cost of equity are presented in percentage. Assets and long-term debts are in 
billion dollars. STD is the standard deviation. N indicates the number of firm-year observations. Public debt, CPs, 
bonds/notes, bank debt, drawn revolving credits, bank loans, capital leases, trusted preferred, and other debt are the ratios of 
each type of debt to total debt. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 2.2 All accounting variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
  CDS firms  Non-CDS firms  
Variables N Mean  Median  STD N Mean  Median  STD Mean 
difference 
Explained variables 
WACC 8,597 8.492 8.358 2.405 40,253 9.005 8.784 3.145 -0.514*** 
Cost of debt 8,597 3.002 3.039 1.751 40,253 2.668 2.633 2.029 0.335*** 
Cost of equity 8,597 10.926 10.474 2.848 40,253 10.418 10.197 3.248 0.507*** 
Weight of debt 8,597 0.300 0.256 0.211 40,253 0.203 0.124 0.228 0.097*** 
Weight of equity 8,597 0.695 0.742 0.215 40,253 0.788 0.869 0.235 -0.092*** 
Debt decompositions         
Public debt  8,127 0.715 0.817 0.293 32,950 0.361 0.164 0.397 0.353*** 
CPs 8,127 0.022 0 0.051 32,950 0.002 0 0.018 0.019*** 
Bonds/Notes 8,127 0.686 0.775 0.292 32,950 0.358 0.160 0.396 0.327*** 
Bank debt 8,127 0.182 0.057 0.254 32,950 0.502 0.500 0.413 -0.320*** 
Drawn revolving 
credits 
8,127 0.062 0 0.141 32,950 0.227 0.007 0.337 -0.165*** 
Bank loans 8,127 0.120 0 0.218 32,950 0.275 0.029 0.363 -0.155*** 
Capital leases 8,127 0.022 0 0.087 32,950 0.085 0 0.240 -0.063*** 
Trusted preferred 8,127 0.002 0 0.008 32,950 0.000 0 0.001 0.001*** 
Other debt 8,127 0.079 0.001 0.182 32,950 0.052 0 0.174 0.027*** 
Firm-level characteristics 
Assets ($ billion) 8,597 14.896 5.395 27.525 40,253 3.239 0.307 14.950 11.657*** 
Leverage 8,597 0.335 0.305 0.208 40,253 0.221 0.167 0.240 0.113*** 
Growth 8,597 2.906 2.100 5.317 40,253 2.694 1.820 5.306 0.213*** 
Profitability 8,597 0.080 0.082 0.117 40,253 -0.032 0.053 0.329 0.112*** 
IO concentration 8,597 0.064 0.041 0.091 40,253 0.154 0.068 0.209 -0.090*** 
IO ratio 8,597 0.704 0.772 0.259 40,253 0.430 0.393 0.359 0.274*** 
Age 8,597 32.776 30.000 18.780 40,253 18.088 14.000 13.027 14.688*** 
R&D  8,597 0.032 0 0.315 40,253 0.461 0.003 2.374 -0.429*** 
Liquidation 8,597 0.576 0.566 0.133 40,253 0.476 0.474 0.174 0.099*** 
Riskiness 8,597 0.395 0.337 0.209 40,253 0.585 0.514 0.341 -0.189*** 
CAPEX 8,597 0.101 0.042 0.195 40,253 0.129 0.034 0.374 -0.029*** 
Stock liquidity 8,597 2.482 1.890 2.129 40,253 1.655 1.037 1.961 0.826*** 
Tax rate 7,340 0.297 0.338 0.086 29,048 0.219 0.265 0.121 0.077*** 
Dividends 8,597 0.575 0.310 0.750 40,253 0.171 0 0.441 0.403*** 
Credit rating 8,597 0.821 1.000 0.384 40,253 0.155 0 0.362 0.666*** 
Analyst  8,597 13.926 13 9.049 40,253 5.594 4 6.160 8.035*** 
Long-term debt 8,597 4.224 1.462 9.117 40,253 0.783 0.019 4.092 3.272*** 
Panel D. Summary statistics of CDS activities 
Variables  N Mean  Median  STD 
CDSINIT 48,850 0.154 0 0.361 
CDSFIRM 48,850 0.175 0 0.381 
Notional  26,580 0.017 0.002 0.222 




Panel E. Pearson correlation between selected variables 
This table illustrates the Pearson correlations for firm-level characteristics. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2 All accounting variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
CDSFIRM 
(1) 
1.00                   
CDSINIT 
(2) 
0.92*** 1.00                  
WACC (3) -0.07*** -0.06*** 1.00                 
Public debt 
(4) 
0.34*** 0.33*** -0.02*** 1.00                
Bond debt 
(5) 
-0.31*** -0.30*** -0.05*** -0.77*** 1.00               
Log(assets) 
(6) 
0.51*** 0.49*** -0.02* 0.30*** -0.26*** 1.00              
Leverage 
(7) 
0.18*** 0.17*** -0.32*** 0.22*** -0.08*** 0.15*** 1.00             
Profitabilit
y (8) 
0.14*** 0.13*** -0.05*** -0.00 0.03*** 0.37*** -0.09*** 1.00            
CAPEX (9) -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.05*** -0.21*** 1.00           
Growth 
(10) 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.08*** 0.02** 0.02*** 1.00          
Log (Age) 
(11) 
0.36*** 0.38*** -0.09*** 0.20*** -0.17*** 0.32*** 0.02*** 0.18*** -0.10*** -0.03*** 1.00         
Riskiness 
(12) 
-0.22*** -0.22*** 0.12*** -0.09*** 0.04*** -0.47*** 0.04*** -0.39*** 0.12*** -0.02*** -0.35*** 1.00        
Dividends 
(13) 
0.29*** 0.30*** -0.11*** 0.19*** -0.16*** 0.43*** 0.06*** 0.16*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 0.37*** -0.33*** 1.00       
Tax rate 
(14) 




-0.17*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 0.13*** -0.47*** 0.02*** -0.20*** 0.03*** -0.05*** -0.10*** 0.24*** -0.18*** -0.33*** 1.00     
Liquidation 
(16) 
0.22*** 0.21*** -0.20*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.18*** -0.14*** -0.07*** 0.16*** -0.22** 0.16*** 0.25*** -0.07*** 1.00    
R&D (17) -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.09*** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.17*** -0.02*** -0.39*** 0.47*** 0.04*** -0.10*** 0.16*** -0.07** -0.24*** 0.08** -0.25*** 1.00   
S&P rated 
(18) 











Table 2.2.  The relationships between CDS trading and the cost of capital     
This table reports regression results of the cost of capital on CDS availability and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. CDS 
activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and the costs of capital are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are computed but 
not reported. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2 All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We 
present estimates with industry- and firm-year fixed effects models in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Column (3) shows 
estimates from firm-year fixed effects controlling for the marginal tax rate. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
CSDFIRM -0.097 
(-1.07) 

























Controls           
Tax rate   0.635** 
(2.17) 
  -1.197*** 
(-6.52) 














































































































































































































































Yes   Yes    Yes    
Firm-fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Observations  48,850 48,850 36,388 48,850 48,850 36,388 48,850 48,850 36,388 
#Firms  5,575 5,575 4,613 5,575 5,575 4,613 5,575 5,575 4,613 





Table 2.3.  The quantile regressions of WACC on CDS trading   
This table reports estimates of regression of WACC on CDS availability and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. 
CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and WACC is from 2002 to 2018. Constants are ignored 
for brevity. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2 All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. Column 1, 2, 3, and 4 report estimates from industry-year fixed effects model with quantile over 0.15, 
0.35, 0.50, and 0.85, respectively. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are computed, 
and the number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.   
                                                      WACC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CDSFIRM 0.133 (2.00) ** 0.028 (0.53)  0.016(0.32)  -0.055 (-0.84) 
CDSINIT -0.282 (-4.34) *** -0.313 (-5.44) *** -0.348 (-6.49) *** -0.572 (-8,23) *** 
Controls      
Log(assets) 0.206 (22.05) *** 0.221 (20.57) *** 0.208 (20.63) *** 0.186 (12.21) *** 
Leverage -3.814 (-39.40) *** -3.857 (-50.10) *** -3.737 (-54.56) *** -3.421 (-51.01) *** 
Profitability 0.308 (3.45) *** -0.221 (-2.46) **  -0.427 (-5.42) *** -1.002 (-9.08) *** 
CAPEX -0.140 (-2.27) ** -0.194 (-3.09) *** -0.219 (-4.37) *** -0.124 (-1.71) * 
Growth 0.037 (13.91) *** 0.037 (12.28) *** 0.035 (12.50) *** 0.020 (8.20) *** 
Log (Age) 0.073 (3.62) *** 0.064 (3.96) *** 0.033 (1. 99) ** -0.098 (-4.31) *** 
Riskiness -0.178 (-2.38) ** 0.777 (9.17) *** 1.317 (17.79) *** 3.101 (22.14) *** 
Dividends -0.193 (-7.07) *** -0.207 (-8.13) *** -0.239 (-12.22) *** -0.195 (-6.35) *** 
IO concentration -1.661 (-16.93) *** -1.712 (-20.21) *** -1.803 (-22.28) *** -1.655 (-14.47) *** 
Liquidation -0.470 (-4.27) *** -0.705 (-8.31) *** -1.099 (-14.34) *** -1.951 (-17.19) *** 
R&D 0.070 (5.69) *** 0.077 (6.57) *** 0.081 (8.53) *** 0.065 (3.65) *** 
S&P rated 0.084 (2.22) ** -0.062 (-1.75) * -0.088 (-2.59) *** -0.220(-4.66) *** 
Stock liquidity 0.224 (31.67) *** 0.258 (35.24) *** 0.262 (28.64) *** 0.252 (19.10) *** 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 





Table 2.4.  The relationships between CDS trading and the cost of capital based on high- and low-rated firms     
This table reports regression results of the cost of capital on CDS initiation and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. CDS 
activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and the costs of capital are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are computed but 
not reported. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We 
present estimates with industry- and firm-year fixed effects in columns (1) and (2), respectively. In Panel A, we report estimates 
using observations from high-rated firms that have a credit rate of above ‘BBB+’, while Panel B reports estimates using 
observations from low- and medium-rated firms, which have a credit rate of below ‘A-’. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A. The impact of CDS trading on high-rated firms 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 





















Controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes    Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  2,534 2,534 2,534 2,534 2,534 2,534 
Adjusted R2 0.553 0.71 0.394 0.761 0.475 0.608 
 
Panel B. The impact of CDS trading on low- and medium-rated firms 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 





















Controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes    Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  46,316 46,316 46,316 46,316 46,316 46,316 






Table 2.5. The relationships between CDS trading and the cost of capital based on high and low default 
probability     
This table reports regression results of the cost of capital on CDS initiation and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. CDS 
activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and the costs of capital are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are computed but 
not reported. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2 All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We 
present estimates with industry- and firm-year fixed effects in columns (1) and (2), respectively. In Panel A, we report estimates 
using observations from firms whose default probability lies below 33% quantile, while Panel B reports estimates using 
observations firms whose default probability lies above 66% quantile. A. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A. The impact of CDS trading on firms with low default probability 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 





















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes    Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.657 0.335 0.684 0.269 0.618 
 
Panel B. The impact of CDS trading on firms with high default probability 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 





















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes    Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  13,995 13,995 13,995 13,995 13,995 13,995 





Table 2.6. Probit regression results on the probability of CDS trading initiation 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of the probit model specified by equation (2) which is used to predict the inception of 
CDS trading. The sample includes all firm-year observations for non-CDs companies and firm-year observations until the CDS 
trading initiation for CDS companies (i.e., we eliminate all observations in the post-CDS period). The sample period is from 2001-
2017. The dependent variable, CDSINIT, equals one in and after CDS trading initiation for CDS firms, and zero otherwise. All 
control variables are lagged one year. The definitions of control variables are listed in Appendix 2.2. All control variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm 
level, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable = Prob (CDSINIT=1) 
Variables Coefficients  
Constant  -10.932 (-2.20) ** 
Log (Assets) 0.328 (13.34) *** 
Growth   0.007 (1.49)  
Risk -0.429 (-2.41) ** 
Profitability  0.400 (1.65) * 
PPE ratio 0.684 (2.75) *** 
CAPEX 0.199 (1.81) * 
Dividends  -0.005 (-0.10) 
IO concentration 0.559 (1.94) * 
Leverage 0.798 (5.49) *** 
Log (Age) 0.283 (7.86) *** 
Cash  0.481 (1.22) 
Turnover 0.051 (4.59) *** 
Liquidation  1.808 (4.32) *** 
R&D -0.069 (-1.08) 
WCAP 0.869 (3.08) *** 
Excess return 0.096 (1.76) ** 
S&P rated 1.119 (13.25) *** 
Stock liquidity 0.151 (11.26) *** 
Likelihood Ratio 2,464.932*** 
Industry- and year-fixed effects Yes 
Pseudo R2 44.67% 
Percent Concordant /C 96.4%  
C 0.964 









Table 2.7. Comparison of control-treated firms’ characteristics  
This table compares CDS and matched non-firms’ characteristics in the year prior to the CDS trading initiation. The 
control observations are selected based on the nearest likelihood of CDS trading initiation by year without multiple 
matching. The details of the definition of variables are listed in Appendix 2.2. All control variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%. The number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Mean of CDS firm Mean of non-CDS firm Difference 
WACC 8.304 8.319 -0.014 (-0.09) 
Cost of debt 4.184 4.303 -0.120 (-0.94) 
Cost of equity 10.006 10.056 -0.050 (-0.27) 
    
Log (Assets) 15.095 14.742 0.353 (3.77) *** 
Leverage  0.337 0.352 -0.015 (-1.08) 
Profitability 0.079 0.072 0.006 (0.85) 
CAPEX 0.118 0.165 -0.046 (-1.90) * 
Growth 2.973 2.918 0.054 (0.13) 
Log (Age) 2.954 2.722 0.231 (4.23) *** 
Riskiness 0.441 0.479 -0.037 (-2.51) ** 
Dividends 0.366 0.222 0.144 (3.96) *** 
IO concentration 0.057 0.066 -0.008 (-1.25) 
Liquidation 0.568 0.560 0.008 (-0.33) 
R&D 0.037 0.067 -0.029 (-1.01) 
S&P rated 0.917 0.906 0.005 (0.24) 
Stock liquidity 1.86 2.227 -0.422 (-2.64) *** 
Logit of Propensity of 
initiation 
-2.259 -2.395 0.135 (1.18) 












Table 2.8. The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using PSM samples 
This table presents regression results based on propensity score matching samples constructed as per the three criteria listed in 
section 4.1. The probit sample has 42,352 observations spanning from 2001 to 2017. Dependent variables are WACC, cost of debt, 
and cost of equity. We report industry- and firm-fixed effects in columns (1) and (2) for each dependent variable, respectively. All 
regressions include year-fixed effects to control time trends on the cost of capital. All control variables are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1% and lagged one year than the cost of capital. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) 
are clustered at the firm level, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Regression results using nearest-one matching sample without multiple matching 
 WACC                   Cost of debt Cost of equity 




















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes     
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.469 0.629 0.415 0.659 0.472 0.601 
#Observations  10,157 10,157 10,157 10,157 10,157 10,157 
#Firms  804 804 804 804 804 804 
Panel B. Regression results using nearest-one matching sample with exact FF48 industry classification 
 WACC                   Cost of debt Cost of equity 




















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.630 0.448 0.667 0.473 0.601 
#Observations  8,648 8,648 8,648 8,648 8,648 8,648 
#Firms 672 672 672 672 672 672 
Panel C. Regression results using nearest-one matching sample with FF17 industry classification 
 WACC                   Cost of debt Cost of equity 




















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes     
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.619 0.422 0.663 0.477 0.603 
#Observations  9,319 9,319 9,319 9,319 9,319 9,319 




Table 2.9. The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using CDS firms 
Panels A and B present regression results based on CDS (treatment) firms. Dependent variables are the cost of capital, cost of debt, and cost of equity. 
Independent variables are CDSINIT and CDSLAG, respectively. We introduce an interaction item between CDSINIT and High_liquidation in Panel B 
to capture shareholders’ strategic incentives. High_liquidation is an indicator variable that has a value of one if the liquidation cost is above the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. All controls are included but not reported. We report industry-fixed effect in columns (1) and (3) and firm-fixed effect in 
columns (2) and (4) for each independent variable, respectively. All regressions include year-fixed effects to control time trends on the cost of capital. 
All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% and are lagged one year compared to the dependent variables. The heteroskedasticity 
consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the 
significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Cost of capital and CDS trading 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 


































Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.509 0.666 0.510 0.667 0.494 0.682 0.495 0.683 0.569 0.675 0.575 0.680 
#Observations  8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 8,597 
#Firms  677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 
Panel B. Cost of capital and CDS trading with controlling strategic incentive 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 
CDSINIT -0.036 (0.28) 0.051 (0.60) 0.058 (0.45) 
CDSINIT*High_liquidation -0.292 (-2.84) *** -0.175 (-2.00) ** -0.124 (-1.24) 
High_liquidation -0.137 (-0.97) 0.086 (0.83) -0.007 (-0.05) 
Controls  Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.497 0.567 
#Observations 8,597 8,597 8,597 





Table 2.10. The impact of CDS trading on cost of capital using trading liquidity 
This table presents regression results using CDS trading activity. Dependent variables are the cost of capital, cost of debt, and cost of equity. 
Independent variables are CDS daily trading notional volume and the total number of clearing dealer in a fiscal year, respectively. The notional 
volume is zero for firms whose CDSs are not covered by DTCC. We scale the notional volume on the log to reduce skewness of distribution. All 
controls are included but ignored for brevity. We report industry-fixed effect in columns (1) and (3) and firm-fixed effect in columns (2) and (4) for 
each independent variable, respectively. All regressions include year-fixed effects to control time trends on the cost of capital. All control variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% and lagged one year than the cost of capital. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) 
are clustered at the firm level, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 














































Controls              
Industry-fixed 
effects  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-fixed 
effects 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.510 0.277 0.681 0.220 0.729 0.201 0.730 0.290 0.651 0.296 0.656 
#Observations  26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 26,580 






Table 2.11. The distribution of coefficient estimates of CDSINIT with randomized CDS-trade-initiation 
events (1,000 replications) 
This table reports the distribution of estimated coefficients of CDSINIT from 1,000 samples constructed by randomizing 
CDS-trade-initiation dates among 677 CDS firms. The dependent variable is cost of debt. The estimates are from pseudo 
samples in which the CDS trading initiation dates are randomly assigned but based on the real CDS trading dates. All 
control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 
152) clustered at the firm level are used to compute var-covariances, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Coefficient  P values 
   
Mean  -0.172 (-3.43) *** 0.001 
Median  -0.171 (-2.64) ** 
 
0.008 
1st percentile 0.060 (-0.85) 
 
0.394 
5th percentile -0.087 (-1.46) 
 
0.144 
10th percentile -0.108 (-1.66) * 
 
0.096 
90th percentile -0.234 (-3.62) *** 
 
0.001 
95th percentile -0.255 (-3.78) *** 
 
0.001 







Table 2.12. The cost of capital and CDS trading initiation based on the first difference sample 
Panel A reports estimates of regressions on the first differences of dependent variables on CDS initiation, while 
Panel B reports regressions of CDS trading initiation on changes of each dependent variable. Variable definitions 
are listed in Appendix 2.2. The first difference data are from 2002 to 2018, while controls and CDS variables 
span from 2001 to 2017. We control industry-year and firm-year fixed effects in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level 
for column (1), and the number in parentheses are t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A. The effects of CDS trading on changes of the cost of capital 
 ∆WACC ∆Cost of debt ∆Cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 





 (-2.86)  
-0.102*** 





Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
 Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 
#Firms  5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.176 0.186 0.238 0.119 0.185 
 
Panel B. The effects of changes of the cost of capital on the inception of CDS trading initiation 
 CDSINIT 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 




    
∆Cost of debt   -0.001 
 (-1.49) 
-0.001 
 (-1.46)  
  




Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 
#Firms  5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 





Table 2.13. Stock analysts and CDS trading  
This table reports estimates of regressions of the number of analysts recommending buying stocks on CDS 
availability variables. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2. The analyst data ranges from 2002 to 2018, 
while controls and CDS variables span from 2001 to 2017. We control industry-year and firm-year fixed effects 
in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are 
clustered at the firm level for column (1), and the number in parentheses are t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Analysts  
 (1) (2) 
CSDFIRM 2.942 (8.17) ***  
CDSINIT 1.094 (4.29) *** 1.075 (4.09) *** 
Controls    
Log(assets) 2.083 (28.27) *** 2.208 (25.10) *** 
Leverage -0.824 (-4.03) *** -0.622 (-2.79) *** 
Profitability 0.075 (0.66)  0.058 (0.48)  
CAPEX 0.230 (1.98) ** 0.138 (1.13) 
Growth 0.049 (10.19) *** 0.043 (9.12) *** 
Log (Age) -0.982 (-9.65) *** -1.176 (-5.64) *** 
Riskiness -0.764 (-4.74) *** -0.569 (-3.19) *** 
Dividends 0.616 (5.10) *** 0.767 (6.22) *** 
IO concentration -0.916 (-5.75) *** -0.865 (-5.15) *** 
Liquidation -1.743 (-6.18) *** -1.684 (-5.42) *** 
R&D -0.016 (-0.98) -0.015 (-0.89) 
S&P rated 0.224 (1.74) * 0.316 (2.32) ** 
Stock liquidity 0.324 (15.65) *** 0.262 (12.21) *** 
Industry-fixed effects Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
#Observations  41,844 41,844 
#Firms  4,866 4,866 





Table 2.14.  The relationships between CDS trading and weight of capital     
This table reports regression results of the weight of debt and equity on the CDS initiation and a set of firm-level 
explanatory variables (excluding leverage ratio). CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, 
and weight of debt and equity in percentage are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are ignored for brevity. Variable 
definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We 
present regression results with firm-year fixed effects in column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 report estimates from 
quantile regressions with quantile of 0.15, 0.50, and 0.85, respectively.  We control the industry-year fixed effect 
for quantile regressions. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the 
firm level for column (1), and the number in parentheses are t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 Weight of debt Weight of equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 

































































































































































































































 Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
Yes    Yes     
Year-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
#Observations  48,850 48,385 48,385 48,385 48,850 48,360 48,360 48,360 







Table 2.15.  The relationships between CDS trading and security issuance     
This table reports regression results of debt and equity issuance on the CDS trading activity and a set of firm-
level explanatory variables. CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and net debt and equity 
issuance are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are estimated but not reported. Variable definitions are listed in 
Appendix 2.2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity 
consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the number in parentheses is t 
statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 Net debt issuance  Net equity issuance 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
CDSFIRM 0.012 (2.48) **  0.041 (9.00) ***  
CDSINIT -0.013 (-2.69) *** -0.010 (-1.70) * -0.005 (-1.65) * -0.001 (-0.42) 
Controls      
Log(assets) -0.004 (-3.58) *** -0.029 (-4.87) *** -0.029 (-16.81) *** -0.047 (-14.60) *** 
Profitability -0.068 (-5.05) *** -0.048 (-3.57) *** -0.136 (-11.17) *** -0.111 (-8.72) *** 
CAPEX 0.013 (2.18) ** 0.004 (0.50) 0.002 (0.27) 0.005 (0.61) 
Growth 0.000 (1.06) -0.000 (-0.30) 0.000 (0.28) 0.000 (0.31) 
Log (Age) -0.006 (-2.84) *** -0.006 (-0.75) * -0.021 (-9.43) *** -0.012 (-2.38) ** 
Riskiness 0.002 (0.85) 0.002 (0.19) 0.005 (0.56) 0.011 (1.41) 
Dividends 0.010 (5.13) *** 0.015 (4.89) *** 0.009 (5.74) *** 0.009 (5.26) *** 
IO concentration -0.032 (-4.08) *** -0.028 (-2.80) *** -0.009 (-1.25) -0.004 (-0.56) 
Liquidation 0.065 (3.11) *** 0.149 (3.23) *** 0.076 (7.00) *** 0.131 (9.30) *** 
R&D 0.000 (0.12) 0.001 (0.12)  0.011 (5.15) *** 0.008 (3.29) *** 
S&P rated 0.017 (5.08) *** 0.026 (4.84) *** 0.014 (6.16) *** 0.011 (4.52) *** 
Stock liquidity 0.001 (0.85) 0.004 (1.18)  0.001 (1.77) * 0.002 (1.92) * 
Industry-fixed effects Yes   Yes   
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
#Observations  22,683 22,683 43,520 43,520 
#Firms  3,918 3,918 5,303 5,303 










Table 2.16. CDS trading and debt placement     
This table reports regression results of debt compositions on CDS initiation and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. 
The dependent variables span from 2001 to 2017. Constants are estimated but not reported, and all controls lag one year 
than dependent variables. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the 
number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 Public debt Bond Commercial Lease  


























Controls          
Log(assets) 0.030 



















































































































































































































Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Firm-fixed 
effects 
 Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
#Observations  41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 
#Firms  5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 






Table 2.16. Continued 
 Bank debt Bank loan Revolving credit Other 


























Controls          




















































































































































































































Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   
Firm-fixed 
effects 
 Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
#Observations  41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 
#Firms  5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 








Table 2.17.  Cost of capital and debt compositions     
This table reports regression results of costs of capital on debt compositions and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. 
The dependent variables span from 2001 to 2017, while independent variables lag one year than dependent ones. Variable 
definitions are listed in Appendix 2.2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The 
heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the number in parentheses 
is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 












Adjusted R2 0.294 0.618 0.386 0.649 0.301 0.591 












Adjusted R2 0.293 0.619 0.385 0.694 0.301 0.591 












Adjusted R2 0.294 0.619 0.386 0.646 0.303 0.591 












Adjusted R2 0.295 0.619 0.382 0.694 0.301 0.591 












Adjusted R2 0.294 0.617 0.383 0.694 0.300 0.591 

























Adjusted R2 0.293 0.618 0.383 0.694 0.301 0.591 












Adjusted R2 0.294 0.619 0.383 0.694 0.300 0.590 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 41,077 








Online Table A1. The effects of the termination of CDS trading on WACC 
This table reports regression results of the WACC on CDSINIT, CDSREVERSAL, and a set of firm-level explanatory 
variables. CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and the costs of capital are from 2002 to 2018. 
Constants are computed but not reported. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2. All accounting variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We present estimates with industry- and firm-year fixed effects in columns (1) and 
(2), respectively. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and the 
number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
CDS Reversal  
 (1) (2) 
CSDFIRM -0.063 (-0.71)   
CDSINIT -0.460 (-5.14) *** -0.239 (-2.73) *** 
CDSREVERSAL 0.276 (2.57) *** 0.049 (1.10) 
Controls    
Log(assets) 0.226 (11.66) *** 0.326 8.25) *** 
Leverage -3.546 (-29.21) *** -2.219 (-17.56) *** 
Profitability -0.635 (-7.58) *** -0.264 (-3.16) *** 
CAPEX -0.129 (-1.75) * 0.017 (0.22) 
Growth 0.026 (7.98) *** 0.010 (3.67) *** 
Log (Age) -0.011 (-0.31) 0.023 (0.25) *** 
Riskiness 0.979 (9.36) *** 1.512 (11.93) *** 
Dividends -0.260 (5.68) *** 0.108 (2.38) ** 
IO concentration -1.701 (-13.83) *** -0.543 (-4.07) *** 
Liquidation -1.230 (-9.19) *** -0.996 (-5.76) *** 
R&D 0.055 (4.71) *** 0.009 (0.63) 
S&P rated -0.121 (-1.95) * -0.203(-3.27) ** 
Stock liquidity 0.250 (19.41) *** 0.131 (10.75) *** 
Industry-fixed effects Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
#Observations  48,850 48,850 
#Firms  5,575 5,575 









Online Table A2. The sensitivity tests of Bloomberg WACCs 
This table reports regression results of EWACC on CDS trading and a set of firm-level explanatory variables. 
CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and EWACCs are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are 
estimated but not reported. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2. All accounting variables are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at 
the firm level for column (1), and the number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 EWACC  
 16-quarter rolling windows 20-quarter rolling windows 






















































Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
#Observations  37,134 39,708 










Online Table A3. The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using PSM samples 
This table presents regression results based on propensity score matching samples constructed as per the three criteria listed 
in section 4.3. The probit sample includes all firms without limiting debt and minimum assets and has 46, 045 observations 
from 2001 to 2017. Dependent variables are WACC, cost of debt, and cost of equity. We report industry- and firm-fixed 
effects in columns (1) and (2) for each dependent variable, respectively. All regressions include year-fixed effects to control 
time trends on the cost of capital. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity 
consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Regression results using nearest-one matching sample without multiple matching 
 WACC                   Cost of debt Cost of equity 




















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.625 0.405 0.660 0.462 0.598 
#Observations  10,315 10,315 10,315 10,315 10,315 10,315 
#Firms 809 809 809 809 809 809 
 
Panel B. Regression results using nearest-one matching sample with exact FF48 industry classification 
 WACC                   Cost of debt Cost of equity 




















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.636 0.498 0.672 0.463 0.606 
#Observations  10,483 10,483 10,483 10,483 10,483 10,483 
#Firms 797 797 797 797 797 797 
 
Panel C. Regression results using nearest-one matching sample with FF17 industry classification 
 WACC                   Cost of debt Cost of equity 




















Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes     
Firm-fixed effects  Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.628 0.432 0.676 0.482 0.600 
#Observations  9,398 9,398 9,398 9,398 9,398 9,398 





Online Table A4. The impact of CDS trading on the cost of capital using CDS firms 
This table presents regression results based on CDS (treatment) firms only. Dependent variables are the cost of 
capital, cost of debt, and cost of equity. Independent variable is CDSINIT. We introduce interaction items 
between CDSINIT and high IO concentration in Panel A, and CDSINIT and high leverage in Panel B to capture 
the effects of high shareholder bargaining power, respectively. All controls are included but ignored for brevity. 
All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% and lagged one year than the cost of capital. The 
heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and t statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A. The cost of capital and CDS trading controlling institutional ownership concentration 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 
CDSINIT -0.234 (-1.72) * 0.035 (0.41) -0.020 (0.16) 
CDSINIT*High IO 
concentration 
-0.186 (-1.55) -0.217 (-2.43) ** 0.003 (0.04) 
High IO concentration -0.280 (-1.78) * 0.209 (2.00) ** -0.092 (-0.61) 
Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.493 0.569 
#Observations 8,419 8,419 8,419 
#Firms  677 677 677 
 
Panel B. The cost of capital and CDS trading controlling leverage 
 WACC Cost of debt Cost of equity 
CDSINIT -0.307 (-2.67) *** 0.078 (0.93) -0.098 (0.81) 
CDSINIT*High leverage -0.767 (-6.30) *** -0.180 (-1.99) ** -0.276 (-1.86) * 
High leverage -0.792 (-5.20) *** 0.300 (2.83) *** -0.051 (-0.51) 
Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.493 0.570 
#Observations 8,419 8,419 8,419 





Online Table A5. The cost of debt and CDS trading based on the first difference 
This table reports estimates from regressions of the first differences in costs of capital on CDS availability 
variables. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2. The first difference data are from 2002 to 2018, while 
controls and CDS variables span from 2001 to 2017. We control industry-year and firm-year fixed effects in 
columns (1) and (2), respectively. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are 
clustered at the firm level for column (1), and the number in parentheses are t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A. The effects of CDS initiation on the changes of the cost of capital 
 ∆WACC ∆Cost of debt ∆Cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 





 (-2.86)  
-0.102*** 





Controls        
∆Log(assets) -0.147***  
(-2.70)  
-0.311*** 






 (5.43)  
0.150** 
 (2.52)  
∆Leverage -2.725*** 


















 (-7.13)  
-0.155** 




























































 (-3.01)  
-0.170*** 
 (-2.94)  
∆IO concentration -1.058*** 
 (-7.00)  
-1.007*** 






 (-5.73)  
-0.886*** 
 (-5.14)  
∆Liquidation -0.543*** 
 (-2.91)  
-0.519*** 








 (-3.35)  





















 (6.59)  
0.015  
(0.33) 
∆Stock liquidity 0.000 











Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 
#Firms  5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 






Panel B. The effects of the changes of the cost of capital on CDS initiation 
 CDSINIT 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 




    
∆Cost of debt   -0.001 
 (-1.49) 
-0.001 
 (-1.46)  
  




Controls        
∆Log(assets) -0.033  
(-4.47) *** 
-0.023 
 (-5.86) *** 
-0.022 
 (-5.68) *** 
-0.023 
 (-5.79) *** 
-0.022 




















 (3.51) *** 
0.009 
 (3.14) *** 
0.011 
 (3.62) *** 
0.010 
 (3.26) *** 
























∆Log (Age) -0.134  
(-4.36) *** 
0.059 
 (1.41)  
-0.134 






 (1.41)  
∆Riskiness -0.011 




















 (0.83)  
-0.002 
 (-0.48) 
∆IO concentration -0.000 
 (-0.05)  
-0.005 






 (-0.03)  
-0.005 
 (-1.01)  
∆Liquidation -0.001 
 (-0.07)  
0.003 








 (0.38)  





















 (8.01) *** 
-0.004  
(-0.70) 
∆Stock liquidity -0.000 








 (-2.32) ** 
0.000 
 (0.22) 
Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#Observations  47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 
#Firms  5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 







Online Table A6. Probit regression with the cost of capital as inputs  
This table presents estimates of the probit model specified by equation (2). The sample includes all firm-year observations 
for non-CDs companies and firm-year observations until the CDS trading initiation for CDS companies (i.e., eliminate all 
observations in the post-CDS period). The sample period is from 2001-2017. The dependent variable, CDSINIT, equals one 
in and after CDS trading initiation for CDS firms, and zero otherwise. We enlarge the control variables with each measure 
of the costs of capital to detect the anticipating ability of changes in the cost of capital. All control variables are lagged one 
year. For brevity, we ignore coefficients on control variables. The definitions of control variables are listed in Appendix 2. 
All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p. 152) are clustered at the firm level, and t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of 
estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Dependent Variable = Prob (CDSINIT=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
∆WACC -0.005 (-0.36)   
∆Cost of debt  0.023 (1.27)  
∆Cost of equity   0.002 (0.10) 
Control variables Yes  Yes Yes 
Likelihood Ratio 2,148.264*** 2149.711*** 2143.841*** 
Industry- and year-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 42.84% 42.87% 42.82% 
Percent Concordant /C 95.5%  95.5% 95.5% 
C 0.955 0.955  





Online Table A7.  The relationships between CDS trading and market and book leverage ratios     
This table reports regression results of market and book leverage ratios on the CDS trading activity and a set of 
firm-level explanatory variables. CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and leverage ratios 
are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are estimated but not reported. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix 2. 
All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level for column (1), and the number in parentheses are t 
statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 Book leverage Market leverage 






















































Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
#Observations  48,572 42,772 





Online Table A8. CDS trading and debt heterogeneity as per high and low default probability subsamples    
This table reports regression results of debt compositions on CDS initiation and a set of firm-level explanatory variables for high and low default risk samples. The 
dependent variables span from 2002 to 2018, while CDS initiation and controls are from 2001 to 2017. Constants are estimated but not reported. Variable definitions 
are listed in Appendix 2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are 
clustered at the firm level, and the number in parentheses is t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A. The relationship between CDS trading and debt heterogeneity: low default risk sample 
 Public debt Bond Commercial Bank debt Bank loan Revolving credit 








































Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
#Observations  13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 13,384 
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.646 0.257 0.737 0.227 0.637 0.267 0.755 0.125 0.695 0.183 0.692 
 
Panel B. The relationship between CDS trading and debt heterogeneity: high default risk sample 
 Public debt Bond Commercial Bank debt Bank loan Revolving credit 






































Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes      
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes      
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes      
#Observations  7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 7,906 





Online Table A9.  The relationships between CDS trading and bank loans     
This table reports quantile regression results of bank loan ratios on the CDS trading activity and a set of 
firm-level explanatory variables. Columns (1) and (2) are quantile regression over 0.5 and 0.85 
percentiles, respectively. CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and bank loan ratios 
are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are estimated but not reported. Variable definitions are listed in 
Appendix 2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity 
consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) are clustered at the firm level for column (1), and the number 
in parentheses are t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.   
 Bank Loan   
 (1) (2) 
CDSFIRM -0.014 (-4.31) *** -0.171 -9.62) *** 
CDSINIT -0.024 (-7.42) *** -0.057 (-4.01) *** 
Controls    
Log(assets) 0.005 (5.34) *** -0.026 (-11.27) *** 
Profitability 0.030 (6.28) *** 0.100 (5.93) *** 
CAPEX -0.022 (-5.38) *** -0.046 (-5.00) *** 
Growth -0.001 (-3.19) *** 0.000 (0.27) 
Log (Age) -0.031 (-20.30) *** -0.097 (-20.10) *** 
Riskiness 0.024 (4.39) *** -0.007 (0.68) 
Dividends -0.013 (-7.53) *** -0.031 (-6.10) *** 
IO concentration 0.091 (6.79) *** -0.001 (-0.05) 
Liquidation 0.097 (10.78) *** 0.066 (2.75) *** 
R&D 0.004 (2.54) ** 0.010 (7.02) *** 
S&P rated 0.029 (0.92) -0.093 (-8.33) 
Stock liquidity -0.003 (-15.51) *** -0.014 (-5.94) *** 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  












Online Table A10. The relationships between CDS trading and weight of capital controlling 
leverage    
This table reports regression results of the weight of debt and equity on the CDS trading activity and a set 
of firm-level explanatory variables. CDS activity and firm-level controls are from 2001 to 2017, and 
weights of capital in percentage are from 2002 to 2018. Constants are ignored for brevity. Variable 
definitions are listed in Appendix 2. All accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We 
present regression results with firm-year fixed effects in column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 report estimates 
from quantile regressions with quantile of 0.15, 0.50, and 0.85, respectively. We control the industry-year 
fixed effects for quantile regressions. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) 
are clustered at the firm level for column (1), and the number in parentheses are t statistics. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 Weight of debt Weight of equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 















































































































































































































































 Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects Yes    Yes     
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
#Observations  38,645 38,645 38,645 38,645 38,627 38,627 38,627 38,627 





Table 3.1. Summary statistics 
The definitions of variables are listed in Appendix 1. All control variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. ***, **, and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Summary statistics: Environmental and social scores 
 
                                                       CDS firms                 non-CDS firms   
Items Mean   Standard 
deviation  




Environmental  62.489 31.215 41.471 29.039 21.018*** 
Emission reduction 62.423 31.493 41.668 29.247 20.755*** 
Product innovation 57.556 31.878 41.166 28.180 16.389*** 
Resource reduction 61.821 30.818 42.562 29.992 19.259*** 
Social 61.790 30.023 42.343 28.466 19.447*** 
Employment quality 57.727 29.968 43.629 29.817 14.098*** 
Health and safety 57.137 31.193 45.205 28.715 11.932*** 
Training and development 56.827 31.029 43.074 30.528 13.757*** 
Human rights 56.980 31.898 41.596 28.248 15.385*** 
Community 61.387 29.173 42.973 29.849 18.414*** 
Product responsibility 57.219 29.585 45.345 29.906 11.874*** 
Diversity 60.377 30.500 43.443 28.864 16.933*** 
Observations  6,687 6,687 17,214 17,214  
 
Panel B. Summary statistics: Firm-level characteristics 
                                                     CDS firms                  non-CDS firms 
Items Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Mean  Standard 
deviation   
Mean 
difference  
Log (assets) 16.177 1.100 14.407 1.312 1.770*** 
Leverage  0.276 0.159 0.207 0.179 0.069*** 
Profitability 0.079 0.090 0.072 0.131 0.006*** 
Tangibility  0.324 0.235 0.312 0.251 0.013*** 
CAPEX 0.101 0.199 0.199 0.573 -0.098*** 
Institutional ownership 0.146 0.169 0.244 0.209 -0.098*** 
MTBV 2.808 3.476 3.001 3.613 -0.193*** 
Age  28.669 19.708 17.885 11.204 10.784*** 
Governance  61.920 31.178 54.106 29.179 7.818*** 
Risk  0.335 0.163 0.391 0.184 -0.055*** 
R&D 0.031 0.057 0.038 0.102 -0.007*** 
Cash holdings 0.121 0.116 0.173 0.170 -0.052*** 
Turnover  0.878 0.553 0.917 0.669 -0.019*** 






Panel C. Summary statistics: Environmental and social scores by countries and regions 




United States 39.831 42.591 1,620 9,108 
Canada 38.584 40.543 279 1,933 
United Kingdom 59.145 64.434 332 3,116 
France 65.525 66.341 72 708 
Germany 77.977 78.666 79 934 
Switzerland 63.334 63.139 52 619 
Japan 56.189 41.875 231 2,673 
Australia 36.076 40.765 399 2,482 
South Korea 60.160 52.879 94 600 
Hong Kong 38.123 38.585 130 1,039 
Taiwan 52.571 44.362 95 689 
Total     3,383 23,901 
 
Panel D. Distribution of CDS firms by one-digit SIC industry 
SIC Industry Number of CDS 
firms 
Number of CDS 
observations 
Percentage of all CDS 
firms 
Agriculture, Forest and fishing 
(0) 
1 14 0.19% 
Construction and mining (1) 47 608 8.72% 
Manufacturing (2,3) 279 3,463 51.76% 
Transportation (4) 100 1,207 18.55% 
Wholesale and retail (5) 40 533 7.42% 
Services (7,8) 72 862 13.36% 
Total 539 6,687 100% 
 
Panel E. Distribution of CDS firms by inception year 
Year  Number of new CDS firms Percentage of all CDS firms 
2001 86 15.96% 
2002 82 15.21% 
2003 52  9.65% 
2004 62 11.50% 
2005 34 6.31% 
2006 47 8.72% 
2007 33 6.12% 
2008 23 4.27% 
2009 8 1.48% 
2010 16 2.97% 
2011 21 3.90% 
2012 23 4.27% 
2013 12 2.23% 
2014 11 2.04% 
2015 21 3.90% 
2016 8 1.48% 





Panel F. Pearson correlation between selected variables 
variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
CDSFIRM (1) 1.000               
CDSINIT (2) 0.896*** 1.000              
MTBV (3) -0.019*** -0.016*** 1.000             
Log (assets) (4) 0.532*** 0.497*** -0.113*** 1.000            
Profitable (5) 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.198*** 0.073*** 1.000           
Tangibility (6) 0.018*** 0.014** -0.151*** 0.075*** -0.127*** 1.000          
CAPEX (7) -0.087*** -0.084*** -0.035*** -0.191*** -0.264*** 0.347*** 1.000         
Institutional 
Ownership (8) 
-0.220*** -0.218*** 0.028*** -0.098*** -0.000 -0.039*** 0.001 1.000        
Leverage (9) 0.178*** 0.170*** -0.012* 0.248*** -0.130*** 0.231*** -0.007 -0.022*** 1.000       
Log (Age) (10) 0.279*** 0.304*** -0.071*** 0.289*** 0.075*** 0.031*** -0.122*** -0.214*** 0.016** 1.000      
Governance 
(11) 
0.069*** 0.067*** 0.096** 0.042*** -0.011 0.048*** 0.058*** -0.151*** 0.093*** 0.049*** 1.000     
Risk (12) -0.132*** -0.142*** -0.064*** -0.317*** -0.337*** 0.074*** 0.252*** 0.096*** -0.044*** -0.247*** 0.007 1.000    
Turnover (13) -0.027*** -0.016*** 0.115*** -0.086*** 0.261*** -0.247*** -0.304*** -0.005 -0.167*** 0.054*** -0.006 -0.111*** 1.000   
Cash holdings 
(14) 
-0.142*** -0.133*** 0.172*** -0.277*** -0.007*** -0.355*** 0.040*** 0.115*** -0.347*** -0.163*** -0.129*** 0.217*** -0.056*** 1.000  








Table 3.2. The effects of CDS trading on environmental and social performance 
This table reports the results from regressing environmental and social (E&S) scores on CDS trading and firm-level controls over the period 2002 to 2017. The dependent variables 
include the following: ENVSCORE is the overall environmental score and reflects the equally weighted average of ENER, ENRR, and ENPI scores, where ENER is the emission 
reduction score, ENRR is the resource reduction score, and ENPI is the production innovation score; SOCCORE is the overall social score, computed as the equally weighted 
average of the SOEQ, SOTD, SOCO, SODO, SOHS, SOHR, and SOPR scores. SOEQ is the employment quality score; SOTD is the training and development score; SOCO is the 
community score; SODO is the diversity and opportunity score; SOHS is the health and safety score; SOHR is the human rights score; and SOPR is the product responsibility score. 
In each pair of dependent variables, the first column uses all controls except Governance, while the second column uses all controls. CDSINIT has a value of one for CDS firms in 
and after the CDS initiation year, and zero before that. Governance is the pillar score of a firm’s overall governance quality extracted from Thomas Reuters’s ASSET4 database. 
All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variable definitions are found in Appendix 1. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. All regressions use a firm-year fixed effects model. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
       ENVSCORE        ENER        ENRR ENPI SOCSCORE SOEQ 







































































































































































































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.834 0.842 0.823 0.831 0.793 0.802 0.766 0.779 0.830 0.840 0.703 0.706 




Table 3.2. Continued 
       SOTD       SOCO        SOHS SOHR SODO SOPR 







































































































































































































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.765 0.771 0.728 0.736 0.771 0.780 0.702 0.706 0.781 0.789 0.757 0.760 





Table 3.3. Emission reductions and SG&A expenses 
Panel A reports the regression results of the log of SG&A expenses on the emission reduction (ENER) score. Definitions for 
control variables can be found in Appendix 1. We present summary statistics of SG&A expenses for CDS and non-CDS 
firms in Panel B. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of 
estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. SG&A expenses are expressed in thousand in panel B. 
 
Panel A Regression of the log of SG&A expenses on the emission reduction (ENER) score 
Variables  Log of SG&A expenses 
ENER 0.0039 (0.0005) *** 
Log (Assets) 0.8103 (0.0162) *** 
MTBV 0.0199 (0.0031) *** 
Cash holdings 0.3378 (0.0996) *** 
Leverage -0.6473 (0.0984) *** 
Dividends  1.9631(0.5227) *** 
Profitability  -0.1103 (0.1031)  
Intercept 1.040 (0.2485) *** 
Year dummies Yes  
Industry dummies (FF48) Yes 
Country dummies Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.806 
Number of observations 16,978 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics of SG&A expenses 
 All firms CDS firms Non-CDS firms 
 Mean  Median  SD Mean  Median  SD Mean  Median  SD 
SG&A 1,291,750 419,851 2,826,640 2,919,068 1,325,382 4,292,613 633,354 260,247 1,504,417 






Table 3.4. Probit regression results on probability of CDS trading initiation 
This table presents the coefficients of the probit model specified by equation (3), which is used to predict the inception of 
CDS trading. The sample includes all non-CDS firm-year observations and CDS firm-year observations until the CDS 
trading beginning during the period 2002-2017. The dependent variable, CDSINIT, equals one in and after CDS trading 
initiation for CDS firms, and zero otherwise. All control variables are lagged one year. The definitions of control variables 
are listed in Appendix 1. Governance is the pillar score of a firm’s overall governance quality extracted from ASSET4 
dataset. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of 
estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable = Prob (CDSINIT=1) 
Variables Coefficients  
Intercept -8.418 (23.698) 
Log (Assets) 0.342 (0.026)*** 
Governance  0.084 (0.044)* 
Risk -0.199 (0.214) 
Profitability  0.482 (0.632) 
Tangibility -0.017 (0.172) 
CAPEX 0.110 (0.098) 
MTBV -0.003 (0.007) 
Institutional Ownership -0.461 (0.143) *** 
Leverage 1.014 (0.166)*** 
Log (Age) 0.025 (0.038) 
Cash holdings 0.057 (0.285) 
Turnover 0.107 (0.052)** 
R&D 0.426 (0.492) 
ROA -0.121 (0.471) 
WCAP -0.388 (0.230)* 
Likelihood Ratio 1,526.465*** 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes 
Pseudo R2 35.57% 
Percent Concordant /C 92.2%  
C 0.922 






Table 3.5. Comparison of control-treated firms’ characteristics prior to the inception of CDS trading 
Panel A Comparison of control-treated firms’ E&S performances 
This table compares CDS and matched non-CDS firms’ characteristics in the year prior to the CDS trading initiation. A 
matched non-CDS firm is selected from the same FF 48 industry of the CDS firm and has the closest propensity score of 
CDS initiation. The definitions of variables can be read in the legend of Table 2, and further details are listed in Appendix 1. 
***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables  Mean of CDS firm Mean of non-CDS firm Difference P-value 
ENVSCORE 49.544 48.152 1.392 0.583 
ENER 50.963 48.570 2.393 0.346 
ENRR 48.257 47.327 0.929 0.708 
ENPI 46.445 47.760 -1.314 0.580 
SOCSCORE 47.840 46.581 1.259 0.611 
SOEQ 47.424 45.318 2.106 0.391 
SOTD 45.174 46.669 -1.495 0.535 
SOCO 46.899 47.673 0.773 0.748 
SODO 49.329 46.307 3.022 0.218 
SOHS 47.115 47.227 0.112 0.962 
SOHR 47.174 44.497 2.676 0.212 
SOPR 48.112 48.401 0.289 0.903 
Observations 307 307   
 
Panel B. Comparison of control-treated firms’ characteristics 
This table reports the comparisons between samples of CDS and matched non-CDS firms. A matched non-CDS firm is 
selected from the same FF 48 industry of the CDS firm and has the closest propensity score of CDS initiation. The 
definitions of control variables are listed in Appendix 1. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. ***, 
**, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables  Mean of CDS firm Mean of non-CDS firm Difference P-value 
Log (Assets) 15.615 15.551 0.064 0.424 
Leverage  0.273 0.266 0.007 0.634 
Governance 51.305 53.707 -2.403 0.337 
Tangibility  0.353 0.341 0.012 0.545 
CAPEX 0.062 0.051 0.011*** 0.005 
Institutional ownership 0.179 0.169 0.011 0.506 
Risk  0.373 0.372 0.001 0.932 
Profitability  0.078 0.079 -0.001 0.943 
MTBV  2.679 2.791 -0.112 0.714 
Log (Age)  2.829 2.812 0.017 0.771 
Cash holdings  0.131 0.123 0.008 0.432 
Turnover  0.925 0.920 0.005 0.931 
R&D 0.021 0.022 -0.001 0.685 
Logit of Propensity Score -2.601 -2.687 0.087 0.385 





Table 3.6. The impact of CDS trading on E&S performance using PSM samples 
This table presents the regression results using the propensity score matching samples constructed as per the three criteria 
listed in section 4.1. Dependent variables include all ten categories and two pillar scores and are provided in the legend of 
Table 2. Panel A presents the coefficients of CDSINIT using one matched non-CDS firm with the same FF48 industry as the 
CDS firm. Panel B reports the coefficients of CDSINIT using one matched non-CDS firm with the same FF48 industry and 
country as the CDS firm. Panel C reports the coefficients of CDSINIT using two matched non-CDS firms with the same 
FF48 industry as the CDS firm. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. All control variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Regression results using the nearest one matching sample based on the same Fama-French 48 industry 















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.778 0.738 0.715 0.781 0.617 
Observations  5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 
 













Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.693 0.657 0.712 0.625 0.751 0.634 
Observations 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 
 
Panel B. Regression results using the nearest one matching sample based on the same country and Fama-French 48 industry 















Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.792 0.780 0.738 0.706 0.778 0.608 
Observations  4,359 4,359 4,359 4,359 4,359 4,359 
 













Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.694 0.662 0.708 0.633 0.735 0.658 






Panel C. Regression results using the nearest two matching sample based on the same Fama-French 48 industry 















Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.786 0.745 0.719 0.781 0.622 
Observations  7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 
 













Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.701 0.652 0.719 0.637 0.745 0.652 







Table 3.7. Average cumulative differentials of ENER surrounding CDS initiation with different event 
windows. 
Columns 2 and 3 are the average cumulative differences of ENER for CDS and non-CDS firms across event windows, 
respectively. Column 4 is the difference between the cumulative mean differentials of CDS and non-CDS firms in each 
event window. t=-1 indicates the year before the year of CDS initiation, and t=0 is the year of CDS trade initiation. P values 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
            Mean differential  
Event Windows CDS firms  Non-CDS firms difference 
[t=-1   t=0] 1.253 0.803 0.450 (0.767) 
[t=-1   t=1] 0.754 1.712 -0.958 (0.346) 
[t=-1   t=2] 1.341 2.407 -1.065 (0.183) 
[t=-1   t=3] 1.509 2.149 -0.639 (0.356) 
[t=0    t=1] 0.342 2.441 -2.098 (0.126) 
[t=0    t=2] 1.378 3.063 -1.685 (0.074) * 










Table 3.8. The effects of CDS trade initiation over the crisis period 
This table presents the coefficients of CDSINIT across E&S scores using the propensity score matching sample constructed 
as per criteria (1) of section 4.1. Dependent variables include ten categories and two pillar scores and are provided in the 
legend of Table 2. CRISIS is an indicator variable which equals one from August 31, 2008, to August 30, 2009, and zeroes 
otherwise. All control variables are included. For brevity, we only present the three interesting variables. All control 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 





































Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.794 0.780 0.742 0.719 0.784 0.624 
Observations  5,597 5,597 5,597 5,597 5,597 5,597 
 





































Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.703 0.659 0.629 0.625 0.756 0.637 








Table 3.9. The distribution of estimated coefficients of CDSINIT with randomized CDS trade initiation 
events (2,000 replications) 
This table reports the distribution of estimated coefficients of CDSINIT from 2,000 samples constructed by randomizing 
CDS-trade-initiation dates among 539 CDS firms. The dependent variable is emission reduction (ENER) score, and the 
independent variables include all controls and CDSINIT, a dummy variable indicating a pseudo CDS trading initiation year 
for CDS firms. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the firm level are reported. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Randomized Years of CDS Trading 
 Coefficient of CDSINIT Standard errors 
Mean  -0.0002 0.0251 
Median  -0.0003 0.0292 
1st percentile 0.0603 0.0282 
5th percentile 0.0409 0.0295 
10th percentile 0.0316 0.0271 
90th percentile -0.0318 0.0297 
95th percentile -0.0416 0.0319 
97.5th percentile -0.0507 0.0310 











Table 3.10. Regression results of various subsamples  
This table presents the coefficients of CDSINIT across subsamples. Column (1) reports results for the CDS sample. Column 
(2) shows results from the sample, excluding firm-year observations from South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Columns 
(3) and column (4) present the results for subsample spanning from 2002 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2017, respectively. 
Columns (5) and (6) report the results for non-US and US samples, respectively. Column (7) presents results when the CDS 
notional amount is used to substitute for CDSINIT. The notional amount of CDS trading is a daily average of trading 
volume over the fiscal year in the unit of 1 million. Column (8) reports the estimates using the log of the total number of 
clearing dealers in a fiscal year to substitute for CDSINIT. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
variables    ENER     














Notional       -0.001* 
(0.0006) 
 
Log (Dealer)         -0.021* 
(0.011) 
Controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.771 0.829 0.786 0.917 0.834 0.809 0.908 0.910 










Table 3.11. Regressions of SG&A expenses on various E&S scores and controls 
This table presents the results of regressing SG&A expenses on a multiple of E&S scores, including emission reduction 
(ENER), resource reduction (ENRR), product innovation (ENPI), employment quality (SOEQ), health and security (SOHS), 
training and development (SOTD), diversity and opportunity (SODO), community (SOCO), human rights (SOHR), and 
product responsibility (SOPR). The definition of each E&S variable are provided in the legend of Table 2 and further details 
can be referred in Appendix 1. To easily compare the magnitude of coefficients, we repeat the coefficients of ENER from 
Table 3 in this table. The sample is comprised of all CDS and non-CDS firms over the period 2002 to 2017, amounting to 
16,688 firm-year observations. All regressions include control variables used in Table 3 and use industry-, country-, and 
year-fixed effects. For brevity, we only present the coefficients of CDSINIT in percentages. All control variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the 
firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Log of SG&A  
Variables Coefficients  Adjusted R-squared 
(1) ENER 0.3988 (0.041) *** 0.806 
(2) ENRR 0.4549 (0.052) *** 0.807 
(3) ENPI 0.5551 (0.050) *** 0.809 
(4) SOEQ 0.2638 (0.043) *** 0.804 
(5) SOHR 0.3936 (0.051) *** 0.807 
(6) SOCO 0.4242 (0.057) *** 0.805 
(7) SOPR 0.3159 (0.061) *** 0.805 
(8) SOTD 0.4364 (0.051) *** 0.808 
(9) SOHS 0.2320 (0.055) *** 0.804 






Table 3.12. Regressions of market value-added on stakeholder management  
This table reports the results of regressing market value-added (MVA) on a multiple of stakeholder relationship 
management proxied by E&S scores, including emission reduction (ENER), resource reduction (ENRR), product innovation 
(ENPI), workforce (equally weighted average of SOEQ, SOHS, SOTD, and SODO), community (SOCO), human rights 
(SOHR), and product responsibility (SOPR). The sample is comprised of all CDS and non-CDS firms over the period 2002-
2017, amounting to 15,359 firm-year observations. All regressions include the following control variables: log (assets), 
profitability, risk, MTBV, leverage, cash holdings, capital intensity, R&D, and tangibility. The definitions of control 
variables are listed in Appendix 1 ,and E&S variables are provided in the legend of Table 2 and Appendix 1. For brevity, we 
only present the coefficients of each E&S score. All coefficients are reported in percentages. The dependent variable is 
market value-added, which is the firm’s market value minus total capital contributed by equity and debt holders. All 
regressions include industry-, country-, and year-fixed effects. All control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
1%. The heteroskedasticity consistent errors (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 152) clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Log of MVA  
Variables Coefficients and Standard errors Adjusted R-squared 
(1) ENER 0.0414 (0.0551) 0.624 
(2) ENRR 0.0924 (0.0520) * 0.625 
(3) ENPI 0. 1323 (0.0556) ** 0.652 
(4) WORKFORCE 0.1935 (0.0717) *** 0.624 
(5) SOHR 0.0963(0.0499) * 0.623 
(6) SOCO 0.0828 (0.0487) * 0.624 
(7) SOPR 0.0577 (0. 0502) 0.622 
 
 
 
